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 On the evening of April 6, 1994, a full moon shone on Kigali Hill 
across the valley from the American residence. My wife Sandra and I had 
just stepped in from the front porch when we heard a huge boom followed 
by a smaller explosion. Sandra, accustomed to small-arms fire and gre-
nade explosions after three months in country, exclaimed, “That was not a 
grenade!” 
 Within minutes, the president’s cabinet director Enoch Ruhigira 
called me from the airport. “They have shot down my president,” he said in 
a broken voice. 
 “Who is they?” I asked. 
 “The RPF of course!” was his instant and grieving response.
 We later learned that two air-to-ground missiles hit the Dassault 
Falcon jet bringing President Juvénal Habyarimana back home to Kigali 
from a regional summit in Dar es Salaam. Three months earlier, Habyari-
mana had been sworn in as interim president under terms of the Arusha 
Accords, signed August 4, 1993, between the then Government of Rwanda 
(GOR) and the insurgent Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).1 When the 
president perished with all aboard that plane, the two contending par-
ties returned to war instead of working out the arrangements of demo-
cratic governance and power sharing based on the Arusha principles. A 
Hutu extremist faction grabbed the reins of government and launched a 
genocide in which over eight hundred thousand victims were slaughtered 
within one hundred days.
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International Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda
 What was the context in which the downing of the presidential air-
craft engendered genocide? What was the role of the international com-
munity in structuring that context? This study looks at the international 
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda2 and asks what lessons might be 
learned from the nearly four-year international effort to halt the conflict 
between the Rwandan government and the Patriotic Front, and to restore 
peace and security to Rwanda’s people.
 From the outbreak of civil war in October 1990, regional states and inter-
national partners sought to broker a ceasefire. Once a durable ceasefire was 
secured in 1992, international Observers accompanied political negotiations in 
Arusha, while diplomatic missions pushed the peace process in Kigali.3 After 
the parties signed a peace agreement in August 1993, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council deployed a peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, to accompany 
the establishment of a transitional government with a peacekeeping force.
 The international community took the signing of the Arusha Accords 
as warrant of the negotiation’s success and guarantee of peace and prog-
ress for Rwanda.4 But attempts to implement the accords revealed political 
chasms that international mediation had not bridged. Only Habyarimana 
had been sworn in as transition president; the organization of other in-
stitutions established by the accords was still in dispute. When the presi-
dent’s plane went down, the peace process blew apart in the renewal of civil 
war and the launching of genocide.
 What seemed a model negotiation had fallen apart in endless politi-
cal point and counterpoint. Within eight months of the peace agreement, 
the international community, including the largest part of the UNAMIR 
mission, was fleeing Rwanda, leaving in tatters a carefully knit humanitar-
ian intervention. What went wrong? What lessons for other humanitarian 
endeavors might we learn from this well-intentioned but tragic effort?
Participant-Observer
 As a diplomat of the United States government, I was a participant in 
those tragic events. My own encounter with Rwanda’s political strife began 
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in 1973 during my first overseas posting in Kigali, Rwanda’s capital. As sec-
ond secretary at the US embassy, I witnessed, in the spring of that year, the 
outbreak of ethnic violence, born out of passions stirred by the prospect 
of elections in the summer. On July 5, a committee of ranking National 
Guard officers, self-designated as “The Committee for Peace and National 
Unity,” took power, abolished political parties, dissolved the government, 
abrogated the constitution, and named the chief of staff, Major General 
Juvénal Habyarimana, as chief of state.5
 Before I left Kigali in August 1975 for onward posting to Bamako, Mali, 
Habyarimana had installed a largely civilian government and established 
the Revolutionary National Movement for Development (Mouvement 
Révolutionaire Nationale pour le Développement, or MRND).6 Adoption 
by referendum of a new constitution in December 1978 and the election of 
Habyarimana as president that same month completed the transition to a 
single-party state.
 Habyarimana was still in power in 1990 when exile forces, brought to-
gether in the Rwandese Patriotic Front, launched an insurgent movement 
from Uganda, seeking to overthrow the regime. Distant from Rwanda by 
postings in West and East Africa and at the Department of State, I was 
drawn back to the region as a discussant at a State Department conference 
in March 1992 that presaged a new policy toward Rwanda. Actively direct-
ing this new policy was the assistant secretary for African affairs, Ambas-
sador Herman (Hank) Cohen, who, in August 1992, asked me to delay my 
next assignment and become the US Observer at the political negotiations 
in Arusha, Tanzania, following the establishment of a ceasefire between 
the contending parties. Although these negotiations lasted from August 
5, 1992, to August 5, 1993, my own engagement ended in November, when 
negotiations stalled and headed into impasse.
 In March 1993, President Clinton named me as his intended ambas-
sador to the Republic of Rwanda, presumably to be accredited to a transi-
tion regime as structured in the Arusha negotiations. Arriving at post in 
January 1994, I found that only the president had been sworn in to his 
transition position under the Arusha Accords. Three months of intensive 
diplomacy thereafter could not bring the parties to establish the transi-
tional government or national assembly. When the president’s plane was 
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shot down on April 6, Hutu extremists rushed to fill the power vacuum, 
launching war and genocide in their quest to hold onto power.
 The Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) vanquished government forces 
and stopped genocide in four months of fighting. In the meantime, some 
eight hundred thousand innocents had been brutally slaughtered as states 
debated how to restore an international force within Rwanda. Having on 
April 10 evacuated Americans and closed the embassy in Kigali under or-
ders from Washington, I was now asked on July 24 to establish the base 
for cooperation with the new government and to oversee the launching of 
a humanitarian airlift, in effect reopening the US mission. For the next 
eighteen months, our embassy was engaged in providing humanitarian re-
lief, rebuilding infrastructure, promoting justice, and increasing the capaci-
ties of the new government. I passed these responsibilities to my successor, 
Robert Gribbin, on January 6, 1996, and went on to West Africa as the US 
ambassador to Mali.
From Memories to Documents
 Memories abound, but they are often selective, sometimes inaccurate, 
and always circumscribed by one’s personal experience. More reliable are 
observations refined and inscribed, fixed in the official record. Upon my re-
tirement from the US Foreign Service in 1999, I was encouraged by the late 
Senator Paul Simon to write about US engagement in Rwanda—policies 
and actions in which he had taken a personal interest. His recommenda-
tion evolved into a proposal to the United States Institute of Peace to look 
at the documentary record of international humanitarian intervention of 
that period, especially the US classified documents that were accessible 
to me as a former presidential appointee. Following reinstatement of my 
security clearance, I began the perusal of those documents in the sum-
mer of 2002. Had I known how laborious it would be to sort through the 
thousands of documents covering the period from 1990, when the RPF 
invaded, to 1996, when the United Nations withdrew its peace mission, I 
might never have undertaken the task. Nor did I have any idea of how slow 





 The analysis that follows is made with a great deal of hesitancy. I am 
reminded of Claude Lanzmann’s remark, when asked to describe Hitler, 
that any attempt to explain Hitler is obscene because you are led, whether 
you want it or not, to justification.7 Similarly, to discuss state and interstate 
response to genocide in Rwanda may well be seen as an attempt to explain 
away failure or to diminish responsibility. Nor can one claim powerless-
ness or lack of jurisdiction. Genocide happened “on our watch”! The ob-
servation of Czesław Miłosz, made in the context of the Holocaust, is thus 
appropriate here, “There is no such thing as an innocent bystander. If you 
are a bystander, you are not innocent.”8
 There are, as well, the issues of historiography in the African context. 
Joseph Miller reminds us that “Africans have had, and have, distinctive 
ways of thinking of themselves and their worlds . . . alternative casts on the 
Modern Western imaginings that make up our reality. . . . A world history 
that evaluates Africans only in terms of their relations with others’ worlds 
catches only the most fleeting glimpses of what they were in fact about.”9
 A particular difficulty with this study is precisely that it evaluates the 
advent of Rwanda’s genocide from the perspective of the others’ world—
namely, that of the international community engaged in humanitarian 
intervention. There is a much deeper story here that must be included 
in any comprehensive narrative, and it must be told from African per-
spectives, and hopefully from more Rwandan ones. Such would be a sig-
nal contribution to “the multi-centric world history of complexity” that 
Miller invokes.10
 A larger problem of historical craft and the human condition remains. 
Hannah Arendt argues that “action reveals itself fully only to the story-
teller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always 
knows better what it was all about than the participants.”11 I was a par-
ticipant and still must live with the consequences of my actions in that 
troubled time. My rendition of the “intentions, aims and motives,” of the 
international community in its effort to extricate Rwanda from civil war is 
admittedly partial. I have sought to ground my narration in the documen-
tary record of the time.
Prologue
xvi
 There are, nonetheless, personal aspirations that emerge from this 
study. One is the desire that the admittedly partial readings and insights of 
a participant who has access to the documentary record may bring some 
light on events and decisions that led to the tragedy of the Rwandan geno-
cide. The second is the hope that this analysis might offer some lessons on 
the possibilities and limitations of international humanitarian interven-
tion seen through the prism of the Rwandan peace process. The third is 
the ambition that the long process of declassification of hundreds of docu-
ments that are particularly relevant to this story will provide “useful source 
material in the historian’s hands.”12 I can only hope that this perusal of 
the historical record will inspire future historians to evaluate more deeply 
and narrate more tellingly the events on which the documents report.
secondary sources
 A word is in order about the sources I have consulted and how they 
are presented in this study. There are numerous books and monographs on 
the history of genocide in Rwanda. Some studies survey the story; some 
focus narrowly on particular events or dynamics. Some analyses attempt 
an even-handed evaluation, whereas others are openly ideological; some 
cite empirical evidence, and others seek theoretical confirmations. Some 
are autobiographies with stories of horror and triumph. The studies center 
around those written close to the events, those that take a longer look at 
middle distance, and those that, on second look and through different 
optics, challenge the previous record.13
official  records
 This is a study of official records of the international humanitarian 
intervention in Rwanda from the opening of civil war in October 1990 to 
the death of President Habyarimana in April 1994. An epilogue brings the 
action forward to the installation of a new government in July 1994. State 
actors in this drama were Belgium, Burundi, Canada, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Uganda, the United States, and Zaire; intergov-
ernmental organizations included the Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
and the United Nations (UN). What is known of the actions of Belgium 
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and France is a matter of extensive public record brought out by hearings 
in the Belgian Senate and in the French National Assembly.14 Germany 
largely focused on its two-year economic development plans for Rwanda 
rather than on any political agenda. Although present as an Observer at 
the Arusha political negotiations, Germany did not participate in political 
discussions on Central Africa, discussions that brought Belgian, French, 
and US policy makers together regularly in each other’s capitals during 
the period under investigation. Canada and Switzerland had significant 
economic assistance programs in Rwanda and occasionally joined in diplo-
matic demarches through their resident development officers.
 In contrast to Belgium and France, the United States Congress never 
held a hearing on the Clinton administration’s policy toward Rwanda, even 
though that was strongly recommended both by leading human rights 
groups and, in 1999, by a panel of experts.15 A critical behind-the-scenes 
player during the Arusha discussions and the leader in postgenocide re-
construction, the United States covered the role of its decision makers 
during those events in a blanket of documentary confidentiality.
 A significant part of the US story became public record thanks to the 
tireless efforts of William Ferroggiaro while working at the National Se-
curity Archive from 1995 to 2003. His pioneering work has led to full col-
lection of declassified documents at the archives. More recently, the State 
Department has collated and made available to the public a large number 
of documents, many of which were first declassified at the request of Mr. 
Ferroggiaro or myself in the course of this study (foia.state.gov).
 UN documents are deposited in UN collections at various institutions 
around the United States or are available online. The key documents of the 
period have been collected in the United Nations and Rwanda: 1993–1996.16 
Internal UN documents are not available. For what was happening within 
UN institutions, within the OAU, or in African capitals, this study has re-
lied largely on the reports of the US Mission to the United Nations in New 
York and the US embassies in Addis Ababa, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, 
Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, and Nairobi. I also drew information from con-
versations with key actors and from my own experiences at the time.17
 Drawing from the documentary record, this study looks at interna-
tional efforts at conflict resolution in Rwanda from 1990 to 1996, with an 
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emphasis on international engagement within the Arusha political nego-
tiations of 1992–1994. As background to that narrative, I first review the 
historic roots of the Rwandan conflict, look at structures of international 
intervention that sought to mitigate that conflict, and anticipate the effect 
of international humanitarian intervention.
xix
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 Like most conflicts, the Rwandan civil war and attendant genocide are 
not easily confined within brackets of time. This study looks at the period 
of conflict in Rwanda from the incursion of the Rwandese Patriotic Army 
(RPA) on October 1, 1990, until the April 6, 1994 downing of President 
Habyarimana’s plane. This event relaunched the civil war and opened the 
door to genocide, bringing the Arusha peace process to an untimely end. 
An epilogue brings forward the implications of this period for the geno-
cide and subsequent events in Rwanda.
 In this introduction, I review perspectives on the Arusha negotia-
tions found in current literature, recount the antecedents of the Rwandan 
conflict, and pose the question of why humanitarian intervention failed. 
Subsequent chapters seek the answers to that question in a story that fol-
lows the international intervention against the backdrop of political nego-
tiations in Arusha and political wrangling in Kigali. In that narrative, the 
arc of humanitarian intervention confronts questions that are customarily 
faced in international interventions as well as questions that reflect the pe-
culiarities of the Rwandan context. A notation of conflict-resolution issues 
at stake and an inventory of lessons learned thus bookend each chapter.
What Do Folks Say about Arusha?
 The conclusion of this study is that the Rwandan peace process, 
centered in the Arusha negotiations, helped set the dynamic context of 
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genocide in Rwanda. Yet, in the voluminous reporting and analysis on the 
genocide in Rwanda, there is little systematic focus on the Arusha political 
negotiations, on the events leading up to those discussions, or on the ef-
fect of those negotiations on the outbreak of genocide. Few commentators 
stop by Arusha. Those that do intersperse occasional references to Arusha 
within their larger narrative. Most studies, with reason, concentrate on the 
breakout of genocide itself and its eventual suppression by the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front. Among the commonly cited references, the most compre-
hensive is Human Rights Watch’s Leave None to Tell the Story, which men-
tions the Arusha negotiations in various places but only as a backdrop to 
growing internal political tensions.1 Gérard Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis 
gives a chapter to the negotiations but similarly focuses on how negotia-
tions played out within Rwandan domestic politics.2 Grünfeld and 
Huijboom give numerous details about the situation in Rwanda during 
the period of negotiations, but little on the process of negotiations.3 André 
Guichaoua’s more recent work, full of behind-the-scenes details and excel-
lent analyses of the ebb and flow of political contests within Rwanda, has 
but two chapters on the Arusha negotiations, and those are seen through 
the optic of the domestic political scene.4
 Memoires of the period naturally deal with the moments when the 
writers were engaged in Rwandan affairs, most after the accords were 
signed. For example, in his excellent narrative on post-genocide Rwanda, 
Robert Gribbin, US ambassador in Kigali from 1996 to 1999, offers but a 
short chapter on the talks, noting, “I was not there and so cannot throw 
much light on the inner workings of the talks.”5
 Two Rwandan accounts from opposite sides of the conflict give use-
ful insights into the Arusha negotiations. Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa, an 
officer in the Rwandese Patriotic Army and the Patriotic Front’s repre-
sentative to the OAU, was at the time of the Arusha negotiations RPF’s 
secretary general as well as a member of the RPF negotiating team. He 
does not treat the negotiations chronologically or thematically, but his 
Healing a Nation: A Testimony does highlight RPF’s ambiguity toward the 
peace process.6 On the other side, Enoch Ruhigira, at that time the direc-
tor of Habyarimana’s presidential office, shows in his La fin tragique d’un 
régime how Habyarimana progressively lost the battle over the negotiating 
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process as distance swiftly grew between the president and prime minister, 
between the presidential party and the internal opposition, and between 
the political elite in Kigali and the negotiators in Arusha.7
 The most incisive analyses of the Arusha peace process and of its 
failures come from a key US policymaker of that time, Assistant Secre-
tary Herman Cohen, and an academic and international consultant on 
peacekeeping, Bruce Jones. In a single chapter on Rwanda in his Interven-
ing in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent, Cohen, with 
pointed realism, faults US policy for its failure to understand the depth of 
hostility in Rwanda (an arena of low US interest), for being obsessed with 
the negotiating process, and for not realizing that “as the Arusha process 
unfolded . . . it inadvertently guaranteed the genocide.”8
 During the late 1990s, Jones, who is now a senior fellow at Brookings, 
wrote his doctoral dissertation on Rwanda. He published his Peacemaking 
in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure in 2001 on the basis of his doctoral work. 
His chapter on the Arusha negotiations analyzes the negotiations through 
the optic of their peacemaking objectives. Although his narrative contains 
errors on chronology, procedural details, and negotiating dynamics, Jones 
tells the larger story with insight into why the Arusha negotiations looked 
so good and failed so miserably.
 In his conclusion, Jones highlights what went wrong with third-party 
intervention in the Rwanda crisis: undue pressure to democratize; draw-
backs in the facilitation of negotiations; lack of community-level buy-in 
with the peace process; and failure to plan for violent opposition or to 
account for spoilers and losers.9 I would agree with Cohen and Jones in 
their critiques of the Arusha process. But the social cataclysm that was 
the Rwandan genocide needs a more systematic explication of the inter-
national search for peace in Rwanda. That narrative begins with a look at 
what brought us to Arusha.
Antecedents
 Like all Rwandan stories, this is a long one. Rwandan dynastic chronolo-
gies would push us back into the mystic past of the founding kings, Kigwa 
or Gihanga, depending on the legend. Some historians would credit stories 
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about Ruganzu Bwimba, reputed to have built a kingdom in north-central 
Rwanda in the 1400s, only to have it fall apart in civil war five generations 
later. Others assert that it was rather Ruganzu Ndori who in the 1600s es-
tablished the Nyiginya dynasty over the first Rwandan Kingdom of which 
we have reliable oral record.10
traditional  so ciet y
 Out of this ancient genesis, Rwandan social and political organization 
coalesced around descent groups. In Rwanda, heads of lineages formed alli-
ances to build clans. “Being alliances rather than descent groups, clans were 
mutable . . . [and] the number of lineages composing a clan constantly var-
ied over time according to the political adventures of the great families.”11
 As with many other emerging polities of the Great Lakes area, Rwan-
dan leaders knit ties with clans having reputed ritual power and built client-
age through distribution of land and cattle. By the beginning of the 1700s, 
the Nyiginya Kingdom was a fragile coalition of lineages in south-central 
Rwanda. By the end of the century, “it had transformed into a unified, cen-
tralized and aggressive entity.”12 Three factors brought about this transfor-
mation: the centralization of power at the court; the extension of clientage 
to bring all land and cattle under notional royal authority; and continuous 
expansion under armies by which sons of the ruling elite proved their valor 
and into which all Rwandan citizens were incorporated.13
 During the 1800s, the reach of the state (king and court) deepened. 
Cyrimina Rujugira (1770), himself a usurper, structured succession to a 
cycle of four regnal names, expanded court ritual, and increased the num-
ber of armies. Around the 1840s, as population and demands on land and 
pasture grew, the court reserved pasture domains for royal use and disposi-
tion. It then appointed chiefs of “tall grass” to oversee pastures and herds, as 
well as chiefs of land to manage farmers and their obligations. Add to these 
the commanders of now-ubiquitous armies, and a tripartite system of bu-
reaucratic control emerges, especially in the districts close to the court.
 This system did provide a sort of check against arbitrary power at the 
local level where a client, whether herder or farmer, could seek the protec-
tion of one lord against the predations of another. Nonetheless, under a cli-
entage system now triply bureaucratized, exactions necessarily increased, 
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impoverishing farmers and herders. Two “social categories” came to define 
subjects of the king: those who had lineage links to power and privilege—
the Tutsi; and those who by dint of circumstance fell into servile status—
the Hutu.14
 That was the Rwanda that the Europeans  “discovered” in the late 1800s: 
a country ruled by a king newly installed by the 1896 Rucunshu coup and 
hemmed in by courtiers, ritual, and intrigue; a territory densely populated 
at the center with farmers competing with herders for land; and a milita-
rized society in which each person belonged to an army and was a client of 
a superior both for land and cattle. An overlapping system of chieftaincies 
administered central lands; at the periphery, sons of aristocrats with new 
armies pressed against surrounding polities, making Rwanda one of the 
more powerful kingdoms of the region.
colonial  rule
 Rwanda’s mountain fastness and warrior reputation had kept the out-
side world (including Swahili slavers and traders) at bay until German 
explorers crossed the land in the 1890s, with Count von Goetzen discover-
ing Lake Kivu in 1894. Three years later, Hauptmann Ramsay offered the 
newly ascendant king, Mwami Musinga, a letter of protection. German 
forces and firepower helped Musinga consolidate his rule at the court and 
expand Rwandan control in Gisaka to the southeast and Bugoyi in the 
northwest.
 In 1907, Germany’s military protection changed to civil administration 
by indirect rule from a residency at Kigali. But in 1916, Belgian forces from 
the Congo pushed the Germans south out of Rwanda and beyond the 
rail center of Tabora. Belgium held its conquered territory provisionally 
until the Milner-Orts Agreement of May 30, 1919, ceded to Belgium the 
two German provinces of Ruanda and Urundi as the mandate territory of 
Ruanda-Urundi. At the Paris peace talks, the Mandates Commission ap-
proved the Belgian mandate and the Great Power Council of Five accepted 
the Milner-Orts Agreement on August 7, 1919.15 In 1947, this mandate 
evolved into a trusteeship under the United Nations.
 The Belgians, like the Germans, faced the dilemma of how to assert au-
thority over a polity already endowed with a sovereign, an administration, 
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and a society knit together by clientage relations. Under ideals of the 
League of Nations mandate, Belgium was to assure the uplift of the local 
population as well as the development of natural resources.16 Belgium in-
tended to meet these goals while administering the territory efficiently, 
with minimum investment and maximum gain from the territory’s dense 
population and fertile lands. Tying into the Congo’s physical and adminis-
trative infrastructure seemed the appropriate approach.17
 Whereas in Congo, Belgian administrators ruled directly over re-
spective provinces, in Rwanda, Belgium would follow the German ap-
proach of indirect rule. The goal, according to Colonial Minister Louis 
Frank, was to “associate the native princes with our plans and bring the 
indigenous ruling class into our service.”18 In 1919, the administration es-
tablished schools for chiefs’ sons to train the necessary cadre. Then in 
1926, the administration began to rationalize and decentralize the tripar-
tite chiefs system while setting contiguous boundaries for chieftaincies 
and subchieftaincies.
 This streamlined structure was to uniformly administer the provinces 
throughout Rwanda, with chiefs trained first at Nyanza and other local 
schools and then at Butare. The new structure was also intended to re-
lieve the “Hutu masses” of burdensome obligations to three different chiefs. 
However, the traditional system of clientage, both in land and cattle obli-
gations, remained, now legally and efficiently enforced. Ignoring common 
social identities found in lineage and clan, as well as regional variances in 
social structure, the mandate administration saw Hutu and Tutsi as the 
overarching social constructs of personal identification and, in 1931, estab-
lished identity cards classifying each person accordingly.19
 In the name of progress, colonial policy discounted regional differ-
ences, reinforced clientage obligations, and crystallized identities along 
ethnic lines. Moreover, the colonial regime, through the local chiefs, as-
sessed a head tax, required labor on public works, and enforced agricultural 
plantings in food crops and coffee. The burden of obligation to political 
elites weighed heavily on the poor, whether Tutsi or Hutu.
 The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations might never 
have approved a policy of “indirect rule” that coercive and controlling were 
it not for the Rwakayihura famine of 1929–30 in which thousands of 
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Rwandans died in inaccessible parts of the country. Only draconian mea-
sures could build roads, increase harvests, and raise the taxes to keep the 
country together.20 With the exile of the recalcitrant King Musinga and 
the investiture of the more educated and compliant Rudahigwa in 1931, the 
Belgian mandate took root.21
transition to trusteeship
 The League of Nations had been content to let Belgium administer the 
territory and send reports on social and economic progress to the Mandate 
Commission in Geneva, there to debate the merits of Belgian policy. 
Following World War II, however, the newly created UN Trusteeship 
Council actively pushed for political change, as well as for economic and 
social development. Regular missions began in 1947, reviewing progress 
on site. Although traditional autocracy had been legally grounded and ad-
ministratively rationalized under indirect rule, the council’s first visiting 
mission to East Africa was convinced that “political evolution has reached 
a stage when an acceleration of the movement would be justified without 
running any great risk of grave social upheaval.”22
 Grave social upheaval was precisely what occurred as Rwanda moved 
quickly toward independence in the late 1950s. By 1959, rural violence had 
broken out in northwest and central Rwanda, with massacres and hut 
burnings perpetrated by both Hutu and Tutsi partisans, while threats and 
intimidations harried Tutsi nobles into exile. In 1960, elected communal 
burgomasters and counselors replaced chieftaincies. As Reyntjens sums it 
up, “In less than two years [1959–1961], Rwanda had passed from a ‘feudal’ 
monarchy to a Hutu ‘democratic’ republic. . . . In 1952, the monarchist, 
fundamentally Tutsi regime was still solidly established, legally reinforced 
by 35 years of indirect administration. In 1962, Rwanda became indepen-
dent under a republican, fundamentally Hutu regime.”23
a so cial  revolu tion
 Chrétien contends that “the 1959–1961 ‘social revolution’ is the key 
event in Rwanda, one that shaped the country’s politics for the next three 





pace toward representative government and national autonomy25
•	 The	monopolization	of	power,	position,	and	privilege	by	the	ruling	
Tutsi elite26
•	 The	abolition	in	1954 of ubuhake cattle-clientage without a concomi-
tant reform of the land-tenure system27
•	 The	emergence	of	Hutu	intelligentsia,	who	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	
traditional institutions and symbols and called for democratic gover-
nance28
•	 The	death	of	Mwami	Rudahigwa	and	the	hardening	of	neo- 
traditionalist attitudes claiming right of conquest and superiority29
•	 The	creation	of	political	parties	mobilized	by	individual	leaders	and	
ideologically centered on presumed Hutu and Tutsi identities30
 Tensions built by these factors came to a crescendo on November 1, 
1959, with the outbreak of violence around Kabgayi, center of the Hutu re-
naissance, and in the northwest, where clan leaders still opposed rule from 
the central court. By the time the violence abated, some three hundred 
Hutu and Tutsi were killed and twelve hundred were arrested, while the 
population of displaced burgeoned.31
 To calm the storm, the Belgian administration installed Hutu chiefs 
and subchiefs in vacated chieftainships. They then implemented a previ-
ously planned administrative reform of replacing subchiefs with burgo-
masters and elected communal councils. A multiparty Provisional Council 
took over the legislative role of the High Council of State. After the failure 
of a reconciliation conference in early January 1961 at Ostend, Belgium, the 
Provisional Council called a national convention of burgomasters and 
municipal counselors. On January 28, these counselors deposed the “mon-
archy and all its symbols” and proclaimed a democratic republic.
 Nine months later, under UN supervision but in an atmosphere of 
preelectoral violence and intimidation, legislative elections and a refer-
endum on the monarchy confirmed the establishment of the republic 
and the parliamentary dominance of the Parmehutu Party. The elected 
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legislators then set up the structures of the new republic, chose a gov-
ernment, and designated Grégoire Kayibanda as president. The “social 
revolution” thus gave birth to the government that took Rwanda to inde-
pendence on July 1, 1962.32
first  republic
 Around the edges of this new, landlocked republic, monarchists in 
refugee camps plotted a return to power. Host country control and inter-
nal divisions within refugee leadership kept the attacks from being more 
effective; but with each attack, Hutu took reprisals against Tutsi still living 
in Rwanda.33
 In December 1963, the monarchist UNAR party planned attacks from 
Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. While the other attacks were 
turned back, a refugee force from Burundi pushed to within twenty miles 
of Kigali before the Rwandan National Guard stopped the column. Tutsi 
opposition leaders were immediately arrested and executed without trial. 
Kayibanda ordered his ministers to organize civil defense in each prefec-
ture; the national radio called for citizens to defend their country; some 
local officials urged the elimination of all Tutsi as the only solution. An 
orgy of hut burning and murder broke out, especially in areas of high 
Tutsi population. Some ten thousand men, women, and children were 
hacked to death.34
 In 1964 and 1966, refugees again attempted cross-border attacks. Each 
was turned back and followed by an anti-Tutsi pogrom. The 1963 victory 
at the Kanzenze bridge brought pride to the National Guard, solidarity to 
the Hutu cause, and a template for handling the Tutsi threat. Given their 
political utility, attacks against persons and property went largely unpun-
ished; impunity for ethnic crimes became an unwritten understanding.
 As the outside threat receded, internal divisions increased. Parme-
hutu became a de facto single party coping with land tenure issues, ten-
sions within the National Guard, intraparty struggles, and disputes with 
the Catholic church. At the local level, burgomasters and prefects recre-
ated networks of clients, extracting dues for services just like subchiefs 




 Hutu advancement remained at the core of the Parmehutu agenda, ar-
bitrarily enforced in school admittances, civil service recruitment, and even 
checks on business payrolls. Hutu who fled the 1972 genocide in Burundi 
gave a further impetus toward Hutu identity. Ethnic solidarity became the 
watchword among Hutu intelligentsia and especially among politicians 
campaigning for elections in 1973. Vigilantism gave way to hut burnings 
and murders. The harassment and intimidation triggered yet another mas-
sive emigration of frightened Tutsi who had hoped to make their accom-
modation with the new regime.
second republic
 In a situation of looming chaos, President Kayibanda finally called on 
the National Guard to restore order. On July 4, 1973, top ministers from 
the government attended the national day celebration at the US residence, 
then repaired to a nightlong meeting with President Kayibanda. In the 
early morning hours, the National Guard surrounded the meeting place 
and arrested all participants. A Committee for Peace and National Unity, 
made up of the National Guard High Command, had decided not only to 
restore peace but also to take over power.36
 The committee declared martial law, displacing all institutions of the 
First Republic, including the party, the national assembly, and the Supreme 
Court. President Kayibanda and seven other top members of his regime 
received suspended death sentences at a court martial.37 Coup leaders set-
tled into high ministerial and administrative posts, with the newly pro-
moted National Guard commander, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, 
being named president and minister of defense.
 In 1975, Habyarimana established the Revolutionary National Move-
ment for Development (MRND) as a nationwide movement dedicated to 
unity and development. By 1978, Rwandans adopted by referendum a new 
constitution legitimizing the movement with Habyarimana as its presi-
dent. Military committee members held onto their sinecures, but power 
and decision making flowed to the president, who instituted an ethic of 
punctuality and hard work focused on rural development.38 A policy of 
balance in regional development and in ethnic quotas for admittance to 
schools or civil service initially reduced interregional and ethnic tensions. 
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Buttressed by connections to the president, some Tutsis prospered in the 
private sector, but others were denied access to higher schools or jobs.
Transition
 The Kayibanda regime had held on shakily for eleven years, beset 
with attacks from without and social tensions from within; in contrast, the 
Second Republic constructed a system that lasted twenty-one years and 
projected an image of efficiency, economic growth, and national integra-
tion. Over time, however, Habyarimana’s policies of ethnic and regional 
balance devolved into instruments for preserving Hutu hegemony or for 
channeling projects and perquisites to the regime’s home areas of Gisenyi 
and Ruhengeri. The MRND single-party system, organized down to the 
ten-person “cellule,” became a means for political mobilization and auto-
cratic control at the national and local level.
constitu tional  reforms
 Whatever the achievements of the Habyarimana administration, 
thoughtful commentators would have agreed that, by the late 1980s, 
Habyarimana’s one-party regime was losing its capacity to keep ahead of 
the political and developmental game. In response to political agitation 
and economic stagnation, Habyarimana promised constitutional reforms 
in 1990. These reforms were to establish political pluralism, to organize 
the eventual return of Tutsi refugees (after years of the regime’s efforts to 
get them squatters’ rights in neighboring countries), and to accept an 
economic structural adjustment program.
the front invades
 Then, on October 1, 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the 
military arm of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded from Uganda. 
Frustrated Tutsi in countries of asylum conceived the attack, which Hutu 
exiles’ tales of corruption, human rights abuse, and incompetence within the 
Rwandan regime had incubated. The RPF’s perception that Habyarimana 
and President Museveni of Uganda might agree to controlled repatriation 
midwifed the attack, which took disciplined, experienced RPF fighters deep 
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into Rwandan territory. But they did not win the support they expected 
from Rwanda’s restive population. Eventually, over one million Rwandans 
fled southward from RPF control. Meanwhile, Tutsis within Rwanda were 
subject to arrest, intimidation, and massacres; with the onset of civil war, the 
cycle of ethnic violence and social displacement spun out again.
states  intervene
 Almost immediately, European governments (France and Belgium) 
intervened with troops to protect their citizens gathered in the capital city 
of Kigali. Meanwhile, neighboring African governments sought to arrange 
a ceasefire. As the two armed elements engaged in periodic combat, politi-
cal representatives met under the auspices of neighboring chiefs of state. 
They signed agreements but never observed a ceasefire.
 Finally, at Paris in June 1992, France, with the backing of the United 
States, facilitated a framework for ceasefire talks. In July, the talks moved 
to Arusha, Tanzania, where, under Tanzanian facilitation, the two parties 
adopted an operational ceasefire plan. In August, they opened negotiations 
on a transition regime. These negotiations, scheduled to last two months, 
went on for a year, punctuated by foot dragging in Rwandan political cir-
cles, massacres in Rwanda’s north, and renewed fighting in February 1993. 
President Habyarimana finally signed the Arusha Accords with Rwandese 
Patriotic Front Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe on August 5, 1993.
 Nine months later, on April 6, 1994, someone shot down the president’s 
plane with ground-to-air missiles. Murderous revenge immediately broke 
out against the president’s political opponents and ethnic Tutsi. Embassies 
withdrew their personnel and citizens; the Security Council reduced the 
UN peacekeeping force to a small holding operation. Even as the Rwan-
dese Patriotic Army and forces of a self-appointed Rwandan government 
contested for territory, extremist Hutu organized the genocide of eight 
hundred thousand innocents in just under one hundred days. The road to 
peace gave way to a policy of extermination.39
The Legacy
 Rwanda’s past casts an illuminating beam on the 1990–94 conflict in 
Rwanda. Evident traits of political culture have deeply rooted antecedents.40
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 Expanding borders and centralizing power have been Rwanda’s leitmotif 
since the seventeenth century. While colonial agreements stopped territo-
rial expansion41 and rules of the Organization of African Unity prohibited 
change to colonial boundaries, each historic dynasty persisted in claiming 
territory and seeking to ingrate it into central institutions.
 Regionalism was the flip side of centralizing power. The conquered periph-
ery (Cyangugu and Kibuye to the west; Byumba and Kibungu to the north 
and east), once endowed with their own polities, resented the powerful center 
(Butare, Gikongoro) and the tributes it imposed. In the northwest (Gisenyi, 
Ruhengeri), former landlords still looked for ways to restore customary rights 
and political privileges. Regionalism, itself divided into loyalties (or enmities) 
built hill-by-hill, undercut attachments to the central state.42
 Coercive violence has been a constant of Rwandan politics; the political 
elite brutally waged wars of conquest or battles for ascendency at court. Co-
lonial invaders backed up the expansionary campaigns of the king (mwami), 
then imposed their own vision of “indirect rule,” rationalizing and institu-
tionalizing coercive force. Labor levies, clientage obligations, and taxes grew 
more egregious and heavy as ambitions of the elite (whether traditional or 
colonial) increased in size and reach. After independence, enforced develop-
ment programs undergirded the structural violence of elite regimes.43
 Clientage was the network that knit Rwandan society together.44 Under 
indirect rule, clientage persisted as a legally recognized institution. Weighty 
burdens of this institution were at the root of the 1959 “social revolution.” 
While the ideology of democratic representation might have challenged 
the monarchical system, the new republican order used clientage to enlist 
the support of the peasantry. Clientage, old and new, implied two things: 
the splendid isolation of the monarch (or president) who was always pa-
tron and never client, and networks of reciprocity and dependence from 
lords down to the lowliest peasants.45
 Ethnic identity in Rwanda began with one’s lineage; lineages built alli-
ances and formed clans. Today one might identify with traditional clans 
or feel linked (obliged) to former classmates, military or professional as-
sociates, or party organizations. Overarching these ascriptive or attributive 
identities are social designators that since the 1800s had come to reflect 
linkage to the political hierarchy and status within the clientage system: 
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Tutsi and Hutu. Colonizers saw these as binary racial and occupational 
categories, born out of migratory patterns of conquest. Elites, struggling 
for power and place in the postindependence arena, used these designa-
tions to build loyalty and claim legitimacy. Amorphous categories became 
exclusive, hardened identifiers—matters of life and death.46
 Profound psychological perceptions of superiority and inferiority 
underlay the interplay of these social categories.47 This perceptual equa-
tion traditionally took on regional variances. Playing against this varie-
gated background was the violence of modern Rwanda’s birth. The Hutu 
revolution of 1959, Tutsi exile attacks with attendant reprisals in the early 
1960s, and pogroms against Hutu in Burundi all accentuated notions of 
ethnic identity and solidarity. Ethnicity formalized on identity cards and 
entrenched by political competition became the passkey for Hutu entrance 
into the modern world and a barrier to advancement for Tutsi. Left out of 
the national equation were Tutsi harried into exile in 1959, 1961, 1973, and 
1978. Some were allowed to return, but most lived abroad for thirty years, a 
people with a country that would not accept them back.48
International Intervention and Peacemaking in Rwanda
 Eventually, the refugees did come back, not in the programmed re-
turn that the Habyarimana regime wanted, but in an insurgency led from 
Uganda on October 1, 1990, by the Rwandese Patriotic Front. What was 
to have been a quick overturning of a supposed weak and corrupt regime 
turned into an initial defeat for the RPF and then a protracted border 
war having all the elements of intractability.49 States of the region and de-
velopment partners rushed to quell the conflict and restore peace to the 
Rwandan people. But instead of a rapid settlement, a complex series of 
international interventions led eventually to the Arusha political nego-
tiations and their result: the Arusha Accords of August 4, 1993. Within 
nine months, the negotiated peace went down with the crash of President 
Habyarimana’s plane as civil war and genocide erupted.
 Why were the hopes for peace set within the framework of the Arusha 
Accords so quickly crushed by political realities? This question drives our 




 A partial answer is to recognize that mediators, facilitators, and Ob-
servers involved in the international intervention did not fully comprehend 
the context of the crisis.50 Our purchase on core dynamics was deficient in 
several regards.
 We were too sanguine about African societies’ vaunted capacity to 
endure. But the pressures of population growth, pluralistic politics, a de-
teriorating economy, and competition for power stretched Rwanda to its 
breaking point. In this context, pushing forward a peace agreement that 
required major structural change and redistribution of political and eco-
nomic power brought not peace but civil war and genocide.
 We misconstrued relations of force in a seemingly powerless country. 
The UN Security Council deployed a peacekeeping force of minimal size 
and mandate. When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, extrem-
ist partisans quickly proved that the UN force had neither the mandate nor 
the materiel to counter determined opposition to the Arusha process.
 We glossed over the emotional roots of conflict, which, in the Rwandan 
case, were fear and loathing—fear that the “other,” once empowered, would 
be a perpetual oppressor, and the loathing that comes from devaluing one’s 
neighbor. The contenders were caught in an emotional recreation of self-
images generated by diminution and demonization of the other side.
 We underestimated the will to power. Determination to control the 
political process brought an impasse to power-sharing talks; commitment 
to ascendancy brought disequilibrium to military negotiations; unwilling-
ness to compromise blocked the installation of the transitional institutions. 
So when the president was killed, Rwanda was left without institutional 
authority, a void quickly filled by extremists who would hold on to power 
at all costs, even the slaughter of innocents.
 As we reflect on the historical complexity of Rwandan society, so also 
we should consider the capacity of the diplomatic intervention to restore 
peace. The mediators were focused on democratic practice and power 
sharing; the negotiating parties were contesting for power. Diplomats pro-
posed classic peacemaking devices for bringing the parties together; the 
parties negotiated out of deeply rooted cultural dispositions. Thus, defi-
cient understandings of Rwandan culture and traditional peacekeeping 
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modalities framed international intervention in the Rwandan conflict. As 
an Observer remarked at the time, “We are, after all, diplomats, not social 
psychologists.”51
modes  of  representation
 Interventions to bring peace to Rwanda moved through different 
modes.52 At the start of the Rwandan crisis, states with representation in 
Kigali negotiated with the Rwandan government, often comparing notes 
among embassies and following similar approaches but keeping to a tra-
ditional, bilateral mode. Meanwhile, states represented in Kampala held 
separate discussions with leaders of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
 When political negotiations started in Arusha in August 1992, a paral-
lel diplomacy emerged based on the conference principle.53 Here the Ob-
server group worked together in evaluating issues and jointly sharing their 
views with the Facilitator or with the parties themselves. As this study will 
show, the understandings arrived at in Arusha through this conference sys-
tem were often out of touch with the bilateral discourse going on in Kigali, 
in Kampala, or in the capitals of concerned states.
 In August 1993, the conference negotiations produced the accords that 
took the peace process back to Rwanda under the aegis of the United Na-
tions Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). At this point, the conference was 
over and bilateral diplomacy was subsumed within a framework estab-
lished by an international organization. The vital exchanges of bilateral 
negotiation and the collective wisdom of multilateral diplomacy became 
subservient to international collaboration in the project of implementing 
the accords and the “technical” program of peacekeeping as outlined and 
captained by the United Nations.54
 This intervention on behalf of international peace and security and 
in the interest of rehabilitating the Rwandan state took on the cultural 
expectations of international diplomacy: giving status to arguments from 
both sides, seeking a middle ground, and urging compromise with a view 
to establishing an institutionalized agreement between contending parties.
 However, this was not just an international diplomatic intervention 
to restore international peace and security. It was also a humanitarian in-
tervention to save lives and comfort the hungry, sick, and homeless while 
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protecting individual human rights on both sides of the conflict. The inter-
national intervention in Rwanda was driven by concern for the displaced 
and refugees, as well as by preoccupation with statecraft in Central Africa. 
The central question was whether the intervention could achieve its ob-
jectives in each domain. Obviously, it grievously failed in both regards.
Does “Humanitarian Intervention” Work?
 In an insightful analysis, Anthony Lang has looked at international 
interventions taken for purported humanitarian purposes and found them 
wanting. Such interventions are, he finds, essentially self-serving, under-
taken to heighten the image of those intervening rather than to succor 
the helpless. Echoing Hedley Bull’s reflections on the ambiguous status 
of human rights within the state system, Lang concludes that humani-
tarian interventions concentrate more “on saving the state than on saving 
people.”55 Lang is not the only one to point out the failures of international 
humanitarian intervention; a plethora of recent studies take up the theme, 
many pointing to Rwanda as the demonstrative case.56 However, Lang was 
one of the first in the genre, and he makes more explicit than most the 
connection between the failure of humanitarian action and the structural 
nature of state action.
 Lang’s thesis is that the space of international action is “the province 
of the states themselves,” and that the language of international politics, 
including discourses on international humanitarian interventions, “is con-
stituted and controlled by state interpretations.”57 Moreover, in humani-
tarian crises caused by collapsing state structures, intervening states are 
concerned with reestablishing the disintegrating state so as to repair the 
breach in the state system.58 Once reestablished, a revived state also con-
tests within the interstate arena.
 Meanwhile, the interests of individual citizens, victims of the humani-
tarian crisis, are secondary to the playing out of initiatives designed to es-
tablish state identity and state persona (including that of human rights 
advocate) in the interstate arena. According to Lang, “State agents focus 
more on other state agents in an intervention rather than on people who 
need assistance.”59 The dynamics of state agency in an international crisis 
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thus intrinsically conflict with the humanitarian aims of intervention. 
Nicholas Onuf echoes the theme: “The institutional machinery which gov-
ernments have authorized for the protection of human rights greatly favors 
states over nationals; in effect, states’ rights trump individual rights.”60
A Look Forward
 A glance forward at the record in this study will show that a state-
centric agenda driven by a diplomatic ethos of negotiation, fair play, and 
power sharing prevailed over the claims of humanitarian intervention that 
would put the real needs of people first. Diplomats did seek policy re-
sponses that met human need. But they persisted in deferring to sovereign 
choice, in treating both sides as equal parties, in holding faith in power 
sharing, and in promoting democratic choice as the antidote to conflict. 
These approaches, reflecting the essential values of the twentieth century, 
obviously did not work.
 Yet, internecine conflict was not new to world leaders, nor was the 
quest for peace.61 Moreover, international peacekeeping had built up con-
siderable experience and expertise since the Second World War. Thus, the 
unrolling of the Rwandan peacekeeping peace process as recorded in the 
several chapters of this book parallels similar endeavors in international 
conflict resolution.
 First, parties in any conflict need to accept the reality of each other’s 
presence on the ground and work through to a sustainable “ceasefire.” Once 
the shooting has stopped, negotiations on the future order ensue: debates 
about fundamental “law,” or negotiations on “power sharing.” But nego-
tiations about principles, structure, or power often come, as they did in 
Rwanda, to an “impasse.” Getting past an impasse to a final settlement, an 
“endgame,” is both an art and impelling goal of international mediation. 
A transition to a peaceful, secure future should then valorize provisions 
of a final agreement. Instead, in Rwanda’s case, “things fell apart.” In the 
Rwandan story narrated here, a brief analysis of conflict resolution issues 
at stake fronts each chapter. At the end of each chapter, I list the lessons we 
learned from that segment of conflict mediation, with specific insights into 
the tragic Rwandan experience.
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 Rwanda was a terrain where states and international organizations 
projected their own interests and identities; where peacemakers misjudged 
the depth of animosity between parties; and where the will to power of 
the contenders eventually overwhelmed the limited international project 
to hold the peace process on course. Customary modes of peacemaking 
and peacekeeping failed, and misjudgments of the peacemaking context 
contributed to the scenario that engendered genocide. Attitudes and 
habits of diplomatic actors, deployed in different arenas and within vary-
ing modes, did not mitigate the crisis. The Arusha political negotiations 





 On October 1, 1990, a military force moved from southern Uganda 
into northeast Rwanda at Kagitumba and headed down the eastern edge 
toward the tourist camp and police headquarters at Gabiro, the central 
entrance to Kagera National Park. The military force called itself the 
Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military arm of the Rwandese Pa-
triotic Front (RPF). Major General Fred Rwigyema, formerly deputy 
commander of Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and deputy 
minister of defense in Uganda’s government, headed the invasion. A large 
part of the force was made up of Rwandan Tutsi from the Lweru triangle 
who had joined Yoweri Museveni’s campaign to overthrow Milton Obote. 
Additional refugees had joined the NRA in 1986 to help put down a re-
bellion in northern Uganda. Now, the troopers moved out of barracks 
toward the Rwandan border under various guises. Major General Rwigy-
ema told people that he was preparing for Uganda National Day on Oc-
tober 9. Recruits from within the Tutsi diaspora, as well as Hutu military 
leaders and politicians who had fled the regime of President Habyari-
mana, were part of the RPA corps.1
 The exiles had carried from Rwanda stories of corruption, injustice, 
and economic bankruptcy in the Habyarimana regime. Expecting that a 
disenchanted population would join in revolt against the government, the 
RPF found that, instead, the people fled before them. Within three days of 
the invasion, General Rwigyema was killed at the front.2 On October 23, 
Rwanda government forces ambushed the RPA, killing top officers along 
with scores of RPA fighters. After suffering additional losses, the RPA 
broke up into small mobile groups, seeking cover in the Virunga volcano 
forests and crossing over into Uganda by night. The initial RPA thrust had 
been broken; the Rwandan government declared victory.3 But Major Paul 
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Kagame, head of Uganda’s military intelligence, rushed back from training 
in the United States and revitalized the RPA forces, preparing for a drawn-
out civil war.
 The October 1 incursions quickly stirred an international response. 
Both President Habyarimana and President Museveni had gone to New 
York to attend the World Summit on Children and were about to journey 
on to meetings in Washington. Their precipitate return to their respective 
capitals highlighted both the surprise and the seriousness of the incursion.4 
Key donors, France and Belgium, dispatched forces to protect Kigali and 
the expatriates in it. The United States began to withdraw nonessential 
personnel from its embassy.5 Neighboring presidents Mobutu of Zaire and 
Mwinyi of Tanzania called separate summit conclaves. All external parties 
wanted the fighting in this poor, overpopulated country to end quickly.
 The journey to a ceasefire, however, went along a circuitous path. This 
chapter explores that journey by first looking at the issues that any search 
for a ceasefire confronts and then recounting the failed summitry of the 
first two years. After considering how cooperation between France and the 
United States and between the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and 
Tanzania ushered in a durable ceasefire on June 13, 1992, I ask what lessons 
we learned from the exercise.
Issues at Stake
 Although the initial fighting in Rwanda had come to a temporary lull 
in October 1990, settling the conflict proved a lengthy exercise in diplo-
matic negotiation and political opportunism. The October hostilities pre-
sented a classic spectrum of questions.
 What is the nature of the conflict? Was the 1990 RPF attack on Rwanda, 
for example, an invasion or an insurgency? An invasion across the border of 
a sovereign state is in international law “aggression” and a matter for UN 
Security Council consideration. The incursion into northeast Rwanda 
originated from Uganda with troops who had taken leave from Uganda’s 
National Revolutionary Army. The Rwandan government characterized 
the incursion as a cross-border aggression sponsored by the Ugandan gov-
ernment, requiring a collective response by the international community. 
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But the Ugandan leadership insisted that the attackers left Uganda 
without the authorization or knowledge of Ugandan authorities.
 If this was a cross-border attack, it was also without question an insur-
gency, a battle by Rwandans to find place and power within the Rwandan 
state.6 Having launched the war, the RPF now sought to legitimize its 
status as an internal insurgency. The Rwandan government, however, was 
not interested in bilateral talks or a ceasefire, which would recognize the 
RPF as the opposite party and change the asymmetry of the government/
rebel equation.7
 Does a conflict warrant international attention, or should local wars be allowed 
to flame out?8 In the Rwandan case, the care of refugees, the war-born 
impediments to trade and humanitarian aid, and especially this ethnic 
struggle for ascendency that found its echo in eastern Zaire, southern 
Uganda, and Burundi all constituted threats to regional peace and secu-
rity.9 The nature of the conflict also determined the applicability of in-
ternational humanitarian law to the Rwandan case.10 Thus, international 
interveners came to see the conflict between the Rwandese Patriotic Front 
and the Rwandan government as an internal insurgency with external re-
percussions that threatened international peace and merited an interna-
tional intervention.
 Who are the contenders and how cohesive are their organizations? It would 
seem at first glance that the battle in and around Gabiro was between 
the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), fighting for the exiled Tutsi, and 
the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), defending the state of Rwanda 
and the people within it. However, the RPF/RPA was but one of many 
groups vying for influence among the Tutsi diaspora. Indeed, the RPF 
had launched the attack preemptively to forestall an agreement of exiles 
to a UNHCR plan for programmed repatriation.11 In addition, expatri-
ate Tutsi businessmen were attracted to possible business opportunities in 
Rwanda under a peaceful, negotiated return.12 Early days of battle showed 
a force divided in terms of vision, strategy, and operations.
 On the other hand, the Rwandan Armed Forces no longer represented 
a unified country. After over twenty years of one-party rule, Rwandan elites 
joined in demanding an end to autocratic control and an opening to a 
democratic, liberal order.13 On July 5, 1990, the seventeenth anniversary of 
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his coup, President Habyarimana promised a new economic and political 
order. A year later, under a new constitution, the legislature approved a law 
authorizing multiple political parties.14 Some sixteen parties filed for rec-
ognition. Whatever their regional base or ideological perspective, the new 
parties sought to distinguish themselves from Habyarimana’s rule.15 Thus, 
even before the RPF invasion, an opening to multiparty politics brought 
to the fore the north-south chasm in Rwandan politics. Eventually, under 
a coalition government led by Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye of 
the opposition Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), Rwandan 
politics and the war effort became a contest with multiple stakeholders.16
 Are parties external to the conflict part of the problem or part of the solution? 
Conflicts draw in interested partners. In this asymmetrical confrontation 
between an incipient insurgency and an established state force, each side 
could claim interested neighbors and external supporters.17 France, Belgium, 
and Egypt had military assistance programs in Rwanda, while China was 
a regular supplier of arms. Libya built the Meridien Hotel and partnered 
with the government in joint enterprises. Zaire, linked formally to Rwanda 
in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) 
and impelled by close personal bonds between the two presidents, had re-
sponded to the October 1990 crisis with the immediate dispatch of sev-
eral hundred troops from the Special Presidential Division.18 Germany, the 
United States, Canada, and Switzerland all had significant assistance pro-
grams supporting a regime in a poor, small country that, during the early 
1980s, was thought to model effective techniques of rural development.19
 On the other hand, after a 1988 international conference, in Wash-
ington, DC, on Rwandan refugees, the RPF began to build up financial 
support among the Tutsi diaspora and moral support from sympathetic 
foreigners. Most important, in launching its adventure into Rwanda, the 
RPF had expropriated armaments from Ugandan army connections and 
continued to receive support from elements within the government sym-
pathetic to the Front’s cause, perhaps even from President Museveni. The 
smuggling of gold and diamonds along the Zairean border provided funds 
for weapons purchased on the international arms market. Thus, both con-
tenders in the Rwandan crisis depended on support from states and third 
parties outside of Rwanda’s borders.
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 Are the contenders ready for a settlement? Has a culture of peace prevailed over 
a culture of war? The 1990 incursion had quickly evolved into a rhetorical 
confrontation, with skirmishes along the border, but not into a “mutually 
hurting stalemate.” Since both sides felt they could ultimately win, the con-
flict was hardly “ripe for resolution.”20 As the RPF tactics changed to guer-
rilla raiding, the conflict settled into a protracted, irregular war, all the more 
disturbing to external third parties who wanted to quickly restore peace.
 If third party intervention becomes possible, who should mediate in the dispute? 
The Rwandan conflict was of immediate concern to neighboring states 
and a source of long-range anxiety for donors vested in large development 
programs and now burdened with humanitarian assistance within the 
Rwandan state. Who should mediate this troublesome conflict, and under 
what auspices? The Africans wanted an African mediation, but which per-
sonality or which state should lead?
 Zaire’s president Mobutu was a dominant figure among African chiefs 
of state but had hostile relations with Uganda’s Museveni. As friend and 
protégé of Habyarimana, Mobutu would hardly be evenhanded in this 
matter. Finally, he was a sick man whose influence was fading abroad and 
whose rule was being challenged by “democratic” forces at home. Mobutu’s 
capacity to sustain a mediation seriously engaging both sides was very 
much in question.
 On the other hand, an insurgency launched and sustained from the 
southern reaches of Uganda into a landlocked neighboring state must have 
had Museveni’s nod of approval. Moreover, Museveni and Habyarimana 
neither liked nor trusted one another. Museveni was in no position to me-
diate between the insurgents and the Rwandan government.
 Burundi was the neighbor to the south whose history, politics, and so-
cial divisions mirrored those of Rwanda. However, Rwandans of all stripes 
considered themselves superior to their traditional enemies in Burundi. 
Additionally, by 1990, Burundi’s military president, Pierre Buyoya, had re-
cently put out the fires of a major ethnic blowup in Burundi’s north and 
was too enmeshed in his own ethnic difficulties to provide mediation in 
Rwanda’s conflict.
 The country with the least vested interest or diplomatic liabili-
ties among Rwanda’s neighbors was Tanzania. While Prime Minister 
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Malecela and several within the ruling Tanzanian elite were friendly to-
ward Habyarimana’s regime, in 1990, both Tanzanian president Mwinyi 
and foreign minister Diria were from coastal Swahili backgrounds and 
had no affinity with either side. Moreover, conflict within Rwanda cre-
ated insecurity on a distant western border. Tanzania had a vital interest 
in seeing peace restored.21
Regional Summitry
early  summits
 Notwithstanding the inherent issues involved, neighboring chiefs of 
state rushed to bring the Rwandan conflict to a close. Within a fortnight 
of the October 1 incursion, Tanzanian president Mwinyi hosted a sum-
mit with Museveni and Habyarimana at which the Rwanda government 
agreed to dialogue under OAU auspices and Tanzania and Uganda agreed 
to pressure the RPF to accept a ceasefire.
 On October 23 and 24, the heads of state of the Economic Commu-
nity of the Great Lakes Countries (Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi), meet-
ing at Mobutu’s home in Gbadolite, proposed establishing a peacekeeping 
force and noted Mobutu’s effort to facilitate dialogue between the Govern-
ment of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Two days later, a sec-
ond summit convened at Gbadolite at which Museveni, now chairman of 
the OAU, confirmed Mobutu as mediator. The chiefs of state authorized a 
military observer group of officers from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, 
and the RPF to be established under OAU supervision.22
 When the military observer group convened November 12–19 in 
Goma, Zaire, to draft the terms of a formal ceasefire, they touched the 
foundations of the conflict’s intractability. While it had agreed to dialogue 
with the Patriotic Front, the government of Rwanda would not accept that 
group as representative of the refugee community nor admit wholesale re-
patriation of refugee populations. The RPF on the other hand wanted full 
recognition as an opposite in the negotiations, as an internal armed force 
whose interests had to be accommodated.
 By this time, the Rwandan government thought it had repulsed the in-
vasion; many of the insurgents had fled back to Uganda, and the rest were 
Prelude to Genocide
26
scattered along the frontier trying to pull together under Major Kagame’s 
leadership. Neither side was particularly anxious to accommodate an in-
ternational intervention and mediation. The OAU was not able to get the 
RPF and the Rwandan government to agree on terms of a ceasefire or on 
deployment of a military observer group. Mediation was instead being im-
posed by self-interested neighbors and patrons.
 In a pattern that would be reiterated numerous times, this blockage led 
to military pressure from the RPF, which was countered by repression and 
ethnic violence abetted by the government. During the months of Novem-
ber and December, the Rwandan government pushed back RPF attacks 
along the Uganda-Rwanda border. In January 1991, the RPF returned to 
the attack along the northern border, briefly occupying the regional capi-
tal of Ruhengeri and freeing prisoners held in the local prison, including 
prominent political prisoners like former chief of security Theoneste 
Lizinde. In reprisal, the government, exercising state-of-emergency pow-
ers, arrested over eight thousand persons suspected of supporting the RPF. 
Attacks against Tutsi Bagogwe in the government heartland of Gisenyi/
Ruhengeri area killed more than two hundred civilians.23
summits  in  zanzibar and dar es  sal aam
 Increased violence again drew in regional summitry. Meanwhile, Presi-
dent Habyarimana, having failed to stop repression at home, lost ground 
in regional discussions. On February 17, in a hurriedly convened mini-
summit on Zanzibar between the presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Rwanda, Habyarimana at last accepted the principle of a ceasefire.
 Two days later, at a regional summit on refugees at Dar es Salaam (Bu-
rundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire attending), Habyarimana 
agreed in principle to the right of refugee return, and neighboring chiefs of 
state covenanted to facilitate naturalization for refugees who wanted to stay 
put. Significantly, the Dar es Salaam Declaration thanked Mobutu for in-
stituting dialogue and urged him to maintain the momentum of dialogue 
“between the Rwandan government and the armed opposition.” The declara-
tion thus confirmed Mobutu as mediator and recognized the RPF without 
naming it as the opposite party in the conflict. The notion that Uganda was 
attacking Rwanda through its cohorts no longer held water with presidents 
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of the region. With diplomatic optimism, the declaration held that dialogue 
would find “a solution to the problem facing the parties concerned.”24
from n ’sele  to gbad olite
 In March 1991, as ceasefire talks began at N’sele, Zaire, President 
Habyarimana announced his intention to offer an amnesty for those who 
had taken up arms against the Rwandan government.25 But that initiative 
did not significantly change the dynamics of the conflict; the peace pro-
cess was in its infancy. By March 29, Casimir Bizimungu, foreign minister 
of the Rwandan government, and now Major General Paul Kagame, vice 
president of the RPF, signed a ceasefire agreement, committing to ongoing 
dialogue and to the deployment of a military observer group under OAU 
supervision. Political dialogue was to start in fifteen days following the de-
ployment of an observer group of the regional states of Uganda, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Burundi. But the military observer group did not get orga-
nized until May. When it deployed in Kigali, the Rwandan government re-
stricted its movement around the country. The ceasefire, which was broken 
almost immediately by skirmishes along the Uganda border, turned into 
a stalemate between the Rwandan government’s conventional forces and 
RPF bush warriors in a low-intensity civil war.
 Meanwhile, the Rwandan government’s position on internal politics 
seemed to soften. That March, the government, under pressure from the 
international community and from its own jurists, released eight thousand 
suspected RPF sympathizers who had been detained since January.26 In 
June, the president promulgated a new constitution that allowed multi-
party political competition. On June 18, the legislature, the National De-
velopment Council (CND), passed the Political Parties Law and the race 
to establish political parties took off.27 By the end of the year, the CND 
finally passed two amnesty laws, one for refugees and exiles and one for 
persons within the country convicted of infractions of the law short of 
violent crimes.
the oau promotes  another summit
 At the OAU Summit in June, pressure built for another try at peace-
making. The OAU chiefs of state directed the secretary general of the 
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organization to convene another regional summit to continue the me-
diation process. Accordingly, Mobutu hosted a meeting at Gbadolite to 
work out the terms of a new ceasefire. With the witness of the president 
of Nigeria, as new chairman of the OAU, the parties signed on September 
16 a ceasefire agreement, seen as a revision of the understanding reached 
at N’sele six months earlier. The major change was in the makeup of the 
military observer group; this time it was to be composed of Nigerian and 
Zairean officers. Political dialogue was also initiated at Gbadolite, but the 
mediator broke it off in ten days, exasperated at RPF intransigence.
 Absent a ceasefire reinforced by political dialogue, renewed fighting 
broke out in December and January, allowing the RPF to demonstrate 
its capacity to attack and leaving it with a permanent foothold in north-
ern Rwanda, thus confirming its status as an “internal” insurgency. Back 
in Kigali, negotiations to install a multiparty government under the June 
constitution stalled; in frustration, a new government was finally sworn 
in on December 30, naming Sylvestre Nsanzimana as prime minister and 
including only one minister who was not from the president’s party. In re-
sponse to renewed fighting in the north, the government increased the size 
of the army fivefold, turning the usually balanced budget into deep deficit.
results  of  summitry
 A year and a half after the October 1990 RPF attack, the regional 
chiefs of state had little to show for their considerable efforts to stop the 
fighting and arrange a peace through summit agreements. Undertakings 
at the summits did move the parties closer to recognizing each other as 
antagonists with whom to negotiate. The chiefs of state laid out quite 
early the elements of a putative peace process: ceasefire, political dialogue, 
military observer group, and peacekeeping force. The implication was that 
goals of peace and security required an international intervention that was 
both political and military in nature.
 But the summit discussions were based on faulty assumptions, namely, 
that the issues at stake were subject to presidential decision; that the con-
tending parties ultimately wanted peace; and that ceasefires, military ob-
server groups, or peacekeeping deployments could be created ex nihilo by 
spoken agreement. But neither the respective states nor the Organization 
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of African Unity had the capacity to organize and operationally structure 
the peace process or ensure the compliance of the parties. Finally, intrinsic 
to summitry is failure continually to attend to the problem. Interveners 
responded to violent outbreaks rather than systematically addressing root 
causes of the conflict.28 Clearly, if peace was to return to Rwanda, the levels 
of international engagement would have to be broadened.
Donors Respond
 France and Belgium, the top two states engaged in assistance to 
Rwanda, reacted immediately to the October 1990 RPF incursion. Presi-
dent Habyarimana stopped by Paris and Brussels on his way home from 
New York and secured the promise of military assistance from President 
Mitterrand and King Baudouin. Both sent troops to Kigali, presumably 
to protect the capital city and the expatriates living there but obviously 
reinforcing the Rwandan military’s capacity to carry the battle to the field. 
While France dealt directly with the Rwandan government and was an 
observer of the summit talks held under Mobutu’s auspices, the Belgian 
approach was to send a high-level delegation to all capitals of the region 
to seek out regional African views and encourage a more vigorous African 
response to the crisis. Belgians seemed skittish about any direct engage-
ment; the very fact that the Belgian foreign minister was visiting the region 
in regard to the Rwanda crisis raised an outcry in the Belgian press and in 
parliament. Once the situation on the front seemed stabilized and the capi-
tal city no longer threatened, Belgium withdrew its combat forces but left 
in place a military training mission working with the gendarmerie. By act 
of parliament, Belgian military assistance was limited to training, techni-
cal assistance, and nonlethal military materiel. Thereafter, Belgium settled 
into a watching brief, ready to demarche the Rwandan or Ugandan govern-
ments as interests required, but with no intention to mediate. Recognizing 
that the French, because of their troop presence in Rwanda, had the larger 
say and the larger headaches, Belgium tended to support French initia-
tives in the region.29
 After the failures of regional initiatives, the French director of African 
affairs, Paul Dijoud, offered to mediate in August 1991, and in October he 
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tried to bring the Rwandan government and the RPF together in Paris. 
Because high-level RPF representation was absent, Rwandan foreign 
minister Bizimungu declined to participate. In November, France sent an 
observer mission to the Rwandan-Ugandan frontier to assess the nature 
of cross-border incursions. As 1992 opened, Dijoud tried again to organize 
direct negotiations between the Rwandan government and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front. By mid-February, the French foreign ministry admitted 
that the initiative had been a failure. The problem was twofold: first, the 
internal situation in Rwanda was “explosive and deteriorating,” with Hutu 
hardliners in the president’s entourage actively opposing moves toward de-
mocratization. Second, neither the Rwandan government forces nor the 
RPF had shown the capacity to prevail militarily, but the RPF seemed 
determined to fight on until Habyarimana was removed. In the French 
foreign ministry’s view, the RPF would continue to secure supplies and 
establish safe haven north of the border; Uganda would not prevent the 
use of its territory as a springboard for RPF operations.30
violence and diplomacy
 The fragile internal situation became evident in March 1992 in another 
outbreak of ethnic violence, this time in the southeastern area of Bugesera, 
a region of new settlement that had attracted Tutsi pushed out of more 
populous zones to the west and north. The attacks occurred as political 
parties pressured Habyarimana for a coalition national government in Ki-
gali and for changes in communal and regional (prefecture) governance. 
Although young thugs, presumably in political hire, led the attack, local 
authorities were slow to intervene, and some even encouraged the violence. 
Eventually the National Gendarmerie had to stop the fracas in which some 
one hundred persons died and twelve thousand were displaced from their 
homes.31 France, Belgium, Germany (also representing the president of 
the European Community), Switzerland, Canada, and the United States 
joined in a vigorous demarche that reminded the Rwandan president of his 
government’s responsibility to stop killings and destruction and to ensure 
peace and security.32
 Both the donors and the government cast the demarche in the larger 
context of Rwanda’s political evolution. The demarche called for the creation 
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of a multiparty government “with the least possible delay” and urged 
moderation in media broadcasts. Inaction by Rwandan authorities, the 
ambassadors warned, could jeopardize the future of cooperative programs. 
The president said he shared the ambassadors’ preoccupation but blamed, 
in part, the rabble-rousing rhetoric of opposition leaders. In his brief on 
the security situation, the interior minister noted that the onset of violence 
had left a vacuum in local administration, that is, local authorities did not 
counter the violence. He also argued that “the existence of multi-partyism 
by its very nature creates incitement.”33
toward a  coalition government
 Meanwhile, the Catholic Church sought to organize dialogue between 
the RPF and the Rwandan government. How many of these contacts were 
carried out informally, the record will not show. But by October 1991, one 
year after the RPF invasion, the church mediated a meeting in which the 
contending sides committed to common principles.34 The church also 
sought broader political representation within the government through 
the establishment of a government of national unity that encompassed 
newly revived political parties. By February 1992, this effort had evolved 
into a ten-person “Comité de contact” of leaders from the Catholic Episcopal 
Conference and the Rwandan Protestant Council and brought together 
party leadership to work out their differences and seek a common future 
in the establishment of a coalition government.35 In March, the church 
leaders met with RPF representatives, including Commissioner Pasteur 
Bizimungu, in Nairobi to determine the extent of the Front’s commitment 
to negotiations with a broad coalition government.36
 Even as talks moved forward on a multiparty government, new parties 
were proliferating. Some were based on sectarian loyalties, like the Islamic 
Party or the Catholic Christian Democrat Party. Others reflected aspira-
tions of personal leaders. A significant party, the Coalition for Democratic 
Renewal (CDR), was based on the ideology of Hutu ascendancy. Formed 
by a charismatic but erratic Hutu civil servant who fell out with Habyari-
mana, the CDR became a party committed to preserving or enhancing 
the institutional stature of the Hutu majority, which the party saw as 
being jeopardized by negotiations with the RPF. Based in the president’s 
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homeland in northwest Rwanda, where Hutu chiefs had ruled in preco-
lonial days, the CDR had links to the president through his wife’s family. 
The party was not, however, invited to the dialogue that led to the signing 
of an interparty protocol on March 13 with a view to forming a mul-
tiparty “government of transition.” After long negotiations with major 
party leaders, Habyarimana, on April 16, finally invited Dr. Dismas 
Nsengiyaremye, a leader of the MDR/Parmehutu party to head a new 
coalition government.37
the united states  expands its  role
 Political opening within Rwanda induced new international interest in 
resolving the conflict between the Rwandan government, now largely rep-
resentative of internal political forces, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 
still harrying Rwandan government forces in the north. From the begin-
ning, the United States had been concerned about the war in Rwanda. The 
foundations for US policy toward Rwanda were found in the inaugural 
address of George H. W. Bush and in his first State of the Union mes-
sage, both of which emphasized democracy and human rights.38 Thus, US 
policy viewed the conflict in Rwanda in terms of its larger international 
dimensions, namely, regional insecurity, refugee burdens and challenges 
to democratic governance, and fundamental human rights. But in an area 
where it had no significant stake, the United States deferred to regional 
players and to European partners with keener interests. As Mobutu, then 
other regional leaders and the OAU, and finally France moved to bring 
the parties together, the United States took a watching brief and played 
behind the scenes.
 At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen 
regularly received intelligence reports of the ongoing efforts to establish 
peace in the region. On learning of the RPF attacks on Ruhengeri in Jan-
uary 1991, he contacted President Museveni of Uganda by phone to ask 
Ugandan help in preventing the incursions and stopping the fighting.39 
The department then instructed ambassadors in Kampala and Kigali to 
proceed by urging Museveni to deny Uganda as a sanctuary for attacks 
on Rwanda and asking Habyarimana to accelerate national reconciliation 
within Rwanda, to intensify direct talks with the RPF, and vigorously to 
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pursue a comprehensive refugee agreement. In addition to this bilateral 
approach, the United States tried to encourage a joint demarche with 
the European Community in order to have a common message from all 
Western donors to both Rwanda and Uganda. The European Community 
would agree only to a more modest parallel demarche, and even then it had 
to drag a reluctant Great Britain in its wake.40
 In April 1991, Cohen convoked American ambassadors from the region 
to a meeting in Bujumbura. The chiefs of mission concluded that there 
were “no vital US interests at stake [in the regional crisis], either inter-
nationally or domestically.” With regard to Rwanda, they recommended 
that the United States not assume a leadership role but, “in coordination 
with EC colleagues, exert influence selectively to uphold U.S. interests.” 
They felt the United States should use the crisis to encourage movement 
on democracy and human rights interests, to tell the RPF that the United 
States supported its democracy and political equality goals, and to seek a 
durable solution to regional refugee problems. Following their delibera-
tions, the assistant secretary articulated the fundamental US approach to 
the conflict in a news conference:
 We believe that the protection of refugees who return to their 
homes should be ensured by a democratic political system that 
provides to every citizen equal rights and defends human rights.
 We condemn any use of force to settle the problems of refugees 
and ask all governments in the region to prevent any use of their 
territory for military action against their neighbors.41
 The assistant secretary went from that convocation to meet with 
President Museveni and with the Ugandan foreign minister, pressing 
the Ugandan government to interdict military supplies to the RPF and to 
move the RPF toward negotiations. Meanwhile, reports from the field out-
lined the distance between the two sides. In Kigali, US ambassador Robert 
Flaten reported that President Habyarimana was still blaming the war on 
Museveni and holding that “Museveni has not changed at all!” According 
to the president, political dialogue was possible if the RPF took its place as 
a party among other parties within a pluralistic environment. Automatic 
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integration of RPF forces into the Rwandan army was totally unaccept-
able. The military observer group set up under terms of the N’sele Accord 
had not inspected RPF positions and did not appear truly neutral.42
 In Kampala, the US chargé stated that the ceasefire was not holding, 
that artillery and small arms fire along the border occurred daily, and that 
a major escalation was eminent. Thousands of Ugandans were displaced 
by the war all along the border. According to credible reports, the RPA 
had taken over portions of Kisoro District in Uganda, and the National 
Resistance Army still connived with or acquiesced in RPA activity. Dur-
ing the lull in fighting, both sides had had the time to reorganize, train, 
and equip.43
 After the June 1991 OAU Summit at Abuja put Nigerian president 
Babangida in the chairmanship and confirmed Zairean president Mobutu 
as mediator of the Rwandan dispute, the United States asked the OAU 









 Babangida proposed a mini-summit of heads of state in the Central/
East African region. US ambassadors in the region were instructed to in-
form their host governments that the United States supported the OAU’s 
renewed efforts to mediate the conflict. That same demarche also inferred 
Belgian and French preference for African mediation.45 Having sought 
OAU leadership in resolving this conflict, the United States, nonetheless, 
pursued a bilateral initiative when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Irvin Hicks met informally with representatives of the Rwandese Patriotic 
Front and the Rwandan government in Harare.
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 The US hope was that, without impinging on other mediation efforts, 
this meeting might help revive the peace process and “lead to an agree-
ment on a cease fire and to the RPF’s participation in the democratic pro-
cess.” That hope was quickly dashed in a spate of acrimonious charges. The 
government representative, Augustin Ndindilimana, said he had come to 
inform the participants that Rwandan government forces controlled all 
national territory, that pushing back against incursions from Uganda was 
permitted under ceasefire terms, that the RPF would not let the military 
observer group inspect their forward positions nor were they seeking to 
join in political dialogue as a recognized party, and that the presence of 
Western forces in Rwanda was a guarantee of a political process open to all 
Rwandans.46
 The RPF representative, Pasteur Bizimungu, said that the Rwandan 
government had failed to respect the N’sele Accord. He brought as evi-
dence the continuing presence of foreign troops, the incarceration of politi-
cal prisoners, and the inactivity of the military observer group. Were it not 
for foreign troops, the RPF would have achieved military victory. Visits of 
the observer group had been turned back because the Rwandan military 
insisted on accompanying them everywhere. Hicks found the Rwandan 
government intransigent and the RPF legalistic. The Harare meetings, in 
sum, made “little progress.”47
 For all its early efforts in promoting the peace process in Rwanda, 
Washington policy focused largely on other trouble spots in Africa and 
deferred to Brussels and Paris on Rwandan issues. As spelled out at the 
Bujumbura chiefs of mission conference, US policy had been to “keep 
former metropolitan powers (including EC) out in front in solving the 
problem.” Since France among European Community partners had troops 
on the ground and the most direct entrée to the Habyarimana regime, 
Washington policy makers determined to let the French take the lead.48
 Three factors seemed to have occasioned deeper US engagement in 
the Rwandan crisis in early 1992. First, there was general admission among 
the tripartite partners—France, Belgium, and the United States—that 
the peace initiative mediated by President Mobutu in the context of the 
Economic Community of Great Lakes States or the efforts of the Organi-
zation of African Unity was not bringing the conflict to a close. Nor were 
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differences among political groups within Rwanda being bridged. In short, 
there was little progress after over a year of effort by states from within 
the region.49
 Second, the nongovernmental and academic communities began to 
highlight the continuing seriousness of the crisis. Roger Winter at the US 
Committee for Refugees had been urging greater US government atten-
tion to the plight of Banyarwanda refugees since the early 1980s.50 Gene 
Dewey of the Congressional Hunger Committee had traveled to the area 
in March of 1991 and reported that Rwandans wanted help from the out-
side in resolving the crisis.51 In March 1992, academic and government 
specialists met under auspices of the State Department’s Bureau of In-
telligence and Research. Invited as a discussant, I returned to Rwandan 
questions for the first time in nineteen years. Our panel recognized the 
increased corruption under Habyarimana’s administration and attendant 
economic decline, the fragile political situation, and the ravages of civil war. 
As a counter, we recommended economic and political decentralization 
within Rwanda and “the creation of a political system in which both groups 
win, i.e., power sharing democracy.”52
 The conclusions of the “specialists” convinced the director of Central 
African affairs, Ambassador Robert Pringle, to push for a higher US gov-
ernment profile in seeking peace for Rwanda, thus bringing into play the 
third reason for US engagement: high-level policy activism. Assistant 
Secretary Cohen convened a Policy Coordinating Committee on Rwanda 
and Burundi. The committee’s conclusions followed both the track set 
down in Bujumbura nearly a year before and the way forward envisioned by 
the panel of specialists: democratization and ethnic reconciliation through 
diplomatic pressure and program emphasis on these issues by USAID, 
USIS, and military assistance. The committee also concluded that “if a 
coalition government acceptable to the opposition is formed in Rwanda, 
we should urge the French to restart the GOR-RPF negotiations, offering to as-
sist by urging the Ugandans to end their support for the insurgency and 
help bring the RPF to negotiate.”53
 The African affairs “front office” quickly engaged to implement the new 
approach. Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Houdek visited Kampala in 
April right after the formation of a multiparty government in Kigali. He 
Ceasefire
37
confronted Museveni with the outside world’s perception that the RPF 
was operating from Uganda: “A definition of sovereignty is that you control 
your own territory.” In Houdek’s view, the Rwanda/RPF conflict was ignit-
ing “ethnic tinderbox situations in Rwanda and Burundi.” The American 
envoy left Kampala with demurrals from the Ugandans and a plea from 
Rwandan ambassador Kanyarushoki that the United States get involved 
again in trying to bring the sides together.54
 After Houdek’s visit to “test the winds,” Assistant Secretary Cohen fol-
lowed up with a May visit to Kampala and Kigali. In Kampala, he heard 
an RPF plea for direct intervention in the peace process, the integration 
of RPF into the Rwandan army, guarantees of RPF safety, and inter-
nationally observed right of return for all refugees. From Museveni, he 
heard, but disputed, the usual demurrals about Ugandan complicity in the 
conflict. Cohen agreed to US participation (if all parties assented) as an 
observer in a French-led meeting to help along the democratic process and 
jump-start negotiations. He suggested the possibility of US technical as-
sistance in setting forth the parameters of a viable ceasefire and in promot-
ing democratization.55
 The assistant secretary carried to Kigali assurances from the Patri-
otic Front that it was ready to negotiate and to work toward an observable 
ceasefire. Refugees should be able to return freely (a nonnegotiable de-
mand) and the RPF should be integrated into the Rwandan Army. The 
RPF doubted, nonetheless, the capacity of the new Rwandan government 
to govern and to carry forward an effective negotiation. Museveni, for his 
part, was still insisting that the war was between the Rwandan govern-
ment and the RPF. He continued to promise full citizenship to Rwandan 
refugees who did not want to return to their country and expected that 
most of them would want to remain in Uganda.56
 Cohen proposed that the Rwandan and Ugandan governments ne-
gotiate a security pact that would “lock in” commitments of both sides 
to peace. The international community would guarantee such a “mutual 
security” agreement. Cohen found support for this notion within Ugan-
dan leadership and from the foreign minister of Rwanda, but he met with 
initial resistance from President Habyarimana, who wanted to maintain 
the posture that Uganda was responsible for the RPF incursion. Cohen 
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also suggested to his Rwandan hosts that the integration of armies and 
the demobilization of forces be linked and that the right of refugee return 
be included in an eventual peace agreement. He told the Rwandan gov-
ernment, as he had offered to the Patriotic Front, that the United States 
would be willing to participate as an observer in future negotiations and 
would provide US technical assistance in preparations for the talks, if all 
parties requested a US presence.57
 The Rwandans welcomed a possible US participation as observer at 
negotiations with the Front. Minister of Foreign Affairs Boniface Ngu-
linzira told Cohen that Rwanda proposed a two-pronged strategy for 
resolving the war: political dialogue with the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
and normalization of relations with Uganda. It was significant to the dip-
lomatic structure of the talks that the Rwandan government would no 
longer demand a mediating message carrier between the two parties but 
would seek “facilitation” of direct, face-to-face negotiations.58
 As a follow-up to this approach, and after having checked with the 
French, Cohen had Ambassador Johnnie Carson in Uganda facilitate a 
face-to-face meeting between the Rwandan government and the RPF in 
Kampala. In late May, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira (accompanied by the 
interior minister and the minister for refugee affairs) traveled to Uganda to 
initiate talks with the RPF and with the Ugandan government. The talks, 
delayed a week by hesitations on both sides, were finally held on May 24.59 
Ngulinzira later asserted that Cohen’s role had been indispensable in 
arranging the projected meeting.60
 The French foreign ministry immediately followed up those talks with 
an invitation to the two parties to meet in Paris. The parties could set 
the agenda and determine the extent of French participation. The minis-
try also informed the parties that, in view of the recent visit made by Mr. 
Cohen in the region and the discussions he had there, France had invited 
the United States to be associated with the meeting.
To Arusha through Paris
 As the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front pre-
pared to meet each other again, this time in Paris, it was in the context of a 
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dramatically changed peace process. For one, the conflict was lasting longer 
than either side had expected. The RPF had hoped for a quick victory 
and enthusiastic reception in 1990. Instead, it found a population that fled 
before it and a GOR military that eventually dealt it some losses. Initially, 
the Rwandan army thought they had won as the RPF forces withdrew to 
the mountains between Uganda and Rwanda. Yet a year and a half later, 
the sputtering confrontation of forces was taking on the characteristics of 
an intractable conflict.
 Second, the internal situation within Rwanda had changed signifi-
cantly as well. Since the incursion of October 1, 1990, the Habyarimana 
regime had released thousands imprisoned for suspected RPF sympathies, 
promulgated a new constitution allowing multiparty government, commit-
ted itself to the programmed return of refugees, offered amnesty to persons 
who had joined the RPF cause, and finally, after eight months of nego-
tiations and an aborted first attempt, set up a multiparty coalition gov-
ernment to rule until the next elections. That government now included 
parties, such as the so-called Democratic Forces of Change, determined 
to replace the established regime through constitutional processes. The 
government’s position in any two-party talks was thus greatly complicated, 
and Habyarimana’s freedom of maneuver significantly limited.
 For all of the changes on the political front, the war that impelled those 
changes had drawn to a stalemate. Despite a huge increase in recruitment 
and operational expense, the Rwandan government forces were not able to 
dislodge or push back RPF forces entrenched in the Virunga Mountains, 
or to protect front lines from lightning incursions. The RPF forces were 
not able, or not yet willing, to leave their mountain redoubts and advance 
southward.61 What united politicians of all stripes within Rwanda was a 
desire to end the war that had depopulated large parts of Rwanda’s fer-
tile north, created over a million internally displaced persons, ruined the 
economy, and bankrupted the country.
 Third, peacemaking had failed, whether under auspices of the Great 
Lakes Community and President Mobutu, the interventions of Tanzanian 
president Mwinyi, or the efforts of the Organization of African Unity. 
For all the presidential summitry, subregional and regional organizations 
had not been able to organize an international presence in Rwanda as a 
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guarantor of the peace process. As Foreign Minister Ngulinzira was later 
to note, “Rwanda has had two unfortunate experiences with African ob-
server forces, one ineffective, the other nonexistent.”62 The RPF and the 
government met and signed a ceasefire agreement at N’sele and amended 
it at Gbadolite, but these had not diminished hostile posturing or armed 
conflict along the border. By the admission of all sides, this “African” prob-
lem no longer admitted a purely “African” solution.
 Finally, the position of donors had evolved. Belgium and France had 
both been active on the diplomatic front since October 1990, with France 
supporting Mobutu’s efforts and Belgium favoring OAU initiatives. Now, 
in the wake of the Bugesera massacres, Belgium had been particularly 
strenuous in its condemnation of the Habyarimana regime, while French 
patience with the Rwandan army’s performance was wearing thin. Both 
sought a more vigorous engagement as a way out of an apparent dead end.
 The Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandan government had en-
treated Assistant Secretary Cohen to lead a new mediation. The United 
States, with its usual proclivity for regional approaches in conflict resolu-
tion, first suggested the EC as an appropriate mediating institution.63 The 
US government finally had agreed to provide some technical assistance to 
the peace process and to be linked formally to future talks as an “observer.” 
Thus, the parties were coming to Paris with the peace process now being 
managed by donor partners rather than by African states.
 Two things remained constant in this protracted history of political 
change and military stalemate: the willingness of the Habyarimana regime 
to countenance or connive in ethnic violence at times of acute political 
tension, and the proclivity of the Patriotic Front to use military coercion 
to enhance its negotiating posture. A prime example of the former was the 
Bugesera massacres, perpetrated just as the Habyarimana regime was re-
sisting pressure to form a coalition government. A good illustration of the 
latter came as the principals were on their way to Paris. On June 5, the day 
that peace talks were to begin, the RPF launched an attack in the center 
north at Byumba. France brought in an additional company of troops to 
protect its citizens in Kigali. It looked like the logic of war was again to 
win out over the logic of peace. Yet, though somewhat delayed, the Paris 
talks went forward on June 6. The US embassy in Paris concluded that “as 
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far as we can ascertain neither the June 5 RPF attack in northern Rwanda 
nor the French deployment of an additional army company had any direct 
resonance in the talks.”64
the united states  joins  the dialo gue
 The United States accepted the invitation of the French government 
and the parties to be “present” at the Paris talks, sending Jeffrey Davidow, 
the senior deputy assistant secretary for African affairs. Davidow engaged 
both sides on the substantive issues facing the talks: the when and how of 
a ceasefire, the agenda for political talks, the relation between the process 
of democratization within the country and the RPF demands for inclusion 
within the polity, and how to deal with repatriation of refugees into an 
already overpopulated country.65
 In the talks with Ambassador Davidow, the Rwandan government 
delegation reaffirmed its two-track approach, patching up relations with 
Uganda even as it initiated talks with the RPF. On the other side, RPF 
chief negotiator Pasteur Bizimungu held that “the transition government 
should be broad based and have the agreement of all parties, even those 
not included in it.” Regarding the talks, Davidow predicted that “successes, 
if there are any, will be minimal.”66 That is why, in his meeting with French 
director for African affairs Dijoud, Davidow noted that the Rwandans 
could not solve their problem alone. He urged the French to consider a 
mediation role, perhaps in conjunction with the Tanzanians, who did not 
have the resources to go it alone. “It is more important that the mediator 
be powerful than that it be neutral,” Davidow insisted.67 As for the United 
States, it was willing to be present in the process but would have difficulty 
contributing manpower or money other than some technical advice to the 
negotiators and assistance for refugees.
what was concluded and what was not
 The Paris talks finally began on June 6, 1992. Except for a French and 
US presence at the opening and closing sessions, the three-day talks were 
direct and closed-door. The closing communiqué reaffirmed the mediation 
of Mobutu while reserving the right to face-to-face “facilitated” talks. The 
parties asked neighboring countries as well as the OAU, France, Belgium, 
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and the United Sates to be Observers to the negotiations. As regards the 
implementation of a ceasefire, the parties “affirmed their political will to put 
an end to the war,” reaffirmed the validity of the N’sele Accord of March 29, 
1991, and asked the OAU secretary general to provide information on an 
OAU monitoring role. On a possible agenda for negotiations, the parties 
retained from the Rwandan government the question of national unity 
and the democratization process and from the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
the fusion of the two armies, a transitional government with an enlarged 
base, and political guarantees. The two parties agreed to meet again July 
10–12 in Africa (either in Zaire or Tanzania) for substantive discussion on 
a ceasefire.68 Less than a month later, direct talks between Foreign Minister 
Ngulinzira and RPF chairman Kanyarengwe at the OAU ministerial in 
the presence of the Senegalese foreign minister (Senegal had just taken 
over as chair of the OAU) firmed up these understandings.
 What was not in the communiqué was the very large arena still con-
tested by the two sides. There was no agreement on how refugees should 
be repatriated. The coalition government wanted to preserve the institu-
tions that the 1991 constitution put in place and expand them to include 
RPF participation; the RPF wanted to dismantle the current government 
and rewrite the constitution. The government wanted to move forward to 
new elections that would provide the basis for multiparty participation in 
government; the RPF wanted to hold national elections at the end of the 
interim period but insisted on immediate local elections to replace officials 
named by the current regime. The government would accept token inte-
gration of RPA officers into the Rwandan army; the RPF wanted to de-
mobilize the government army and integrate RPF troops into a new force 
at a 50:50 ratio. As for the critical issue of moving forward on a sustainable 
ceasefire, the Rwandan government wanted an interposition force, whereas 
the Patriotic Front wanted a truce line monitored by a small observer force.
 The Paris talks reflected, as well, positions of the international actors 
in this crisis. France’s role, solicited by the government and questioned by 
the RPF, was confirmed by the success, however limited, of the Paris talks. 
The United States, which had early staked out a middle ground on the 
crisis, was now being solicited by both sides as an honest broker. However, 
Ambassador Davidow had carefully delimited the modest role that the 
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United States envisioned.69 His argument against an expensive interposi-
tion force, his urging of progress in democratization as the path to peace, 
and his enthusiasm for parallel interim institutions like a political military 
committee were positions to which the United States would continually 
return. Operationally, keeping the French forward in the peace process and 
keeping costs low became central planks in the US platform.
 Senegal, by virtue of its presidency of the OAU, was assured of a voice 
at the table. Both France and Rwanda seemed to see Uganda as an essential 
part of the peace process, as witnessed by the border-assessment mission 
France had already deployed and the upcoming visit of Ugandan foreign 
minister Ssemogerere to Paris. The parties were ambiguous about poten-
tial African mediators. Neither side was particularly friendly with the Tan-
zanians. Both the internal opposition and RPF mistrusted Zaire. But 
both were determined that the ceasefire negotiations should move back to 
an African locale. Eventually, Arusha won out over Kinshasa, although 
the parties insisted on keeping Mobutu as mediator and the N’sele Accord 
as the founding document for the revived negotiation process.70
an american gambit
 Since the US policy review in March, the United States had been 
visibly active in the Central African region. An internal summation of 
the US position concluded that “with Hank Cohen’s high visibility as the 
promoter of dialogue and without a vested interest in the area, the USG 
is seen as the most objective party.”71 Cohen’s personal diplomacy had 
brought together the Rwandan government and the Front in Kampala. He 
had encouraged Museveni’s positive participation in the peace process and 
had secured an invitation to the United States to be present at the Paris 
talks in May. Now the French had invited the assistant secretary to be in 
Paris during the visit of Ugandan foreign minister Ssemogerere on June 20. 
The ostensible purpose of the foreign minister’s meeting was to be briefed 
on the French border survey. But Paris wanted Cohen’s help in pressuring 
the Ugandans to stop assistance to the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
 At the meeting, the assistant secretary found the foreign minister 
surrounded by Ugandan security officers and plaintively denying Ugan-
dan engagement with the RPF. Cohen finally got Ssemogerere to the side 
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and told him that the United States knew that Uganda was supplying the 
RPF. This war was destabilizing the region and costing the international 
community large outlays for humanitarian relief. The war must stop. If a 
ceasefire was not in place by October 1, Cohen warned, the United States 
would deduct from its aid to Uganda the amount of its costs for relief 
for displaced persons within Rwanda.72 The foreign minister said that he 
personally welcomed this demarche and wished that President Museveni 
would have a chance to hear it directly.
 Consequently, Cohen had Ambassador Carson deliver to President 
Museveni a letter in which Cohen noted that the fighting in the Rwan-
dan conflict had intensified despite Museveni’s commitment to help end 
the conflict, that the fighting was not necessary since the democratization 
process in Rwanda allowed the RPF the best chance to gain satisfaction of 
its legitimate grievances, that the fighting was draining international relief 
coffers, and that Museveni’s government “bears a direct responsibility in 
the continuation of the fighting.” The letter then reiterated the US position 
that if a peaceful settlement or firm ceasefire “is not in place by October 1, 
1992, we will have no choice, given the burden the conflict places on U.S. 
resources, but to deduct what is needed for relief for Rwanda’s displaced 
from the economic assistance we provide to Uganda.”73
 On Assistant Secretary Cohen’s return to Washington, the staff sent 
up a decision memorandum proposing technical assistance to the ceasefire 
negotiations. The memorandum was based on the belief that the Rwandan 
conflict had reached a critical turning point where “the situation may de-
teriorate due to inertia and inexperience on the part of the GOR and the 
RPF,” if the United States did not exert pressure to influence the outcome 
of ceasefire negotiations. The proposal would have legal expert John Byerly 
and military specialist Lt. Col. Charles Snyder meet with the government 
of Rwanda and the Patriotic Front, respectively, to discuss preliminary 
ceasefire proposals and conflict resolution techniques.74
 If those talks were constructive, the experts would proceed to the ne-
gotiations as backup technical support to the US ambassador to Tanzania, 
Edmund DeJarnette, the official US Observer for the ceasefire talks. The 
memorandum also recommended that “we brief the French and the Bel-
gians on what we propose to do” and that the United States raise the level 
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of regular contact with the Patriotic Front to the ambassadorial level in 
Kampala, thus “increasing symmetry in our relations with the GOR and 
the RPF.” Cohen agreed to the proposals under specific condition that 
the French and the Belgians not object to this modest US initiative. The 
French and Belgian embassies in Washington were called in for a briefing, 
and demarches were made in each capital.75
 Snyder and Byerly had helped construct the Namibian peace agree-
ment and brokered a truce in the Angolan civil war, and they were at that 
time deeply involved in peace negotiations in Mozambique. With Byerly’s 
knowledge of texts and approaches and Snyder’s understanding of military 
requirements, they constituted a formidable reservoir of information on 
strategies for conflict resolution. Snyder spent long hours with RPA leader 
Kagame and his cohort when they visited Washington, and Byerly went to 
Kigali to huddle with the Rwandan government negotiators. The Byerly-
Snyder team forwarded texts from ceasefire agreements in Zimbabwe, 
Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to both parties.76
 The experts found two very different planning environments. Colonel 
Snyder met with Paul Kagame, a military leader who had demonstrated 
military prowess in the field but had yet to raise significant political sup-
port within Rwanda. Convincing Kagame and the RPF that they could 
attain their minimum goals through compromise within a political process 
was Snyder’s goal. He found the RPF to be quick learners who assessed 
negotiating scenarios and expanded their options and analyses in prepa-
ration for the July 10 encounter. On the other hand, Byerly met with a 
Rwandan government discouraged about the war, divided on core prin-
ciples, and competing with the president for power. Byerly had to rally the 
divided and dispirited members of the Rwandan government, convincing 
them to develop a common position and confidently to engage the RPF in 
negotiations.77
Finally, a Ceasefire
 Despite the apparent success of the Paris talks, the success of the July 
ceasefire negotiations was by no means assured. Until late June, it was not 
known where the talks would take place, other than that they would be 
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held in Africa, in keeping with OAU principles. Though the parties were 
loyal to Mobutu as mediator and to the N’sele and Gbadolite Accords as 
the foundation for future discussions, Zaire, preoccupied with its own in-
ternal problems, was not in a position to host the negotiation.
 With customary caution, the Tanzanian government indicated its 
willingness to take on such a role, should both parties request it officially.78 
On June 26, Rwandan minister of interior Munyazesa asked the govern-
ment of Tanzania to “arrange for direct GOR-RPF talks to take place in 
Arusha, July 10–12.” But it was not yet confirmed what the Tanzanian role 
would be in those talks.79
 As the ceasefire talks opened in Arusha, July 10, Ambassador DeJar-
nette noted the style of Foreign Minister Ngulinzira as conciliatory and 
flexible but that of RPF commissioner Bizimungu as rhetorical and de-
manding. Ngulinzira presided over a large delegation representing con-
tentious political parties, the foreign ministry, and the defense ministry. 
Bizimungu spoke for a small team of experienced negotiators and one field 
commander.80
 The sessions were beset by “confusion over tabled texts, a tendency 
by both delegations to score negotiating points rather than focus on sub-
stance.” According to DeJarnette, “mutual suspicion and a tendency to lose 
sight of final objectives” characterized the Rwandan delegations. Long-
winded interventions by Foreign Minister Diria and other African Ob-
servers “missed the mark more often than they hit it.” The US delegation 
concluded that “it is at best an even proposition that they will succeed in 
reaching any agreement in Arusha and even less that the agreement will 
be workable.” Although the United States had been engaged in the ne-
gotiating process with technical advice from the Byerly-Snyder team and 
networking by Ambassador DeJarnette, the delegation felt that the United 
States should not associate itself with an agreement that could not be ex-
pected to succeed.81
 Yet, despite maladroit handling of issues, including dismissal of a 
hard-won agreement on a buffer zone, Minister Diria persisted. On the 
night of July 11, he kept delegations locked in discussions until fundamen-
tal agreement had finally been hammered out in the early morning hours. 
Technical framing from the Observer group, including the proposal of a 
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“mixed commission” to oversee the peace process, contributed significantly 
to an early morning consensus. An agreement was in hand by July 12 and 
finally signed on July 13. Under its terms, a truce would take effect on July 
19 with the full ceasefire to go into force on July 31. Political negotiations 
were to begin on August 10 and conclude no later than October 10 with the 
signing of a permanent peace treaty. Measures in the peace agreement were 
to be implemented by January 19, 1993.
 The ceasefire agreement reestablished the Neutral Military Observer 
Group (NMOG) made up of contingents from West and Southern Africa 
and officers from the contending parties. The group would verify and con-
trol the ceasefire and report violations to the OAU secretary general and 
a Joint Political Military Commission ( JPMC). This mixed commission, 
which Observers had pressed on the negotiating parties, would be com-
posed of five representatives each of the opposing parties, with the OAU, 
neighboring countries, Belgium, France, and the United States invited to 
participate as Observers. The JPMC would follow up implementation of 
the ceasefire and of the peace agreement, once it was signed. Its first session 
was held in Addis within a fortnight of the ceasefire agreement, another 
meeting convened in Addis on September 25–27, and two more met in 
Arusha on October 25–26 and December 22–23. In those early days, absent 
the expected deployment of the NMOG and given the tough jousting of 
political negotiations, the JPMC became guardian of the ceasefire and a 
channel of dialogue between parties.
 Under Article V of the agreement, the signatories accepted political 
principles whose “modalities of implementation” were to be specified dur-
ing subsequent negotiations:
•	 establishment	of	the	rule	of	law	on	national	unity,	democracy,	pluralism,	





 The United States, which had wondered if there would be a cease-
fire worth supporting, now wanted to buttress the first realistic ceasefire 
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document in the war’s nearly two-year history. In an official statement, the 
Department of State said it was “greatly encouraged” by the signing of the 
ceasefire agreement and gave credit to both parties, as well as to the govern-
ment of Tanzania which hosted the negotiations, to the Organization of 
African Unity which would supervise the military observer group and to 
the government of France for its lead role in organizing the negotiations.83 
The Department of State immediately dispatched letters of congratula-
tions to President Habyarimana, RPF chairman Kanyarengwe, and the 
chief negotiators.84
Residual Issues
concessions  and compromises
 A quick look at the simple language of this brief agreement shows how 
much is granted by both sides. At the Paris meeting, the RPF urged dis-
solution of the current regime and the constitution of a new order in which 
the RPF would be a major partner. The Rwandan government wanted to 
preserve the 1991 constitution and to insert the RPF as a political party 
within the emerging democratic process. The ceasefire called for an “en-
larged, broad-based” interim government, suggesting deeper changes 
in established institutions than the government might have wanted. The 
RPF wanted the “dissolution of the Rwandan army and its reconstitution 
as a new entity with full integration of RPF soldiers.” The Rwandan gov-
ernment was willing to accept only integration of select RPF officers. That 
the ceasefire formula called for “formation of a national army consisting 
of Government forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front” implies 
that the RPF won the day on the military side. 85
 What is missing from the scope of the ceasefire principles is any men-
tion of refugee return. After the June three-day, closed-door session in 
Paris, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira told Ambassador Davidow that there 
was still no real agreement on the refugee issue. The Rwandan govern-
ment was prepared to permit the return of qualified professionals, but “a 
mass return of peasants without lengthy careful preparation would bring 
insurmountable problems.”86 At his news conference at the conclusion 
of the Paris meeting, Ngulinzira reaffirmed the Rwandan government 
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commitment to the February 1991 Dar es Salaam Declaration on refugees. 
The Patriotic Front, however, did not want Rwandans’ right of return con-
travened by any schema, whether Rwandan government or international. 
That is one of the reasons they launched the war.87 Yet, the ceasefire agree-
ment, other than mentioning the Dar es Salaam Declaration on refugees 
in its preamble, did not set forth the refugee issue as a matter of future 
negotiation.
presidential  hesitation
 There was as well a structural and political difference in this ceasefire 
negotiation. President Habyarimana or his cohorts had agreed to the two 
previous ceasefires. Despite the fact that one had been ineffective and the 
other nonexistent (to use the characterization of Foreign Minister Ngu-
linzira), the president had been engaged in the process. This time, the 
foreign minister, coming from an opposition party in the coalition gov-
ernment, negotiated the ceasefire. The agreed political agenda conceded 
ground that the Rwandan government had adamantly held on continuity of 
the government and on integration of forces. There was a question whether 
the president would accept the handiwork of the Rwandan government 
delegation.
 Immediately following the ceasefire signing, President Habyarimana 
went off to Belgium. At his meeting with King Baudouin on July 20, 
Habyarimana seemed hesitant in his support for the ceasefire terms. But 
at his later meeting with Foreign Minister Claes, Habyarimana came out 
solidly in support of the ceasefire. What happened in between was that 
the US embassy tracked down the president in his hotel and delivered a 
letter from President Bush congratulating him on “his success in bringing 
Rwanda one step closer to peace.” Having read the letter, Habyarimana 
gave his “personal and unwavering commitment to continuing the peace 
process” and asked that that oral response be conveyed to the president.88 
The Belgians saw the quick and unambiguous support of the United States 
for the ceasefire as the element that tilted the Rwandan president, publicly 
at least, in its favor.89 Whether the president would buy into subsequent 
negotiations carried out by the coalition government remained a problem 
to the very end.
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museveni ’s  role
 Perhaps pivotal to the success of this ceasefire’s implementation was 
a new engagement by President Museveni. He had, heretofore, claimed 
innocence regarding the RPF incursion and had perfunctorily attended 
peacemaking summits. Now he called in the American chargé and told 
her that, although he “didn’t know what was happening in Rwanda” and in 
view of the fact that he was being held responsible, he had asked his people 
(the NRA) to find out who was responsible for the fighting in June. He 
also sent a message to the RPF informing them of his strong support for 
the ceasefire. The president took the occasion to complain that the French 
were arming the Rwandan army with a new long-range gun, which French 
instructors had fired at the RPF. Museveni’s positive support for the cease-
fire, his apparent efforts to rein in the RPF, and his strong criticism of the 
French put the jinx on a joint French-US demarche to Museveni being 
proposed in the capitals. The chargé concluded, “This meeting would seem 
to make a joint French-U.S. demarche . . . superfluous.”90
nmo g iv
 The text, mainly at the insistence of US technical advisors, contained 
a provision for establishment of a “neutral corridor” separating the two re-
spective forces so as to facilitate monitoring of the ceasefire by the Neutral 
Military Observer Group (NMOG). This monitoring group was not a 
new idea; the Gbadolite Summit, the N’sele ceasefire agreement, and the 
1991 OAU Summit outlined a monitoring group in different iterations.
 At the Arusha discussion, the parties decided to reconstitute the fifty-
officer Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) under direct OAU au-
thority, giving it responsibility for verification and control of the ceasefire. The 
group was to be deployed on July 31, but the international community was not 
prepared to fund deployment of the force. Equipping of the NMOG was still 
being discussed between donors and the OAU secretary general on August 10 
at the opening of the political negotiations. Only on October 13 could OAU 
deputy secretary general Mapuranga report that the six NMOG contingents 
were at last in Kigali and would be deployed to the “neutral zone” by the 
weekend. By this time, the first two parts of the Arusha Protocols had been 
negotiated, without any intervening force on the ground.91
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kigali ’ s  reaction
 Back in Kigali, Rwandan political forces did not universally welcome 
the ceasefire. Some were suspicious of the sincerity of the RPF in enter-
ing into negotiations, believing that it might use negotiations as a blind 
to cover rearmament and an enhanced field position. Others wondered if 
Habyarimana’s trip to Europe was not a way of getting support for toning 
down provisions of the ceasefire. An insider from the Revolutionary Na-
tional Movement for Development (MRND) said that many party stalwarts 
believed that the government had given away too much at the ceasefire talks. 
On his return from Europe, Habyarimana urged all Rwandans to support 
the agreement, and the president of the MRND accepted the principles of 
the agreement as long as they did not “call into question either the political 
system or the republican institutions already existing in the country.”
 The nascent CDR, however, came out categorically against the cease-
fire, denouncing the agreement point by point and claiming that all conces-
sions had been on the Rwandan side, that Uganda should be party to the 
agreement (in line with the thesis that the RPF was a Ugandan front), that 
the RPF should not have parity with government either in negotiations or 
in the Joint Political Military Commission, and that the CDR should be 
accepted in the government and participate in the next negotiations. Its 
rhetoric heightened in subsequent weeks as CDR leaders called for the 
prime minister’s resignation and urged the creation of a new government 
that would protect Hutu interests.92
 As a result of changes in internal administration, strife erupted be-
tween youth wings of the major parties.93 The MRND Interahamwe 
showed its strength and connections to the security apparatus as the 
youth corps barricaded traffic in and out of Kigali under the benign eye 
of the Kigali prefect, gendarmerie captain, and the prosecuting attorney. 
Although the purpose of the demonstration was to protest intimidation 
by other youth militia against MRND incumbents, the fact of interparty 
strife accentuated the divisions within Rwanda even as the government 
sought to organize a united front for political negotiations.94
changed perspectives
 The two days of disjointed but intense negotiations that constituted the 
Arusha ceasefire talks changed the dynamics of the peace process in two ways. 
Prelude to Genocide
52
First, there was enough in the details of the agreement to offer promise of 
implementation through the Joint Political Military Commission, the Neu-
tral Military Observer Group, and the Organization of African Unity’s clear 
mandate for oversight. Second, whatever their ultimate goals regarding con-
trol in the country, the two Rwanda parties did commit to the logic of peace 
built around discussions on the rule of law, military integration, and power 
sharing, and to a warrant searching for common ground in subsequent talks.
 Meanwhile, the context of international intervention had changed. 
Mobutu, the mediator, held on to his title but was too busy parrying with 
the Zairean National Conference by this time to give much thought to 
Rwandan negotiations. Instead, OAU secretary general Salim Ahmed Salim 
presided over the talks, while Tanzanian foreign minister Diria “facilitated” 
the negotiations with a certain heavy-handed determination that finally won 
concessions and agreement. Finally, under the able leadership of Senegal’s 
ambassador Louis Pape Fall, the Observers gained cohesion as a group.
persistent problems
 For all the changed dynamics of the peace process, many things re-
mained the same. The distance between the two parties was palpable in the 
tensions of the negotiations and in the rhetorical attacks of formal presen-
tations. Both parties anchored their strategies in positions that seemed ir-
reconcilable: radical change of Rwandan governing institutions on the one 
hand, or continuity and defense of those same structures on the other.95 
The exiles carried in their conceptual baggage long years of participation 
in Museveni’s National Resistance Movement. The government brought 
thirty years of experience in governing or contesting for governance in 
Rwanda. The question was whether the parties—given their long, separate 
histories and contrary perspectives—would find common ground. The 
conflict that had settled into a stalemate now had a sustainable ceasefire, 
but was the crisis “ripe for resolution”?96
Lessons We Learned
 The search for a durable ceasefire in Rwanda took over twenty-one 
months and involved states and organizations of the subregion, major 
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partners, and international organizations. Lessons learned in this multi-
stakeholder pursuit of peace include the following:
•	 Outbreaks	of	international	violence	are	seldom	predictable.	Both President 
Habyarimana and President Museveni were playing on the world 
stage in New York when the Rwandese Patriotic Front attacked across 
their mutual border into Rwanda.
• Conflicts between states and insurgencies usually need outside intervention to 
bring both parties to the negotiating table. In Rwanda’s case, it took a high-
level intervention by France backed by the United States at a meeting 
in Paris to set up the eventual framework of the Arusha talks.
•	 A willingness to talk comes out of a mutually hurting stalemate. Parties will 
stop the fighting and pursue peace only when they see a greater long-
term advantage in political dialogue than in continued armed conflict.
•	 Along the path to a cessation of hostilities, return to fighting can be expected. 
Contenders will use violence to demonstrate their capacity to harm 
before engaging seriously in negotiation. In Rwanda, the government 
abetted ethnic violence, whereas the RPF used unexpected strikes 
against strategic targets.
•	 Failed attempts at a durable ceasefire have a certain utility. In Rwanda, iden-
tifying the parties, drawing out their commitment to negotiations and 
to peace, mobilizing international concern, and outlining the elements 
of a peace process all came out of aborted ceasefire negotiations.
•	 A	carefully	tailored	agreement	might	not	last	if	power	holders	are	uncertain	
that the negotiation satisfies their interests. In the case of Rwanda, Habyari-
mana almost backed out of the ceasefire agreement until reassured by 




 In a ceasefire agreement hammered out in the early morning hours 
of July 12, 1992, the Rwandan government (GOR) and the Rwandan Pa-
triotic Front (RPF) decided that political negotiations should include the 
“establishment of the rule of law that is based namely on national unity, 
democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights.”1
 International participants in the negotiations applauded the wisdom 
of this intention. After all, since ancient days, law has been linked to state 
founding, whereas in modern times, the rule of law has been seen as a fun-
damental building block of international peace and domestic tranquility. 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) built its 
ethos on the notion that “societies based on the rule of law are prerequi-
sites for . . . the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation.”2 
Boutros-Ghali saw the rule of law as intrinsic to peacekeeping. “There is 
an obvious connection between the rule of law and the achievement of 
true peace and security in any new and stable political order.”3 Kofi Annan 
considered the rule of law and fair administration of justice as essential to 
the consolidation of peace in a postconflict situation.4 “A government of 
laws and not of men,” John Adams’s prescription for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, has become a formulaic mantra of numerous governmental 
and nongovernmental agencies seeking to promote stability and order.5
 This chapter will first review the issues confronted in negotiations on 
the rule of law. Since this was the first session of the political negotiations, 
I also look at the context of the policies and strategies being developed on 
both sides before considering the physical space across which the nego-
tiations were conducted. For the international interveners buttressing the 
talks, the questions under debate took on curious twists of meaning, but 
the signing of the first protocol raised hopes for future success. However, 
Law
55
postscripts to the talks—ethnic violence within Rwanda, diplomatic 
jockeying, and a signal lack of focused attention by international partners—
were harbingers of difficult times ahead.
Issues at Stake
 If there is anything in political negotiations that contending parties 
might agree on, it surely ought to be the creation of a regime of law that 
would channel conflict into peaceful, political engagement. It is seldom so 
simple. The issues at stake in negotiations on law entail several questions:
 Should political negotiations first deal with foundational principles of law or 
brace into the complexities of power sharing and military integration? Can agree-
ment on first principles generate a fundamental understanding on which 
to build subsequent negotiations?
 What is the understood purpose of negotiated principles? Are these under-
standings to reform existing institutions, or are they to establish a revolu-
tionary new order?
 How do the perspectives on legal order that delegations brought with them affect 
the course of the negotiations? Do perspectives from different legal traditions 
and political circumstances lead finally to shared understandings, or do 
they cover over profound differences of view and approach?
 What was the significance of the agreed principles? What did democracy, par-
ticipation, rights, equity, or good governance mean to each party? The language 
in agreements usually comes out of different contexts and points toward 
different objectives.
Whose Rule? Which Law?
 Like many descriptors in the public arena, the rule of law is a more com-
plicated and ambiguous prescription than it seems.6 Which legal order is being 
invoked? A legal system may be nothing more than the maintenance by ac-
cepted authority of traditional customs and sanctions.7 It may be, in the con-
tinental tradition, a codification of fundamental principles, derived from a 
universal normative order. Or it may be the compilation of particular decisions 
of law courts using previous precedent to establish “common law.”8 Changing 
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legal systems can radically restructure society. In transitional situations espe-
cially, law becomes an instrument of power rather than a hedge against it.9
 The Rwandan government delegation was schooled in code law, a good 
part of it directly taken from Belgian criminal and civil law at the time of 
independence. The RPF’s experience, at least for the leadership that came 
from Uganda, was in the common law tradition, combining precedent 
from British courts with local custom. Within Rwanda, Rwandan citizens 
had experienced the administration of law under a de facto single party 
from 1962 to 1973 and a de jure single party from 1978 to 1991. The president 
ruled, and the law was his instrument.
 Outside of Rwanda, refugees and exiles that made up the RPF had 
lived in quasilegal status. Theoretically they were under the protection of 
the international refugee regime, but they were without guarantee of life 
or property and thus at the mercy of local and national politics. In 1982–83 
for example, thousands were forced off land they had bought in south-
west Uganda and harried back to refugee camps or into Rwanda with 
great suffering and hardship. Moving from one part of the host country to 
another was sometimes necessary to avoid local animosities. Under these 
conditions, law was arbitrary; refugees made up their own rules for sur-
vival. Security became the lodestar of any legal undertaking.
universal  norms or p ositive  l aw?
 In the particular case of Rwanda, it was also a question of what inter-
national understandings of law were at play. Was the Rwandan dispute a 
matter of international province or local jurisdiction? Emphasizing the ex-
ternal nature of the insurgency, the Rwandan government tended to appeal 
to international law on intervention, whereas the RPF generally held that 
this was an internal argument to be resolved between the parties them-
selves. Rwandan authorities believed that civic rights and social status were 
internal matters for the government to control, whereas the RPF appealed 
to universal standards of human rights.10
 In its formulation, the amended N’sele ceasefire agreement described 
the rule of law in terms (national unity, democracy, pluralism, and respect 
for human rights) that bespoke late night wrangling over such differences 
of approach, bridged by a grab-bag definition of multiple and sometimes 
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contradictory notions.11 Could the rule of law undergird the national unity 
objectives of the N’sele ceasefire agreement? As Kritz points out, the rule 
of law is fundamentally a conservative principle, unless one is seeking to re-
place an existing legal system with another. The “respect for human rights,” 
however, is a liberal principle, often challenging—on the basis of universal 
norms—the particular application of existing law.12 Positive law and innate 
rights may often conflict.13 In the Rwandan negotiations, the government 
tended to emphasize existing law and local custom, whereas the Patriotic 
Front appealed to immutable, universal rights.
which founding principles?
 The appeal both to democracy and pluralism had its ambiguities as 
well. As Aristotle long ago made clear, democracy has within it a bias to-
ward anarchy or tyranny. His preferred option was a “mixed regime,” incor-
porating the strengths of several political interests within the body politic. 
This view has its champions in contemporary proponents of pluralistic 
republicanism.14 In Rwanda, since the revolution of 1959, Hutu elite had 
ruled under the banner of majoritarian democracy. But the Hutu regimes 
excluded, either arbitrarily under Kayibanda or by announced policy under 
Habyarimana, a significant part of the population from effective represen-
tation in the institutions of government and the occupations of state. The 
leadership of the RPF, on the other hand, had been trained in the “no party” 
politics of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement, inclusive of various 
ethnic groups but holding to a vision dictated from the top, not to a con-
sensual agreement on law. What would be the constitutional foundation 
underlying the establishment of political order in Rwanda?
a traditional  rwandan view?
 Was there, behind the scrim of these modern interpretations, a tradi-
tional understanding of judicial relations in Rwanda? There did exist in 
precolonial Rwanda a formal judicial mechanism mediated by the army 
system into which each Rwandan male was integrated. Assisted by his 
local military chief, every Rwandan had the right to appeal directly to the 
court of the king (mwami). In disputes with land chiefs or cattle chiefs, 
the army chief became the designated protector of his clients’ interests. 
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Although the king was surrounded by guardians of ritual custom (abiru) 
and by a council of chiefs (abatware b’intebe), he ruled by virtue of his divine 
origins, gave account to no one, and passed judgment as he saw fit.15
 The import of this traditional system of justice is fourfold. First, there 
was an institutionalized system of justice in precolonial Rwanda with a direct 
route from local grievance to the king’s court. Second, the mediator for that 
justice was the local army chief, and thus justice was tied directly to military 
representatives of royal authority. Third, the king was not circumscribed in 
his right to judge; the system of justice was thus hierarchical and autocratic, 
untrammeled by institutional limitations. Finally, with the president’s close 
control of the judicial system, the pattern of judicial administration under 
the Second Republic replicated in modern garb this traditional model. The 
first agenda item at Arusha—negotiations on the rule of law—implied a 
direct challenge to the prevailing judicial ethos and to a traditional Rwandan 
understanding of judicial administration. Would negotiations on the rule of 
law lead to a separation of powers and judicial autonomy, or would the old 
system of personalized but autocratic justice prevail?
 If autocracy and autonomy, law and rights, democracy and plurality 
are problematic in any contemporary polity, how much more were they 
salient in troubled Rwanda?16 The ruling regime, the newly established 
political parties, and the “armed opposition” all invoked the norm of “de-
mocracy” and the process of “democratization.” All would have, as well, 
upheld a national unity that allowed some form of diversity. All would 
have, in principle, supported “human rights” as constitutionally defining 
the place of citizens within the national polity. All, no doubt, sought a re-
gime in which “political relations between the state and its citizens feature 
broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation.”17 But what, 
concretely, did these ideals mean for determining the parameters of “law” 
and for structuring the other items on the negotiation agenda: “establish-
ment of power sharing” and  “formation of a national army”?
Preparing to Negotiate
 The difficulties of answering that question became apparent in the weeks 
leading up to the opening of political negotiations in Arusha. Jockeying 
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for advantage threatened to undo the goodwill and understandings that 
brought contenders to the arena. On the government side, the weakness of 
the negotiating team during ceasefire talks demonstrated the imperative of 
building a solidly reasoned government position that had the support of 
all major parties. In the face of significant political resistance to the cease-
fire terms, this was not an easy task. On the RPF side, concern that the 
government might back away from positions already conceded led to a 
steady stream of media invective and continuing thrusts and parries on the 
battlefront.
 As the State Department geared up for the upcoming negotiations, 
Assistant Secretary Cohen asked me to be the US Observer at the nego-
tiations, which were to begin in Arusha on August 10, 1992, and conclude 
with a peace agreement on October 10. I would have to delay reporting to 
my next assignment and so arranged a short leave. Thus I would become 
the first of four US Observers in what ended up being a yearlong wrangle.18
governmental discord—the anti-arusha forces
 My route to Arusha took me through Kigali, where I met with the 
prime minister, party leaders, and the team working on drafting instruc-
tions for the Rwandan delegation. They briefed me on the difficulties of 
bridging differences in Rwanda’s fissured body politic. The problems were 
threefold. First, there was the split between the old regime represented 
by the president’s party (The Republican Movement for National De-
velopment, or MRND) and the emerging political parties legitimized by 
promulgation of a new constitution and the Political Parties Law in June 
1991. The MRND youth wing (Interahamwe) and party allies, especially 
the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), had protested the 
terms of the Arusha ceasefire and led unauthorized demonstrations in an 
attempt to delay the peace negotiations.19
 Nor was the protest to the course of peace talks confined to political 
demonstrations. As the Arusha talks commenced, the American embassy 
noted that “internal insecurity has increased in parallel with each signifi-
cant step forward in the democratization and the peace processes and 
subsided as internal political forces reached a new level of common un-
derstanding.”20 The violence had included massacres in Bugesera, random 
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land-mine explosions, interparty dustups, military mutinies, political as-
sassinations, and grenade and car-bomb explosions.
 Along the political track, MRND ministers had been boycotting 
sessions of the multiparty government over what they considered to be 
arbitrary decisions of the prime minister on internal administrative re-
form. The MRND was less than enthusiastic about negotiating with the 
RPF and actively challenged the leadership of the coalition government; 
opposition leaders in turn looked to the negotiations as a means to ef-
fect regime change within Rwanda. Bringing the broad-based coalition 
government together on a comprehensive negotiating strategy was a 
Sisyphean task.
governmental  discord—the mdr
 Second, a split within the largest opposition group undercut the co-
hesiveness of the government delegation. Prime Minister Dismas Nsen-
giyaremye’s party, the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), was a 
revived successor to MDR/Parmehutu, the party that brought Hutu lead-
ers to power in 1960. The party still suffered from a regional and ideo-
logical split between those who favored a Hutu-centered polity and those 
who favored national reconciliation, those who were from the north and 
those who represented the center-south. Whereas the prime minister, who 
was from the center of the country in Gitarama, seemed to anchor the 
geographic and ideological core of this party, Faustin Twagiramungu, a 
businessman from the southwestern town of Cyangugu and son-in-law of 
former president Kayibanda, led the progressive wing. Donat Murego, a 
historian and renowned orator, led the northern, pro-Hutu faction. An-
other Kayibanda son-in-law, Emmanuel Gapyisi, also from the central 
party stronghold of Gitarama, was another party leader.21
 In the insecurity that surrounded the response to the Arusha ceasefire 
and the workup of political negotiations, Twagiramungu was accused by 
his political opponents of destabilizing the country. He had, they claimed, 
sought to capture the youth wing of his party, the Democratic Republican 
Youth ( JDR), by stirring them up against elders within his own party and 
co-opting the appointment of new local mayors with newly minted MDR 
partisans of his own choice. For a while, Twagiramungu and the prime 
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minister publicly encouraged the forceful takeover of mayoral offices in 
communes where the MDR was dominant. Twagiramungu worked closely 
with Justin Mugenzi, the fiery founder of the interethnic Liberal Party, in 
raising popular opposition to the Habyarimana regime.22
 MDR politics thus complicated the position of Rwanda’s chief nego-
tiator, Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira. A northerner, he was none-
theless of the Nsengiyaremye political clan, which drew its support from 
the center of the country. As foreign minister, he led the breakthrough to 
ceasefire talks by reaching out to the RPF, a move that won him enmity of 
the pro-Hutu right, even within his party. Moreover, Ngulinzira had re-
placed Dr. Casimir Bizimungu, a stalwart of the president’s party, as minis-
ter for foreign affairs; having begrudgingly ceded this key post, presidential 
supporters could find little good to say about the new foreign minister. 
As leader of the government negotiating team, the foreign minister was 
developing networks and building a consensus among political leaders that 
challenged the “progressive” alliance that Twagiramungu had built with the 
Liberal Party. Thus, the Rwandan government’s chief of delegation and 
principle negotiator was on ambivalent political ground within his own 
political party and fiercely contested from without.
governmental  discord—the cnd
 Finally, Rwandan polity was beset with an encumbering institutional 
oddity. When the new constitution and party law were adopted in June 
1991, members of the national legislature, or the National Development 
Council (CND), voted themselves incumbency as a transitional legisla-
ture until new parliamentary elections could be held, presumably in April 
1993. Members of the CND were all elected under the old single-party 
slate drawn up by the Habyarimana regime. While some had political and 
regional loyalties that made them favorable to a new political order, most 
were oriented toward the status quo. In the lead-up to the peace nego-
tiations, Rwanda’s only elective institution found itself sidelined; political 
negotiations were within parties, among parties, and between party leaders 
and the presidency. Nonetheless, after the government’s negotiating strat-
egy had already been drawn up, the CND belatedly made its views known, 




 The regime establishment hardly wanted to negotiate, the opposition 
was badly split, and the people’s representatives were making new claims 
on the policy process. What brought this inchoate mix of historic parties 
and self-appointed politicos together were two principle dynamics. First, 
the war was draining the nation’s resources and the expanded army had 
stopped fighting. The people and their political leaders were tired of the war. 
Second, the forces of democratic change had swept over Rwanda. Within 
a couple of years, Rwanda had gone from a single-party system based on 
“democratic centralism” to a multiparty government with several centers of 
power. Opposition political leaders saw “democratization” as their key to 
political control. That was why the government delegation chose to negoti-
ate “within the framework of existing laws and institutions.”24
 Continuity and evolution, not revolution, was the Rwandan govern-
ment’s negotiating strategy. Intrinsic to this democratic evolution was 
the prospect of nationwide elections, established by protocol as prior to 
April 16, 1993, when the terms of office of the CND would end. Parties 
would have to contest for legislative and mayoral offices, thus confirming 
for the first time their true political weight. The prime minister insisted 
on the agreed timetable. Difficulties that the communes were facing over 
appointed mayors prompted the foreign minister to comment, “Officials 
need the legitimacy of elections.”25 How to incorporate the Patriotic Front 
into the framework of the existing political process—to let it function as 
a political party and participate in a defining electoral tally—was the chal-
lenge of political negotiations as the Rwandan government saw it.
insurgent vision
 The Rwandese Patriotic Front did not accept the government’s no-
tion that existing institutions were sacrosanct or that the democratization 
timetable had explicitly to be observed. For the Front, “Peace, reconciliation 
and national unity are the overriding objectives which the RPF is deter-
mined to achieve.”26 There was a remarkable consistency to the position 
the RPF put forward in the years between its invasion of Rwanda and the 
formal opening of peace negotiations. National unity required the eradi-
cation of barriers to the return of refugees, to equal opportunity, and to 
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full participation of all in Rwandan society and politics. Reconciliation of 
Rwandans to each other would come through the elimination of “sectarian 
and antagonistic regional divisions.” In this process, democracy would ges-
tate through grassroots change. Elections under conditions of instability 
and sectarianism would “throw the country into another wave of blood-
shed.”27 In a presentation to the May 1991 African Leadership Forum, the 









peace-loving nations of the world28
insurgent strategies
 These goals implied a long-term process. In a March 8, 1992, letter 
to the Department of State, the RPF attempted to explain the failure 
of the meetings in Paris the previous January as a premature attempt 
by the French and the Rwandan government to put forward issues that 
were short-term and self-serving, such as the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios. The Front called rather for “a just and durable solution to the 
problem of peace,” to be discussed after a ceasefire was in place and its 
monitoring was effective.29 As RPF statements over time show, such a du-
rable solution would include the right of return of all refugees, a consti-
tutional and governmental revolution that ensured a democratic process 
and fostered national unity, the integration of the two contending armies, 




 The same documents make it consistently clear that the RPF consid-
ered the Habyarimana regime to be oppressive, corrupt, and delinquent in 
upholding the rights of the Rwandan people. Already at the 1991 Kampala 
Forum, the RPF document noted that “President Habyarimana and his 
clique . . . continue upholding the principles akin to Nazism of Germany.”31 
On an interim basis, the RPF wanted the Habyarimana regime replaced 
by an organ of national will and action patterned after Museveni’s Na-
tional Resistance Movement. In its proposals tabled at the June 1992 cease-
fire talks, the Front insisted that “there should be a national council which 
is broad-based and which has full executive and legislative powers. This 
national council should preside over the interim period.”32
insurgent tactics—military initiatives
 For all its evocation of national unity and peace, the RPF pressed for 
tactical ascendency in field operations, media coverage, and negotiating po-
sitions. First, the RPF intentionally used the force of arms to make politi-
cal points. The initial thrust into Rwanda came when the Habyarimana 
regime had accepted a UNHCR plan for the programmed return of refu-
gees, a presumed RPF goal. But the RPF wanted an untrammeled right of 
return to a Rwanda rid of Habyarimana’s control.33
 Thereafter, the RPA punctuated negotiating strategy with military 
tactics: witness the January 1991 attack on Ruhengeri when Habyarimana 
stalled on ceasefire negotiations in Goma, the quick investment of Byumba 
right before the June 1992 ceasefire negotiations in Paris, the temporary 
RPF offensive immediately before the political negotiations opened in Au-
gust 1993, and, especially, the February 1993 push toward Kigali after the 
government reneged on negotiated protocols.
 The RPF claimed its actions were defensive. Its theme became, “We 
are not yet in a situation of ceasefire and we have only responded to offen-
sives of governmental forces.” As regards the attack on Byumba, the RPF 
explicitly laid the blame on efforts of the president and his party to block 
the peace process. “Thus, the investment of the city of Byumba by the 
combatants of the RPF was a response to the provocations trying to check 
the process of peace that had been initiated.”34 In fact, war tactics were the 




 In communiqués and press releases, the Patriotic Front fought for 
media advantage. In an increasingly sophisticated approach, RPA publi-
cists used French and English according to the intended audience. RPA 
concern for the Visoke gorillas, for example, was published in English for 
an American audience.35
 Where the government was claiming victory, the RPF claimed, on the con-
trary, the capture of strategic positions.36 Press releases gave details on “defen-
sive operations” in which government positions were overrun and government 
materiel captured.37 After the Kibuye massacres that followed negotiations on 
the rule of law, a press release gave data gleaned from Rwandan human rights 
organizations and excoriated the shelling of an RPA position as a violation 
of agreements already reached.38 A press release analyzing the “rout of govern-
mental troops” claimed that “the ambition of Major General Habyarimana to 
resolve by arms the conflict which opposes the Rwandese Patriotic Front to 
the Kigali regime shows itself today to be an impossible mission.”39
 What for the RPF was the outcome of these back-and-forth raids? RPA 
commander Kagame, with a modesty that belied some press release claims, 
summarized the RPF battle strategy to a BBC reporter: “I do not think we 
have been fighting to capture territory. We have been engaging the govern-
ment troops and we have done a very good job of crippling that army, and 
that is the army that is being used to keep the dictatorship in place. I think 
we can even use one square kilometer to do that job very successfully.”40
 Even as the Rwandan political complexion changed with the institu-
tion of a multiparty government, the RPF condemned it with faint praise. 
A press release noted that Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye’s April 16 speech 
on the installation of the interim government “seemed to reflect a willing-
ness and commitment to tackle the many problems facing Rwanda.” But it 
also found that “despite the apparent goodwill, it is doubtful whether the 
prime minister has the means to effect the changes he envisages.”41
insurgent tactics—negotiations
 As Rwanda’s coalition government staked out positions and engaged 
partners in between the meetings with the RPF in Kampala in May and 
in Paris in June, the Rwandese Patriotic Front returned to a negative and 
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cautionary tone. A June 23 communiqué questioned whether the new gov-
ernment had changed its goals and whether a process of negotiation for 
a return to a durable peace remained on the agenda of the prime minis-
ter and the minister of foreign affairs. The RPF concluded that the prime 
minister and the ministers of the internal opposition, in general, “operate 
under the pressure of President Habyarimana, of the party-state MRND, 
and of the military forces of the regime.”42
 What had stirred the RPF riposte were calls from the prime minister 
to bolster Rwandan government troop deployments, presidential criticism 
of a Brussels meeting between the RPF and the Forces démocratiques pour le 
changement (FDC, the loose coalition of internal opposition parties), and 
open discussions by the foreign minister on modalities for carrying out the 
Paris agreements with France, the United States, and Belgium, including 
a Rwandan request for Belgian facilitation of the next meeting. As far as 
the RPF was concerned, the war continued until there was a ceasefire, and 
ceasefire talks had not yet taken place.
 While the commitment to peace had been affirmed in Paris, the mo-
dalities of how to put it in place had yet to be discussed; the next meeting 
on African soil would initiate those discussions. In sum, the only acceptable 
discussions for the RPF were those that strictly followed the negotiating 
schedule and strategy that formed the basis of the Paris communiqué and 
had been buttressed by a sidebar meeting with opposition parties. More-
over, having drawn up the draft text that Facilitator Diria used as a work-
ing document in the July ceasefire talks at Arusha, the RPF had shown 
its superior strength in negotiating tactics. The Patriotic Front seemed to 
take negotiation as war by another means, and it was determined to win. 
Observers, noting RPF continuing dominance in the July ceasefire negotia-
tions, counseled behind the scenes on a more flexible and compromising 
approach. This was a negotiation in which both sides should take away 
something of value, not a “winner-take-all” scenario.
Negotiating across the Divide
 On August 11, a multicentered government delegation and a highly 
focused RPF team gathered on either side of the negotiating forum under 
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the eyes of international Observers and the guidance of Tanzanian for-
eign minister Diria as Facilitator.43 Other than the distance across the 
room, there was not a lot separating the parties, or so it seemed. Though 
they spoke formally in English or French at plenary sessions and required 
documents in both languages, the parties were, in fact, of the same cul-
ture, speaking the same language, sharing the same history, and given to 
the same habits of life. Ethnic, regional, and physical stereotypes failed to 
explain their separation at the negotiating forum. Observers, even African 
neighbors, would have been hard-pressed to tell who belonged to which 
supposed ethnic group.
 More important, the parties had covenanted at the July ceasefire talks 
on the logic of peace: “the cessation of all hostilities for the purpose of dia-
logue and serious negotiations between the two parties.” They had agreed 
on the structure of that peace: “establishment of the rule of law; formation 
of a national army; and, establishment of power sharing within the frame-
work of a broad-based transitional government.” What remained for the 
time allotted to political negotiations, from August 10 to October 10, was 
to work out the “modalities” of the interim order.44
 It was not to be that simple. The parties came at those principles from 
very different perspectives. It was fundamentally a question of what kind 
of change was necessary to build the Rwanda of the future and who should 
control that change. Habyarimana and his cohorts in the MRND wanted 
to preserve the institutions of state, a political culture that still in large 
part reflected the ethos of the one-party state. They would accommodate 
enough change to end the war and to secure the presidential and MRND 
supremacy within the transitional order. In this regard, they were for 
quick elections, before the party grip on the hinterland eroded.
 The internal opposition wanted to use the democratic process and the 
threat of RPF arms to break down MRND power and circumscribe the 
president, to whose role each political leader no doubt aspired. The par-
ties’ role in the political game, however, was determined by the 1991 con-
stitution and the interparty protocol of March 13, 1992. The institutions 
and arrangements within those documents were intrinsic to their political 
survival. As the Rwandan political parties had agreed in developing a com-
mon position for the political negotiations, the government would, at the 
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negotiating table, seek to preserve the democratic gains of the previous two 
years and negotiate within the framework of existing laws and institutions. 
As Foreign Minister Ngulinzira explained it to Kigali’s diplomatic corps, 
“The RPF must accept to integrate into the existing system and into the 
democratization process already underway in Rwanda.”45
 The RPF, on the other hand, wanted revolutionary change. The consti-
tution, the CND, the judiciary, appointments to the bureaucracy, and the 
pattern of local government all reflected the design and the power of the 
Habyarimana regime. Encamped on a small sliver of northern Rwanda, the 
RPA had repeatedly proved its capacity to move forward at will and to coun-
ter any effort to dislodge its positions. Observer states like France, which was 
training and supplying government forces, or Tanzania, which was the pur-
portedly neutral Facilitator, recognized RPF military prowess.46 The Front 
hoped to use its military capacities to force change and its political skills to 
win over the FDC to a radical remake of Rwandan polity. Thus, in spite of 
a common culture, a mutual commitment to peace, and an engagement in a 
diplomatic process of negotiation, the parties were deeply divided in perspec-
tive, purpose, and quest for power.
l ay of  the l and
 The two contending parties were to gather at the old East African 
Community headquarters in Arusha along with the official Mediator of 
the ceasefire (Zaire), the Facilitator of the ceasefire talks (Tanzania), and 
the Convener of political negotiations (the Organization of African Unity, 
or OAU). Also present were representatives of the official Observer na-
tions: Senegal (representing the chair of the OAU), Burundi, Uganda, 
France, Belgium, Germany, and the United States.
 The Rwandan delegation came late, detained by last-minute internal 
discussions on their negotiating mandate. Contention over the agenda fur-
ther delayed opening ceremonies. The Facilitator wanted to follow agenda 
points as they were ordered in the July 13 ceasefire agreement, namely, the 
establishment of the rule of law, the formation of a national army, and the 
establishment of power sharing within the framework of a broad-based 
transitional government. The Government of Rwanda agreed with this 
approach, but the Rwandese Patriotic Front wanted to go back to the 
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communiqué of the preparatory meeting in Paris that listed the objects 
for general debate as the question of national unity, the democratization 
process, the fusion of the two armies in the conflict, the transitional gov-
ernment with an enlarged base, and political guarantees.47
 Even with the delay, the opening ceremonies were finally held without 
clear agreement on future directions. Up on the third floor of the renamed 
Arusha International Conference Centre, the organizers had arranged the 
negotiating arena with the government delegation on one side and the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, thirty feet away, on the other. At the head of the 
negotiating rectangle were OAU officials and the Tanzanian government. 
At the bottom of the arena were the Observers, with the representative of 
the OAU chair (Senegal), neighboring states, and France (as head of the 
Western group) having pride of place.
 Behind the tables, a rat’s nest of cables attached to antiquated head-
phones and microphones stretched out to the interpreters’ cabins for si-
multaneous renditions in English and French. Although Kinyarwanda was 
the common mother tongue of the contending delegations, the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front spoke in French and English, and the Rwandan govern-
ment delegations spoke in French. Both would insist throughout the nego-
tiations on use of world languages and simultaneous translation in plenary 
sessions.
 I had taken a plane to Nairobi and then caught an early bus to Arusha. 
Travel fatigue and a jump seat on the crowded minibus during the four-
hour journey south hardly prepared me for active representation at the 
negotiations. Fortunately, Edmund DeJarnette, the US ambassador to Tan-
zania, was there to introduce me to the key personalities and hand off the 
Observer responsibilities he had held during the ceasefire negotiations.48
 The delegations as well must have been tired at that late morning 
opening, for they had been up past midnight arguing over the order of 
the agenda.49 Foreign Minister Diria contended that the June Paris com-
muniqué had been incorporated in the later Arusha agreement and, in his 
opening remarks, tabled an agenda based on the July ceasefire.
 In opening remarks, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira outlined the Rwan-
dan government’s desire to be open-minded and collaborative in the ne-
gotiations but underscored its commitment to the legitimacy of existing 
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Rwandan institutions and the democratic process already underway. Chair-
man Kanyarengwe echoed the rhetoric of Commissioner Bizimungu in 
Paris by harshly criticizing President Habyarimana and the MRND party. 
But he also declared that the “Revolution of 1959” was not in question in 
these negotiations. Since that revolution overturned the monarchy and es-
tablished Hutu political dominance in Rwanda, this declaration seemed to 
alleviate the worst fears of some on the Rwandan government side.50
 Immediately after the opening session, Kanyarengwe flew down to 
meet with President Mwinyi in Dar es Salaam. The Tanzanian president 
tried to convince the RPF chairman to be realistic in his expectations of 
negotiations; Mwinyi told Kanyarengwe that “results must be acceptable 
in Kigali to be considered a success.” Both the OAU and the Tanzanian 
government felt that the Rwandan government had showed its weakness 
in the ceasefire negotiations. This time, the RPF had to understand that 
successful negotiation meant no losers.51
 If the message got through, it was not obvious. Once the formalities 
were over, hardheaded negotiating tactics surfaced. Foreign Minister Ngu-
linzira had anticipated a general debate on principles of governance so as to 
elicit what the RPF really wanted from the negotiations and then to clear 
with Kigali authorities the terms of the government rejoinder.52 The RPF 
wanted to get right to negotiation of agenda items, the first being the rule 
of law. It took two days of corridor wrangling before the formal sessions 
started in acrimonious general debate.
 In plenary session, the negotiating styles of each side quickly became ap-
parent. RPF negotiator Pasteur Bizimungu, adopting the manner of a trial 
lawyer, was aggressive and at times insulting, characterizing the political sys-
tem in Rwanda as “dictatorial” and claiming that the coalition government 
he faced across the table was “neither democratic nor in charge of Rwandan 
administration.”53 In a bad-cop, good-cop routine, and after Bizimungu had 
totally exasperated the other side, RPF commissioner Patrick Mazimpaka 
might intervene and offer to take a look at government proposals.54
 Foreign Minister Ngulinzira had to keep peace within his oversized 
delegation and was constantly consulting with its more prominent mem-
bers. He generally held to straightforward presentations of the govern-
ment’s position. However, the Patriotic Front found his attitude (and no 
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doubt, the position of his government) on refugees and power sharing to 
be condescending and patronizing. Observers had characterized the for-
eign minister’s style at the July ceasefire talks as “diffident.”55 One month of 
careful preparation for political negotiations had, apparently, not changed 
that characteristic. In a moment of pique at RPF intransigence, Ngulinzira 
commented, “The government’s commitment to democratic change is 
irrevocable; that process will go on with or without RPF participation.”56
 This “take it or leave it” attitude had the RPF wondering whether there 
was anything to negotiate. Clearly the hopes for quick and systematic ne-
gotiations of agenda items within the agreed timeframe were naively out of 
tune with the determinations and ambitions of each side. Reflecting back 
on that period, I later commented, “Under the intellectual discourse of 
that conference, one could sense the distrust and hostility, that pride and 
ambition which alienates brothers and divides peoples.”57
the observers  weigh in
 As the parties groped toward some common ground for discussion, 
Observers jumped into the fray with ideas, formulations, and suggested 
compromises, mediating in ways that no doubt exceeded their mandate 
but that both sides solicited. The Observer team was changed in several 
ways from that which buttressed the ceasefire talks in July. Among African 
Observers, Zaire had played a significant role in July by dint of the per-
sonal capacities of its ambassador to Tanzania. However, at the political 
negotiations, Zaire was represented by a chargé d’affaires who was seldom 
there and took no significant part. In contrast, the Senegalese ambassador 
to the OAU, Pape Louis Fall, the formally designated spokesperson for the 
Observers, gave remarks at the opening plenary and played a vital inter-
mediary role throughout. At this negotiating session, Uganda was present 
only at the opening. However, Rwanda’s southern neighbor, Burundi, sent 
its ambassador to Tanzania and the director of its foreign ministry’s Africa 
section; both were experienced diplomats and effective message carriers.
 Among the Western group, France was represented not by their 
ambassador but by the deputy chief of mission in Dar es Salaam, Jean- 
Christophe Belliard, a Swahili-language linguist with large experience in 
Africa and a real sensitivity to African perspectives. His lesser diplomatic 
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title may even have increased his access to both parties; in any case, he was 
a most effective interlocutor and leader of the Western group. Belgium had 
intended to send its foreign ministry’s director for East and Central Af-
rica, Will Jannen, back into the fray, but he fell ill. He was replaced by his 
deputy, Rudolph Van den Maagdeberg, who understood his role in more 
traditional terms as a listener and supporter rather than as an activist. The 
Germans had been invited to join the Observer group by virtue of their 
large assistance partnership in Rwanda and their willingness to help fund 
the OAU’s peacekeeping role in the Neutral Military Observer Group 
(NMOG). German diplomats from Dar es Salaam intermittently showed 
up at the negotiations.
 On the US team, “Maitre” Byerly and Lt. Col. Snyder had gone from 
the ceasefire talks back to negotiations in Mozambique. I took over from 
Ambassador DeJarnette, who was soon to depart post. The embassy in 
Dar es Salaam did second their able political officer, Robert Bentley, who 
assisted as duties in Dar es Salaam permitted. We operated without limits 
on creative thinking or innovative approaches but under one clear instruc-
tion, namely, “Keep the French out front!” Given the weight of the United 
States as world leader and the tendency of Foreign Minister Diria to con-
vene me for one-on-one discussions over breakfasts of millet gruel, it was 
not easy to keep a low profile. Good relations with Belliard, however, al-
lowed us both to work toward our common interest in moving the Arusha 
process toward lasting peace.58
 The success of the Arusha negotiations was predicated on close co-
operation between the Organization of African Unity as Convener and 
the Tanzanian government as Facilitator. The good relationship between 
Secretary General Salim Salim and President Mwinyi made that possible. 
Salim Salim brought a thorough grasp of negotiation dynamics and an 
imposing presence to the talks, but he attended only occasionally. He 
was seconded at the negotiations by the scholarly Zimbabwean, Dr. 
Machivenyika Mapuranga, who was the assistant secretary general for 
Southern Africa at the OAU. Mapuranga had been detailed by Salim 
Salim for consultations with the RPF in the bush and with the Rwandan 
government in Kigali throughout 1991, as the OAU sought what role it 
might play. Most familiar with the ground-level dynamics of the conflict 
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was the gregarious Joe Felli, a Ghanaian political officer on Salim’s staff 
who had been similarly itinerant between the parties. Felli seemed to 
know everyone and everything about the state of play in negotiations, but 
he discreetly used what he knew to push the OAU agenda forward.
 Tanzania’s foreign minister, Ahmed Hassan Diria, a fellow islander 
with Tanzanian president Mwinyi and OAU secretary general Salim Salim, 
came to the August political negotiations with a reputation strongly en-
hanced by his having pushed the ceasefire talks to a satisfactory conclusion. 
But although both parties wanted a ceasefire, it was not clear that either 
party wanted to give much on their political agenda. Up against erudite 
language and bunker intransigence, Diria sometimes confused issues and 
misinterpreted intentions, as his maladroit handling of opening exercises 
illustrated. Fortunately, he was seconded by a veteran diplomat seasoned 
in Namibia/Angola negotiations; Ambassador Ami Mpungwe became the 
point man of the Tanzanian facilitation.59 Since Foreign Minister Diria 
had to leave the first session of negotiations for OAU meetings, the Tan-
zanian government replaced him with the then minister for education and 
former foreign minister Ben Mpaka. So skillful was Mpaka’s handling 
of the remainder of the negotiations that I extraordinarily requested his 
return for the second round.60
Questions at Large
 Even with a de facto RPF acceptance of Foreign Minister Diria’s 
agenda, namely, an initial discussion on the rule of law, it did not take long 
for the delegations to lock horns on what, to us, were arcane arguments. 
Foreign Minister Ngulinzira’s hope for a debate on general principles of 
governance quickly gave way to an acrimonious argument over particulars: 
the right of return, the nature of democracy, and human rights.
the right of  return
 To our surprise, the RPF strongly rejected efforts to qualify the “in-
alienable right of return” with the word voluntary. Voluntary return of 
refugees had been a cornerstone of international treaties on refugees and 
was part of the 1991 Dar es Salaam communiqué. The RPF’s European 
Prelude to Genocide
74
representative, Dr. Jacques Bihozagara, who fled Rwanda to Burundi after 
his parents were slaughtered in Gikongoro in 1963, emotionally argued 
that, after thirty years living as a refugee in Africa and Europe, the uncon-
ditional right of return as a citizen meant infinitely more to him than any 
internationally guaranteed refugee rights. The RPF finally agreed to the 
phrasing offered by the Western observers, namely, that “they undertake 
not to hinder the free exercise of this right [of return] by the refugees.”61
elements  of  demo cracy
 The RPF wanted the broad-based transitional government mentioned 
in the N’sele Accord charged with carrying out the agenda of democratic 
change. The government wanted the RPF to join in the democratic pro-
cess already underway. Over this fundamental difference, the negotiations 
went into a two-day stall. The government apparently accepted a corridor 
compromise brokered by the Burundi Observers. But back at the table, the 
government added language that reemphasized the government’s position. 
RPF negotiator Bizimungu called the negotiation to a halt. It took a phone 
call to the prime minister in Kigali (always a long and difficult operation) to 
get permission to drop the added language. Ambassador Fall finally came up 
with a formulation that was incorporated as Article 12 of the protocol.
 The broad-based transitional government provided for in 
Article V of the N’sele Agreement, as amended in Gbadolite, on 16 
September 1991 and in Arusha on 12 July 1992, shall lead the country 
to a democratic system defined above.
 To this end, the two parties note that a political process has 
been initiated by the Rwandese people to ensure the progress of 
democracy and reaffirm the need to build together a society founded 
on the Rule of Law as stipulated in the present Protocol.62
 Articles 5–12, which provided the definition of a “democratic system,” 
were worked out in lengthy esoteric debate on the meaning of popular 
sovereignty, fair elections, multiparty governance, pluralism, and toler-
ance. Having been excluded for twenty years from rights of citizens by the 
Rwandan politique d’équilibre, the RPF wanted nothing in the document 
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that hinted of group rights, whether it be majority rule, minority rights, or 
political distinctions based on regional or “sectarian’’ identity.63 They chose 
rather to stake their political future on a strong affirmation of individual 
rights and of popular sovereignty.64
 The government side did not have particular problems with the notion 
of individual rights or a commitment to the will of the people; those, at least 
for the opposition members, were building blocks for a better future. But 
the government delegation was concerned about a notion of national unity 
that expected all persons to be autonomous as well as equal. The hard-won 
rights to political pluralism implied the right to group affiliation and the po-
litical expression of group aspirations. Moreover, popular sovereignty was 
but a utopian chimera unless some sort of electoral process channeled the 
people’s will. The RPF, however, saw elections as the culmination of a long 
process of transforming the popular will at the grass roots. The government 
would not, however, accept the RPF’s formulations unless it also would 
commit to pluralism and to “regular, free, transparent and fair elections.”65 
In its final rendition, the protocol had something for both sides.
 Article 5: Democracy is founded on the idea that sovereignty belongs 
to the people. It is expressed, notably, through regular, free, transparent, 
and fair elections. Popular representation must be the authentic expression 
of the will of citizens.
 Article 6: The two parties accept the universality as well as the implica-
tion of the following fundamental principles of democracy:
•	 sovereignty	of	the	people
•	 government	based	on	the	consent	of	the	people	expressed	through	




in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as in the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, among others, freedom 








the state power, and defines the powers and limitations of the institu-
tions of the republic
•	 multipartism,	social	and	economic	pluralism
 Not satisfied with the principles detailed above or with subsequent 
provisions on “multipartism,” development, elections, and democratic 
culture, the government fought for the inclusion of Article 13: “The two 
parties recognize that a democratic society is also founded on pluralism, 
which is the expression of individual freedoms and must respect national 
unity and the fundamental rights of the citizen.” In the back of the govern-
ment delegation’s thinking was the specter of Museveni’s National Resis-
tance Movement, which in the interest of national unity outlawed all other 
political movements. Many in the government delegation had fought hard 
for freedom of association and the right to mobilize politically in parties. 
They were not about to give up “pluralism” for an ephemeral “popular will.”
toleration
 In the discussion of “tolerance’’ (which the government promoted and 
the RPF rejected), Observers came to realize how ideas with deep reso-
nance in the Western political tradition can come to mean something quite 
other in a particular African context. Hard-won after wars of religion, ab-
rogated edicts and pilgrim migrations, tolerance came to be considered in 
the West as the communal glue that guaranteed the life of reason and held 
diverse societies together. From Pierre Bayle through Locke and Jefferson 
to J. S. Mill and the drafters of the UN Charter, Western political history 
has been a progressive celebration of the political virtues of “tolerance.”66
 The RPF, however, saw in tolerance the seeds of secondary status. 
Mere tolerance was intolerable. They did not want to be diminished by 
being put in a “tolerated” category, Commissioner Mazimpaka explained. 
Rather, they wanted full rights as citizens and universal recognition of 
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those rights by all in society. The government had originally seen “tolera-
tion” as a guiding principle of the rule of law. The RPF saw in that a pater-
nalistic condescension that they had felt as refugees in strange lands and an 
attitude that still, in their view, characterized the government’s approach 
to refugee return. At the insistence of the RPF, all references to “toleration” 
were dropped from the protocol. “Intolerance,” however, joined “ethnicism, 
regionalism, and integrism” as obstacles to national unity.67
human rights
 In contrast to the extended debate on other subjects, negotiations on 
human rights went quickly, and its provisions were quite briefly inscribed 
in the protocol’s chapter 4. Human rights were universal and their viola-
tion was declared to be matters of concern to the parties and to the “In-
ternational Community” (Article 14). The Rwandan government accepted 
an RPF proposal to establish an independent National Commission on 
Human Rights charged with investigation of “human rights violations 
committed by anybody on Rwandese territory” and use its findings to 
sensitize the population and institute legal proceedings, where necessary 
(Article 15). The parties also agreed to establish an International Commis-
sion of Enquiry to investigate “human rights violations committed during 
the war” (Article 16). In fact, the government had already pushed through 
provisions setting up such organs, as Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, with a 
certain touch of one-upmanship, revealed in his concluding speech.
 Noticeably absent from the document is any guarantee of group or 
minority rights. As with its views on democratic representation and on 
toleration, the RPF did not want any recognition of minority rights, some-
thing the government was quite willing to offer. They rather sought to 
avoid labels and categorization, basing their claim to rights on individual 
freedoms as human beings.68 As Esman has noted, the cause of individual 
human rights based on universal claims of humankind has a strong ap-
peal to human rights activists. On the other hand, states have found the 
evocation of group rights the easiest way to effect change in authoritarian 
regimes or to resolve conflicts over political entitlements.69
 Be that as it may, the RPF wanted no part of a group designation that 
would allocate them to a minority position. Creating a level playing field 
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for each individual was rather the RPF goal. In effect, this commitment 
to individual rights, finally agreed to by the parties and inscribed in the 
protocol, foreclosed on power sharing within a consociational model or 
on proportional representation of designated groups.70 According to the 
protocol, the only lawful claim to power within the emerging democratic 
system was a claim to represent the people in some degree. That could be 
asserted not by group identity but by affiliation within a political party 
and endorsed, one assumed, by some kind of plebiscite.71 The two par-
ties agreed that “the Rule of Law is . . . first and foremost characterized 
by justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme 
value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing 
a framework for its fullest expression.”72
 The result of these rather Byzantine negotiations was a surprisingly 
liberal document, although its affirmations, as we have seen, held some 
occult meanings. This declaration of basic human liberties and conditions 
of democratic governance, however common the language, was an out-
growth of each party’s experience and vision. On reviewing the terms and 
tenor of the previous debate, I predicted, “The parties were still miles apart 
on how they conceive the next stages of negotiation. The central issue will 
be the RPF’s hope for radical change against the government’s champion-
ship of continuity.”73
 In his concluding remarks, Commissioner Bizimungu looked forward 
to that next stage. The RPF, he noted, would not sell itself for a few min-
isterial portfolios nor cooperate with the dictatorial system still in place. 
Since the next session was to consider power sharing in the broad-based 
transitional government, a sharing in which the regime in place expected 
to play a dominant part, the upcoming negotiations seemed headed into 
stormy weather. Nonetheless, the first negotiations on rule of law con-
cluded with a sense of mutual achievement in a protocol signed on August 
18. Foreign Minister Ngulinzira said the protocol was a solid document 
containing the principles his government wanted and drawing the RPF 
into the democratic process. RPF representative Dr. Rudasingwa said that 
the protocol of agreement reaffirmed the centrality of the transition period 
(hence an end to the current regime) and demystified allegations regarding 




 Whether that sense of achievement was shared in Kigali political cir-
cles depended on whom I talked to as I passed through Kigali on my way 
home from the talks. Some were proud of the achievement and hopeful 
for further talks. Some wanted the initial protocol to have signaled greater 
change. Others were fearful that the high ideals deceptively covered over 
deep divisions that would surface in subsequent negotiations.
insecurit y
 The rule of law did not seem very much on the minds of party youth 
who were forcefully demonstrating for their demands to be heard. In a 
pattern evident since the RPF incursion in 1990, politically motivated vio-
lence again became a counterpoint to political change. The US embassy 
commented, “Throughout this year, internal insecurity has increased in 
parallel with each significant step forward in the democratization and 
peace processes and subsided as internal political forces reach a new level 
of common understanding.”75 On July 28, CDR demonstrations in Kigali 
against the Arusha ceasefire left three dead. On August 8–9, interparty 
violence in the northwest and southeast between MDR and MRND and 
in the southwest between CDR and Liberal Party left four dead and many 
injured. The issues were twofold: opposition to the whole course of the 
Arusha negotiations, which CDR and MRND youth considered to be 
surrender to the RPF; and “communal cleansing,” the effort of MDR and 
PL parties to force out of office local mayors appointed by the regime 
and to replace them with their candidates.76 Moreover, as the delegates 
returned from the rule of law negotiations, ethnic violence broke out in 
the east at Kibuye, with attacks on Tutsi homes involving several dead and 
many displaced.77
 There were several dimensions to this recrudescent violence. The size 
and forcefulness of political action groups in the multiparty competition 
had clearly outstripped the ability of communal police to control them, 
but the gendarmerie was habitually slow to intervene.78 Security officers 
in civilian dress were sometimes seen participating in political demonstra-
tions. Upon a protest from the embassy, MRND leaders admitted that 
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some reservists might have been involved in the Interahamwe youth move-
ment but promised to tighten up procedures. Party president Mathieu 
Ngirumpatse decried CDR’s policy of ethnic separatism and claimed the 
CDR posed a threat to party leaders. The minister of defense said that 
any active duty military found engaging in political activity would be dis-
ciplined.79 Finally, stories were circulating of a secret group of forty-five 
prominent Rwandans allied to the Habyarimana regime whose purpose 
was to destabilize the country, blame the opposition or the RPF, and slow 
down the democratization process.80 On the other hand, MRND officials 
charged opposition parties of collaborating with the RPF by engaging in 
a destabilization campaign.81 Whoever was responsible, an atmosphere of 
insecurity prevailed and no one was brought to bar.
p olicy  perspectives
 It was against this background of insecurity and impunity that the 
government evaluated the results of the rule of law and prepared to nego-
tiate principles of power sharing. Foreign Minister Ngulinzira sounded 
out opinions of civil society and the political parties in a series of meet-
ings. Justin Mugenzi, president of the Liberal Party, argued that, if the 
ideals of the rule of law protocol were to be upheld, parties like the Hutu- 
supremacist CDR would have to be disbanded and the constitution re-
written. Political parties, not government leaders, should head the negotia-
tion process.82
 On the other hand, Mugenzi’s putative political ally Faustin Twagira-
mungu, just elected president of the largest opposition party, the MDR, 
said that “the Arusha negotiations were given full support in the MDR 
convention August 29 and 30.”83 He seemed perfectly satisfied with the 
direction and tenor of the negotiations, as well he might be, since the prime 
minister and the foreign minister, the two principal architects of the gov-
ernment position, were both from his party.
 The presidency, for its part, believed that the negotiations ahead would 
be very difficult and rancorous. Enoch Ruhigira, Habyarimana’s cabinet 
director and a drafter of the 1991 multiparty constitution, expressed “pro-
found hope” that no one would insist on changing the constitution as a 
condition for further negotiations. The very narrow limits within which 
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the government could negotiate were not “the result of CDR pressure 
or of Habyarimana’s reluctance, but the result of the fundamental ethnic 
mistrust that pervades the society.”84
 Minimally, the political leadership within Rwanda seemed agreed on 
two things: the protocol that set up the interim government would have to 
be modified in some manner in order to allocate ministerial portfolios to 
the RPF, and admission to any revamped cabinet would not be open to the 
eleven recognized minor parties clamoring for a seat at the political table. 
Such an incipient political monopoly took scant recognition of the proto-
col’s demand that “all citizens have equal opportunity of access to the po-
litical, economic and other advantages,” or its recognition of  “the aspiration 
of any Rwandese citizen to accede to power through democratic process.”85
diplomatic  itineraries
 Neither side was slow in picking up on the diplomatic implications 
of this agreement. The protocol’s language won a favorable audience, par-
ticularly in Western capitals. Thus, the RPF sought follow-up meetings in 
Paris and Washington. The Rwandan government asked me for a brief-
ing; I met instead informally with key leaders. After Kigali, I undertook 
consultations in Paris and Brussels, buttressing the good relations already 
developed at the talks. I found both capitals encouraged by the process but 
not particularly focused on how to broker future power-sharing arrange-
ments. Meanwhile, back in Washington, with the Arusha talks presumably 
on track, the State Department focused on other African trouble spots: en-
couraging the South African negotiations to a successful conclusion, push-
ing along a power-sharing agreement and elections in Mozambique, and 
especially initiating within the administration a response to famine and 
anarchy in Somalia. Trilateral diplomacy between Washington, Paris, and 
Brussels was also in a watching brief. At Western capitals, except for the 
office directors directly concerned, the Arusha political negotiations were 
taking place in a diplomatic vacuum.86
the oau resp onse
 The Amended N’sele Ceasefire Agreement signed July 13 included in 
its provisions that “the verification and control of the cease fire shall be 
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conducted by the neutral military observer group under the supervision of 
the Secretary General of the OAU.” This group of ten officers each from 
Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and an African country to be determined, 
as well as five officers each from the Rwandan government and the RPF, 
was to be deployed on July 31, the date the temporary truce was to become 
a formal ceasefire.87 By the end of the rule of law talks, there still were no 
monitors on the ground in Rwanda.
 The ceasefire agreement also set up a Joint Political Military Commis-
sion of five officers each from the Rwandan government and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front, along with Observers. The commission was “to ensure the 
follow-up of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement; [and] to en-
sure the follow-up of the implementation of the peace agreement to be 
signed at the conclusions of the political negotiations.”88 This group did 
meet as scheduled on July 26 at OAU headquarters, with another meeting 
planned for a month later.
 In Kigali, on return from the rule of law talks, I searched out OAU’s 
Mapuranga and Felli to let them know that the United States, having al-
ready funded OAU’s peacekeeping office, was “impatient with the languor 
of OAU’s deployment of the GOMN [NMOG].” To maintain credibility, 
the organization needed to get the military observers in the field immedi-
ately.89 In the absence of any coercive international presence, the fact that 
the intermittent warfare had effectively stopped after mid-July 1992 was 
testimony to the will of both parties to pursue the logic of peace. The US 
embassy noted, “The continued observance of the cease fire is the baseline 
for the relative optimism of the peace process.”90
Lessons We Learned
 The ability of the parties to find common ground on principles after 
this intense debate on law pleased all participants at the negotiations. Only 
in retrospect did we come more fully to understand some of the lessons 
learned from this exchange.
•	 The idea of starting negotiations on fundamental principles seemed to work. 
It gave very bright minds a chance to spar over important principles 
before tackling power sharing and military integration. Ambassador 
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Mpungwe, the Facilitator’s key person on the spot, later noted that 
the negotiations were “forging ahead almost on a continuous basis and 
building on the momentum gained on the way.”91
•	 The fundamental question “whose rule and whose law?” remained. Would the 
basis of law and justice in Rwanda be the traditional order, with its 
close link to executive control? Or would it reflect the broadened base 
of rights and participation as established in the constitution of 1991? 
Or would it be a transformed system founded on radical notions of 
individual rights and general will? Inclusive crafting in the Protocol on 
the Rule of Law signed at Arusha papered over deep differences.
•	 The	erudite	debate	had	its	surprises.	We thought we knew what “national 
unity, democracy, pluralism, and respect for human rights” meant, but 
the parties each had their own interpretation. The final description of 
democracy was more a grab bag of ideas than an operational defini-
tion. Behind the agreed language was a fundamental disagreement on 
what kind of regime should structure the transition and beyond.
•	 An	agreement	may	represent	nothing	more	than	views	of	the	negotiators.	
While concluding speeches at Arusha welcomed the protocol, back in 
Rwanda discord and violence greeted the protocol’s signature. Prime 
Minister Nsegiyaremye and Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, both from 
an opposition party, had made the negotiating decisions. The Arusha 
peace process was already becoming estranged from a major part of 
the constituency back home.
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t h r e e
Power Sharing
 At Paris in June 1992, the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the govern-
ment of Rwanda set an agenda for peace talks based on questions of na-
tional unity, democratization, the fusion of the two armies, a transitional 
government with an enlarged base, and political guarantees. During the 
Arusha ceasefire talks in July, these aspirations were conflated into an 
agenda for political negotiations: establishment of the rule of law, forma-
tion of a national army, and establishment of power sharing. In August, 
the parties resolved on the principles of “national unity, democracy, plu-
ralism, and respect for human rights” that would undergird the rule of 
law. Now, the negotiators turned to the third agenda item: “establishment 
of power sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitional 
government.”1
 Those power-sharing negotiations at Arusha were held in Sep-
tember and October 1992 during two sessions, commonly called Arusha 
III and Arusha IV (counting the ceasefire talks as Arusha I and rule 
of law negotiations as Arusha II). This chapter opens with a look at is-
sues entailed in these two negotiations, then reviews discussions during 
Arusha III, which constructed a framework for sharing power in cabinet, 
national assembly, and judiciary; and evaluates the negotiations of Arusha 
IV, which sought to fill in the framework with provisions for each institu-
tion. The chapter also assesses the interim between the two sessions and 
concludes with lessons we learned from these difficult negotiations.
Issues at Stake
 Power, of course, infuses the whole agenda. These were, after all, “po-
litical negotiations,” and politics, we are told, is about keeping, increasing, 
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or demonstrating power.2 As the contending parties negotiated how power 
was to be shared within state institutions, they faced common questions.
 How is power to be defined, and once defined, how is that power to be shared? 
Hannah Arendt sees that “power is what keeps the public realm, the poten-
tial space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence . . . 
power springs up between men when they act together.”3 But is the binding 
power of human relations to be seen as hegemony, as control of resources, 
as regulation of the political environment,4 or as engagement in “shaping, 
molding, or managing the social environment in which rules operate”?5
 Who has the right to rule? Geertz poses the historic question, “How do some men 
come to be credited with the right to rule over others?”6 Under international law, the 
UN General Assembly established the Republic of Rwanda on July 1, 1962. 
But three constitutions later and with an armed insurgency at the door, who 
was in charge or ought to be? Who was to say that Habyarimana must go 
and that internal opposition parties or exiled fighters should now rule?
 Where is power to be located, and how does its control emanate across the state? 
In the Rwandan political culture, power was centralized, exercised by the 
mwami (king), the colonial resident, or the president. If that power was 
now to be shared, how would it devolve and to whom? How was authority 
to be both shared and exercised locally? And by what means was the con-
sent of the governed, from whom governments derive their just powers, to 
be assessed?
 Is power sharing a short-term, interim instrument in peace building, or a funda-
mental principle of democratic governance? Sharing power is a classic means of 
channeling violent confrontation into political competition during a tran-
sition period. This short-term objective is easily distorted by a long-term 
ambition: the determination of participants in the peace process to hold 
power after the interim. International interveners, on the other hand, gen-
erally seek some equitable sharing of power during the interim that could 
lead to durable power sharing in a future democratic order.
Arusha III—Laying the Groundwork
 Despite the seeming consensus on the rule of law built up during 
the first negotiating session, the Rwandan government and the Rwandese 
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Patriotic Front came to power-sharing discussions with very different vi-
sions of what was to be shared and how the sharing was to be instituted.
 The RPF, which had voiced a willingness to look at all options, 
opened the negotiations with a proposal for a super commission, a Na-
tional Committee for Reconciliation, with broad executive and legisla-
tive powers to run Rwanda during the transition period. Commissioner 
Bizimungu, noting the continuing insecurity in Rwanda, argued that the 
current regime with its flawed constitution could not be entrusted with 
the transition. In response, the government queried whether the Patri-
otic Front intended to dissolve all existing state institutions, substitute a 
new agreement for the constitution, oust current administrative person-
nel, and rule through a self-appointed committee of limited membership 
and extensive powers.7
 After the opening session, the Facilitator, Tanzanian foreign minis-
ter Diria, told our Observer group that the Front’s proposal duplicated 
the roles envisioned for the Joint Political Military Committee ( JPMC). 
The proposal would surely be unacceptable to the Rwandan government. 
In Diria’s view, the Front’s project, concentrating power in a commission, 
stripped away the legal basis for guaranteeing human rights, undermined 
authority of institutions, and pushed back the democratic process until the 
end of the transition.8
where is  p ower to be  shared?
 In the subsequent session, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira clarified at 
length the government’s position on power sharing and opened the possi-
bility of constitutional change through legal channels.9 After a day’s pause 
in which to prepare a response, Commissioner Bizimungu detailed the Pa-
triotic Front’s position. “The old order must change,” Bizimungu asserted. 
“The transition is from dictatorship to democracy.”10 The Front wanted 
not only to share power within the government (that is to say, the cabinet), 
but also to share the power that MRND exercised through the presidency, 
administration, and most of the institutions of state. The constitution—
with its articles 50, 55, and 101—was against power sharing and should be 
suspended or radically amended. In an impassioned summation, the com-






 The foreign minister gave a rather studious reply to particular points 
raised by the RPF. A previously appointed two-party committee tabled 
a working draft. Immediately, the sides locked horns on the meaning of 
“power” in the document’s title. Diria stopped the debate and had OAU’s 
Mapuranga explain how the working document was put together and high-
light areas of agreement and areas of disagreement that needed negotia-
tion. But the spadework, rhetorical exchanges, lengthy behind-the-scenes 
meetings, and prolonged breaks did not move the negotiations forward.12
 Before the next plenary, Foreign Minister Diria convoked the Observ-
ers, asking us whether we had a common position on the negotiations that 
might constitute a fair settlement of initial issues. It was generally agreed that 
the Rwandan government was showing greater flexibility in trying to accom-
modate RPF demands. Even the Ugandan representative offered that the 
Rwandan demand for a “Supreme Council” and the exclusion of the MRND 
from it was untenable. I noted that some of the RPF’s concerns about en-
suring security and the guaranteeing of negotiated agreements could be ad-
dressed within the already established Joint Political Military Commission.
 Remarking that a “broad-based transitional government” as now en-
shrined in the ceasefire accord was originally an RPF idea, Dr. Mapuranga 
suggested that Observers point the parties toward negotiation on specific 
institutions, hoping that the meaning of power sharing might be better 
understood in concrete arrangements. We agreed to meet with the parties 
behind the scenes and move the government and RPF toward discussion 
of specific changes needed in existing institutions.13
 The next plenary did not, however, follow the game plan. The parties 
continued to debate the central operative point: whether power sharing 
was within the government or spanned the separate institutions of state. 
Exasperated, the chair harangued the parties, especially the RPF, accusing 
them of backing away from commitments made under the protocol on the 
rule of law. He then tried to define power sharing as being across the three 
governmental powers, precisely the interpretation held by the Patriotic 
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Front. For the government, however, power sharing was within the govern-
ment (presidency and cabinet), with the possibility of reforms enabling the 
RPF to participate to some degree within other institutions. The parties 
then got into a tendentious debate over whether they were talking about 
power sharing between the government and the RPF or power sharing as 
a feature of the institutions of state. The Facilitator offered some commen-
tary and an amendment that pleased neither side.14
 In between plenary sessions, we met with both sides and urged com-
promise on definitional statements so the parties could discuss mecha-
nisms of participation. At the beginning of the September 13 plenary, the 
two sides offered a two-part compromise formula on power sharing. The 
first part only reiterated agreement on the principle of power sharing as 
encompassed in the N’sele Accord. Article 2, part A defined the modalities 
of power sharing as “maintenance of the present structures of the coalition 
government with appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in 
this protocol with a view to making room for the participation of the RPF 
and other political forces in the country.”15
the government prop oses
 Having agreed on a formula, the parties then debated whether to pro-
ceed immediately to a discussion of particular institutions or agree on a 
common program for the transition. The RPF wanted to discuss struc-
tural particulars; the Rwandan government wanted to outline a general 
program. Finally, the government went along with the RPF’s proposal, but 
wanted to begin the discussion of particulars with consideration of “the 
broad-based transitional government.”16
 The next morning, however, Facilitator Diria insisted that the parties 
adopt a program for the transitional government. Both sides got over the 
issue by agreeing to adopt a draft program as a “working document.” Play-
ing along with the erratic direction from the chair, the government said it 
was ready to present proposals but wondered if the RPF had any. It was 
also willing to adjourn talks for several days to give the RPF time. This 
turned the meeting into an uproar while we sought to convince both sides 
to keep talking. Eventually, the government side was convinced to present 















proportional representation would replace the current legislature, 
and the RPF would appoint its members and hold veto on legislation 
related to the peace agreement.
•	 Within	the	judiciary,	the	Council	of	State	would	be	abolished	and	a	
Supreme Court would exercise legislative review as well as have the 
final word on judicial appointments.
•	 The	transitional	government	would	create	commissions	to	deal	with	
national reconciliation, pubic security, information and education, 
refugees, the constitution, and preparation for general elections.17
the rpf  disp oses
 That evening, we heard the RPF spokesman accept the government’s 
proposal as a basis for discussion, while scathingly underscoring the illogic 
of the government’s position. The RPF countered with the idea of a tripar-
tite presidency, a prime minister drawn from internal opposition seconded 
by an RPF vice prime minister, an appointed national assembly, and an 
independent judiciary that elects its own Supreme Council of Justice.18
 Foreign Minister Ngulinzira took the floor, saying that he spoke 
for both government and the parties within it. He would welcome RPF 
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amendments or changes to the government proposal. The RPF promised 
to make its formal proposals the following day. Thus, by the evening of 
September 14, a week after these discussions began, the government had 
finally outlined a structure for the transitional order, one that would set 
the course of future negotiations.
 RPF rejoinders, however, demonstrated the deep disagreement on de-
tails. The RPF was not opposed to executive powers; its super-commission 
would have exercised untrammeled executive and legislative authority. But 
the RPF was opposed to an executive dominated by the president’s party, 
the MRND. The Front had seemed to favor elections, but now it proposed 
a nominated assembly and accepted delays in local elections for communal 
mayors. The Front proposed an independent, self-perpetuating judiciary 
as a hedge against residual MRND power and its record of human rights 
abuse. In effect, the RPF wanted to change the old order and to claim a regu-
lar place in all the transition powers, with “strong protections for basic rights 
and the principle of equal access without quotas or special treatment.”19
 The following day, the RPF locked in the government proposals on 
participation in the government and institutions, especially the legislature, 
but stuck to its proposal for a presidential troika. By that evening, as the 
two parties met to tally areas of agreement and of disagreement, the presi-
dential council had become a seven-person commission, with the chief of 
state as chairman. But the government wanted the presidential powers 
to devolve to the cabinet, not to some new executive commission. It was 
agreed that the two parties would finalize their lists and then work up a 
provisional protocol detailing progress to date before adjourning.20
international  perspectives
 The first session on power sharing revealed varied outlooks in the in-
ternational community, just as it uncovered the parties’ contrasting posi-
tions. The French were for change, but change had to be legitimized by 
elections, which incumbents would no doubt dominate. The Belgians up-
held the importance of seeking change within the existing framework and 
suggested a smaller working-group meeting in Kigali to define parameters. 
The United States concentrated on practical ways to move the negotiation 
process ahead, urging both sides toward a middle ground. I worked with 
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both parties in suggesting a variety of ad hoc commissions that could build 
confidence in the interim period by collaboration on particular problems.21
 None of the Observers, African or Western, felt that the RPF’s idea of 
a transitional national commission (or its later iterations as a presidential 
troika or a presidential commission) could work. The idea of a separation 
of powers was too ingrained in Western thinking; the idea of an executive 
of co-chiefs did not fit the African hierarchical tradition. However, the 
idea of placing the powers of state in a collective executive for the transi-
tion period was not as far-fetched as the diplomats imagined.22 It was not 
just an RPF echo of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement. In preco-
lonial Rwanda, executive control prevailed through monarchs surrounded 
by courtiers and ritual advisors. The colonial system at the provincial level 
made the “administrator” the executor, legislator, and judge of all. More-
over, the model in the mind of RPF’s chairman, Col. Kanyarengwe, was 
not Museveni but the Committee for Peace and National Unity, which had 
managed a transition to a new constitutional order while ruling Rwanda 
for some ten months after President Kayibanda was deposed in 1973.23
 The Facilitator and Observers were also unified in seeing the govern-
ment as flexible and forthcoming and in characterizing the RPF as ob-
structionist and obdurate. This was due in part to the courtroom rhetoric 
of RPF spokesperson Pasteur Bizimungu, who was given to hyperbole, 
sarcasm, and castigation. How much of this was the RPF version of “shock 
and awe” and how much was just Bizimungu’s style was hard to tell, but it 
stood in vivid contrast to the studious, careful approach of the Rwandan 
foreign minister. Observers felt that Bizimungu’s rhetoric was not helpful 
to the negotiating process; it was simply not “diplomatic.”24
preliminary agreements
 At the beginning of this session, the two sides were opposite in their 
views of power sharing; at the conclusion of these discussions, in the Ob-
servers’ view, the positions were still at odds. We would have agreed with 
the assessment of Ambassador Mbapila, permanent secretary at Tanzania’s 
foreign ministry, who commented that for all their negotiated language, 
the two parties were still far apart on what that language meant or how 
they would share the future of governance in Rwanda.25
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 Nonetheless, the parties had in eleven days worked through to suffi-
cient agreement such that on September 18 they were able to sign a protocol 
defining power sharing and outlining a possible structure for the transition 
period. How power would be shared within that structure would be the 
subject of the next negotiating session.26
The Interim
the government ’s  “l ast  word”
 In between the two negotiating sessions on power sharing, Foreign 
Minister Ngulinzira traveled to Dar es Salaam to brief President Mwinyi 
on the talks. Ngulinzira’s remarks closing the first power-sharing negotia-
tions prefigured his talks with Mwinyi. The foreign minister had reminded 
the plenary that the very idea of sharing power “within the framework of 
a transitional government with an enlarged base” had been a major gov-
ernment concession to RPF demands in the July 12 ceasefire agreement. 
Notwithstanding that concession, the government side had not been able 
to elicit from the RPF a memorandum on what it thought power sharing 
should mean in concrete terms. Moreover, he saw the RPF as intransigent, 
interested in “power sharing” per se rather than sharing power within the 
framework of the government. Indeed, the Front seemed to see itself as 
an entity outside of Rwandan society wanting to divide up state powers 
without regard to the will of the nation or people to whom government 
was responsible. Ngulinzira invited the RPF to drop its ideas about new 
and expensive structures based on failed models and instead to come par-
ticipate in government to improve structures from within.27
 It was a tough speech by the usually circumspect foreign minister, and 
it demonstrated his suspicion that the divide between reform and revolu-
tion had not yet been bridged, even by the agreements conveyed in the 
concluding joint communiqué. He went to Dar es Salaam with this skep-
tical assessment and with a message from President Habyarimana. That 
message was in fact twofold: first, it communicated that the Rwandan gov-
ernment stood behind the offers it made at the last round of negotiations; 
and second, it informed President Mwinyi that “this was as far as it could 
go.” The estimate of Ambassador Mpungwe, who attended the meeting, 
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was that there was not much further give in the Rwandan government’s 
position. President Mwinyi, in turn, invited RPF chairman Kanyarengwe 
to Dar es Salaam to relay the Rwandan government’s position and to ask 
that RPF consider it seriously.28
jpmc convenes
 Meanwhile, the Joint Political Military Committee ( JPMC) met in its 
second session in Addis Ababa. This guardian institution of the ceasefire 
agreement attracted a full complement of Observers to this meeting, including 
Zaire, which had hardly appeared at the political negotiations, and Germany, 
which had been added by the consent of both parties as a major donor and 
supplier of funds for OAU’s Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG).29
 Technical issues delayed the consideration of substantive questions: 
RPF’s request for travel subsidies and group commander General Opalaye’s 
request for more troops and UN-level per diems. Observers worked out a 
compromise on travel subsidies while the OAU finally decided to limit the 
food and lodging supplement to $10 a day. Since NMOG force levels had 
been set at fifty in the July 12 ceasefire negotiations, the matter of an increase 
in the NMOG’s size was referred to future political negotiations.30
 In the substantive discussions, the sides exchanged accusations of 
human rights violations, of mistreatment of prisoners, and of using foreign 
forces in the battle line. Many of these charges were being raised for the 
first time and were used by both sides as debating points. Lt. Colonel Tony 
Marley, the US Observer, remarked that “there was very little evidence of 
progress in national reconciliation” in the formal sessions and in the pres-
ence of Observers. Away from the formal meetings, however, members of 
the two delegations seemed to get along well, engaged in “relaxed conversa-
tions about world events, mutual acquaintances, contemporary Rwanda, 
and the ongoing peace process.”31
 Despite the rhetoric and posturing, the JPMC did provide an arena for 
venting complaints that might not be brought up in formal political negotia-
tions. It also provided an opportunity to refine procedures of the JMPC and 
the NMOG, both novel organizations. Importantly, the setting offered an op-
portunity for the Rwandan parties to be together outside of the negotiating 
halls of Arusha and the physical and psychological distances of that arena.
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 The meeting also furnished two bits of corridor intelligence that pre-
figured discussions to come. The RPF political commissioners told Colo-
nel Marley that they would be asking for a 50 percent share in the new 
integrated army, including command positions; the RPF’s competence and 
discipline merited a coequal position. They were uncertain as to what they 
wanted to do about the gendarmerie. As a matter of policy, they wanted 
a small national military rather than a large one but had not given much 
thought to the process of demobilization.32 Additionally, the RPF commis-
sioners, while pressing for more concessions, told Ambassador Mpungwe 
that they might be able to accept the Rwandan offer tabled at the last ses-
sion of political negotiations “pretty much as it stood.”33
meeting with museveni
 With hopeful hints coming from the Patriotic Front, the Department 
of State sent me to Kampala to see President Museveni, get his views of the 
negotiations, and encourage him to keep the RPF moving toward accom-
modation. Ambassador Carson and I met with Museveni on the lawn of 
State House in Entebbe. Our assumptions were that Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army had been supplying the RPF, that the RPF military and 
diplomatic strategy took a lot from Museveni’s play book, and that the 
Ugandan president could have direct influence on RPF negotiating posi-
tions anytime he wanted.
 The president demurred in all those regards, then launched into an 
analysis that showed him to be following Rwandan events with a keen eye. 
In Museveni’s view, the RPF had, in effect, won on the battlefield and there-
fore could expect an even 50/50 sharing of positions in the integrated mili-
tary. Moreover, the RPF needed that kind of military weight if they were 
to feel secure in their old homeland. Politically, however, Rwanda had, over 
the last thirty years, evolved into a complex social and political landscape. 
The peace agreement had to take into account that landscape, giving par-
ties place according to their influence among the people. This included the 
partisans of the president’s party, the MRND. The RPF must have a signifi-
cant but not a dominant role in that political process. At the conclusion of 
this long analysis, the president said he would try to get in touch with RPF 
leadership and encourage them toward serious and realistic negotiations.34
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Arusha IV—Devolution of Executive Powers
talking past  each other
 Although the renewed session of negotiations was to open on October 
5, the RPF delegation was delayed in Uganda because of problems with their 
travel documents. The next morning in the opening plenary session, For-
eign Minister Ngulinzira, with details on the powers of the president and 
government, outlined how the government’s previous offer would work.35 In 
his response that afternoon, Commissioner Bizimungu went through the 
government’s proposals point by point, finding them too vague or a dupli-
cation of the existing constitution. He proposed instead a “National Presi-
dential Council,” melding the RPF’s National Reconciliation Council and 
presidential troika proposals. The Presidential Council would do everything 
from initiating legislation to exercising control over government and declar-
ing war or states of emergency. The government would be left with pro-
posing the budget to the Presidential Council and drafting decrees for the 
council’s approval and promulgation. Such were the comprehensive powers 
and inclusive membership of the council that Bizimungu suggested it could 
be called “The Broad-based Presidential Council.”36
 In exchanges the following day, the government side amplified its pro-
posals, while the RPF countered that it preferred sharing executive powers 
in collective decision making but could accept the transfer of these powers 
to other institutions. In the RPF’s view, the government proposals echoed 
the 1991 constitution. Commissioner Bizimungu insisted, “We do not care 
to be offered the June 10 Constitution.” To prove that the 1991 constitu-
tion had not changed much in Rwanda, Bizimungu referred to a letter of 
September 22 from Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye to President Habyari-
mana noting the ways in which the president under that constitution was 
blocking the actions of government.37
 Ngulinzira told the plenary that the National Presidential Council 
was unwieldy, duplicative of existing institutions, and ambiguous as to its 
place in the hierarchy. The government’s proposals on the other hand pro-
vided a series of amendments to make the governmental system work ef-
fectively. The point was to make sure that “the fate of the nation was not in 
the hands of one man.”38 So at the conclusion of the first plenary session, 
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despite signals out of Dar es Salaam, Addis, and Kampala, the RPF was 
reiterating in new guise its shared executive proposal, and the government 
was sticking to its narrow interpretation of power sharing within the cabi-
net. The two sides appeared locked into their respective positions.
 Caucusing on October 5, our Observer group once again concluded 
that the two parties held different definitions even of what they had mutu-
ally accepted. With similar phrasings, they were, in fact, talking past each 
other. Moreover, the Ugandan delegate suggested that the RPF was being 
encouraged in its proposal for a collective executive by opposition parties 
in Kigali, who wanted to use RPF pressure in breaking Habyarimana’s 
control of national institutions.39 Now in a meeting with the Facilitator, 
Observers agreed that “while we had more clearly defined the position of 
the two sides, little real progress had been made.”40 The RPF had told sev-
eral Observers and intimated in the plenary that it would be flexible about 
the government’s proposal, provided it could be amended to meet their 
concerns, but the Front’s initial riposte suggested that it would fight over 
every clause.41
the observers  engage
 With the stalemate of the last session threatening to perpetuate itself, 
we huddled with both sides. Over breakfast with US and German Observ-
ers, the government’s team leader, Ambassador Kanyarushoki, was blunt. 
The Front was demanding more executive powers than the government 
could possibly concede. However, RPF’s concerns about the president 
being able to obstruct cabinet decisions were genuine. The government 
proposals addressed these concerns by making it impossible for the presi-
dent to act without consent of the cabinet or national assembly. Pressed 
on what would happen if the president acted in defiance of the constitu-
tion or peace agreement, Kanyarushoki said that the president could be 
impeached.42
 In informal meetings with Observers the same morning, RPF nego-
tiators Bizimungu and Mazimpaka elaborated on their concerns about the 
government proposal. In their view, the government was simply repackaging 
the existing constitution with no means to prevent the president from abus-
ing his powers or reneging on the peace agreement. They feared that the 
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president would obstruct and frustrate the peace process, using terror tactics 
and his control of groups like the MRND youth to abort the transition.43
 At the next plenary session, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira described how 
powers would devolve from president to cabinet. If the president sought 
to block implementation of government policies, the impeachment pro-
cess offered a remedy. Surprised by the government offering the impeach-
ment idea, the RPF side sought adjournment for private meetings with the 
Rwandan side. These consultations continued for the next two days. How-
ever, by October 10, Ngulinzira reported that an impasse had been reached 
in bilateral discussions. We asked that an accounting of points of agreement 
and points of discord be put before the plenary. The foreign minister, on 
behalf of the negotiators, went down a list of twelve items on which there 
was convergence, five items on which there was partial convergence, and 
ten items on which there was disagreement. The main issue was the role 
of the president in decision making. In Ngulinzira’s characterization, the 
RPF wanted a total transfer of power from the president to the Council of 
Ministers; the government side, in contrast, was urging a semipresidential 
system, political efficacy, and separation of powers.
 The RPF representatives said that they did not intend to exclude any 
party or any person from contributing to the transition; they wanted to make 
sure that no party or person could block the transition process. The mecha-
nism of government should be efficient, transparent, and broad-based. The 
head of state might have prerogatives, but he should share his powers with 
other forces in the executive. The RPF urged the government to distinguish 
between the exercise of presidential power and presidential prerogatives.44
 There was enough give in the two statements that I pressed the parties 
to meet again in head-to-head negotiations and pin down areas of com-
monality. Over the weekend, the parties worked out broad agreement on 
major issues. This time, Commissioner Bizimungu briefed the October 
12 plenary on behalf of the negotiators: the parties had agreed that the 
incumbent president, Juvénal Habyarimana, would remain in power until 
elections at the end of the interim period, exercising certain prerogatives 
and participating in decision making, but that executive power would be 
exercised collectively in the Council of Ministers. The presidential “sus-
pense veto” had evolved into an obligation to sign decrees and laws in ten 
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days. The president would have the usual duties of appointing the prime 
minister and ambassadors as well as signing treaties, pardons, and orders to 
mint money. But the proposing of laws went to the Council of Ministers. 
Yet to be resolved was who would be the guarantor of national unity and 
judicial independence, who would get to address the nation, who was to 
be chief of armed forces, and who had the power to dissolve the national 
assembly. In effect, while the issues of assuring continuity of government 
had been resolved, the means of managing national crises had not.45
 The negotiators went back into closed session. The following day, For-
eign Minister Ngulinzira summarized further aspects of their agreement. 
The president would sanction and promulgate laws without right of veto. 
The “Government in Council” would safeguard national sovereignty, assure 
national defense, and organize the armed forces. War and peace would be 
decided by the council, authorized by the national assembly, and declared 
by the president. The prime minister would declare national emergencies. 
Key issues outstanding were what to do in case of presidential vacancy; how 
the national assembly might be dissolved; and who would name the prime 
minister, nominate judges, and authorize nominations to civilian positions, 
as well as who was responsible for drafting the “national program.” Nor had it 
been agreed whether the president would remain commander-in-chief.
 Once the principle of “Government in Council” had been accepted, 
the devolution of executive powers to the Council of Ministers had pro-
ceeded very rapidly. Observers cautioned that the notion could work only 
if authorities in Kigali agreed to both the concept and the pattern of de-
volution. I urged that keeping the president as commander-in-chief was 
vital for the functioning of the transition system and necessary in keeping 
Habyarimana committed to the peace process.46
Wrapping Up Arusha IV
 On the evening of October 17, Commissioner Bizimungu informed 
the plenary that all matters regarding executive power had been decided 
except for the questions of presidential vacancy and who dissolves the na-
tional assembly. The president would be commander-in-chief. Authority 
to make judicial appointments would be vested in a new Supreme Council 
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of the Judiciary, thus finessing the question of who would safeguard judi-
cial autonomy. Decisions in government would be by consensus, but after 
a second reading, decisions would be by two-thirds majority. Questions of 
defense, security, and amending the peace accord would require consensus. 
Foreign Minister Ngulinzira told observers that the negotiated settlement 
had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers in Kigali with Habyari-
mana’s MRND ministers present. The negotiators promised signature to a 
protocol by October 22.47 RPF negotiator Rudasingwa told Observers that 
the Front was satisfied with the discussion on presidential power, the most 
critical area for them. There should be no major problems on judiciary or 
the national assembly. The RPF was concerned, however, to get the refugee 
issue back on the political agenda.48
residual  issues
 While the parties had finally negotiated the devolution of execu-
tive power, there were vital elements of power sharing still unresolved—
namely, the structure of the judicial system, the naming of the interim 
prime minister, the composition of the broad-based government, and the 
formation of a national assembly. Dr. Rudasingwa’s optimism as regards 
the judiciary was warranted. Both sides apparently welcomed the creation 
of an autonomous judicial organization that would make bench appoint-
ments. The parties seemed anxious to prove their commitment to the rule 
of law through a thorough reform of judicial structure.49
 Rudasingwa’s optimism was sadly premature on the other outstand-
ing issues. Wrangling over the interim prime minister’s slot split the exist-
ing coalition government and the main opposition party, the Mouvement 
Démocratique Républicain or MDR. Differences over the role of the national 
assembly and how it should be established persisted throughout subse-
quent negotiations. When and if elections should take place was hotly de-
bated. In Kigali, there was widespread concern among the political elite 
over what negotiators may have ceded in the negotiations.
presidential  angst
 President Habyarimana was quite negative on the results of the 
power-sharing negotiations. He complained, in a private meeting with US 
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Ambassador Flaten, that the foreign minister and prime minister were not 
keeping him informed on the concessions they had been accepting in Aru-
sha. In particular, he saw power devolving from elected institutions (the 
presidency and the National Commission for Development, or CND) to 
appointed officials in the government and the transitional national assem-
bly. In an unelected government or national assembly, the opposition could 
join forces with the RPF to override or even exclude from power the presi-
dent and his party, which had the mandate of the people. Early elections 
were the only way to meet donor requirements for democratic progress. If 
negotiators concluded an unacceptable settlement, the president warned, 
the people would substitute a civil war for a war on the border.50
naming the prime minister
 The power-sharing protocol had devolved presidential prerogatives 
to a transitional “Council of Ministers,” but who would lead the council? 
The government team asked that the incumbent, Prime Minister Nsen-
giyaremye, be kept in office, as President Habyarimana had been. Ob-
servers saw this as a scarcely disguised ploy by the incumbent through 
his political ally, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, to preserve his position 
and power by negotiation. The RPF response appeared to be procedural: 
the peace negotiations should not be used to confirm the current prime 
minister in his office. Observers again sensed that in this the Front might 
have been colluding with internal opposition that clearly wanted Nsen-
giyaremye out of the way.51
sharing cabinet p ower
 More difficult yet was the issue of how portfolios were to be allocated 
within the council of government. Initially, the government side seems to 
have been in favor of an early naming of ministers. But then it backed off 
and came up with a formula of dividing portfolios in tiers by function: na-
tional sovereignty, economics and development services, and social services. 
The government would offer the RPF at least one portfolio in each functional 
area and limit each party to but one portfolio in the national-sovereignty 
function and two portfolios in the other tiers. The RPF told observers 
that the formula was acceptable, but it insisted that specific portfolios had 
Power Sharing
101
to be assigned to respective parties (without naming the officeholder) and 
incorporated into the peace agreement.
 The Front, which had derided a narrow focus on distribution of port-
folios, now pushed for conclusion on this matter. Spokesman Bizimungu 
made it clear that agreement on portfolios was necessarily antecedent to 
other discussions still on the table.52 But the government backed off again; 
early distribution of portfolios might undercut the authority of ministers 
now in place. We sensed a disconnect between a negotiating team want-
ing closure on power sharing and the government back home not wanting 
to be superseded by negotiations in Arusha. Moreover, the allocation of 
portfolios to parties by functional area would strip the MRND of key 
portfolios and reduce the party to 25 percent representation in cabinet, less 
than a blocking third.53
establishing a transitional national assembly
 There was even less progress in negotiations over the transitional na-
tional assembly. Under the 1991 constitution, the existing assembly (CND) 
was to serve out its term and be replaced when a new multiparty assembly 
was elected. Negotiated protocols had mentioned an interim assembly but 
with no intimation on how it should be set up. The Observers weighed in 
with several scenarios for the parties’ consideration, such as a bicameral 
house with the transitional assembly as the upper and controlling house, 
or an expanded assembly leaving the CND in place but countering their 
influence with appointed members (the Ugandan proposal).54
 On the morning of October 23, Ngulinzira told us that the Council 
of Ministers in Kigali was discussing an entirely appointed assembly.55 At 
plenary on October 24, the foreign minister said the government wanted 
a national assembly that was representative of the peoples’ wishes. To that 
end, the government delegations had proposed direct legislative elections 
in three months, then offered indirect elections, an electoral college, a con-
stituent assembly with seats reserved for the RPF, a nominated second 
house with special powers, or an expanded CND.
 The Front accepted none of these compromise proposals. Commis-
sioner Mazimpaka argued that the CND had been superseded by the gov-
ernment’s proposal of a transitional national assembly. Nonetheless, the 
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negotiators were still looking for ways to set up a national assembly, and 
Mazimpaka promised, “We will find them.”56
pushing toward signature
 By October 27, the parties had agreed on immunities and an oath for 
the president, had transferred tourism and information from the presi-
dency to newly created “offices,” and had worked out the organization of 
judicial power as well as the attributes of the Supreme Court. There was, 
however, no progress on how and when government portfolios would be 
handed out or how the national assembly was to be organized. Recog-
nizing progress in “peripheral matters,” the RPF said it would wait for 
the government’s proposals, but absent progress on these, it suggested a 
pause. Ngulinzira noted with asperity that the agreed matters were not 
peripheral and that the government had offered several compromise pro-
posals on the assembly, but the RPF had offered nothing but its original 
idea of a nominated assembly.57
 By October 28, Ambassador Mpungwe had informed Observers that 
President Habyarimana could not accept the RPF’s idea of an appointed 
assembly and that the Council of Ministers in Kigali was deadlocked on 
the matter. The prime minister wanted the foreign minister to press ahead 
and get any deal he could, while the president insisted that Rwandans work 
out a common position. Both sides in Arusha then agreed to initial what-
ever had been agreed and take a pause. At the plenary, however, Minister 
Diria said that the two parties would sign a “Protocol on Power Sharing, 
Part One” and return in fifteen days to deal with refugees, the formation 
of the government, and the nature and functions of the national assembly. 
Foreign Minister Ngulinzira suggested instead first dealing with the for-
mation of government and the assembly when talks reconvened, followed 
by opening up military integration issues, then pausing before returning to 
conclude military issues and refugee matters.58
 Even as a protocol outlining areas of agreement and a joint communi-
qué were being drafted, the Facilitator was hoping for a breakthrough on 
the national assembly question. In conversation with Robert Bentley and 
me, Ambassador Mpungwe reviewed the alternatives. We pointed out that 
an elective process would move the current CND aside constitutionally. 
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Barring that, some way had to be found that included CND members in 
the peace process or they would undermine it from without. Moreover, the 
peace process should move quickly through to elections that would break 
political deadlocks and remove ambiguities of mandate. Mpungwe, sup-
ported by the Ugandan high commissioner, insisted that elections would 
be counterproductive in the Rwandan situation, a position that Foreign 
Minister Diria also held. We, nonetheless, stressed the importance of 
understanding why President Habyarimana was opposed to an appointed 
legislature and the value of working toward a deal that did not exclude any 
major political force.59
 On October 30, 1992, the two parties signed a protocol on preliminary 
agreements regarding power sharing that devolved powers of the presi-
dency to a Council of Ministers, reestablished an autonomous Supreme 
Court, and projected decision making in council by consensus with over-
rides requiring a two-thirds vote. Further negotiations were suspended 
until November 15.60
The Joint Political Military Commission—an Instructive Aside
 Toward the end of the fourth set of negotiations at Arusha, the Joint 
Political Military Commission ( JPMC) met for the third time.61 The 
JPMC was supposed to be a central transitional institution charged with 
enforcing military and political agreements. The Facilitator, Foreign Min-
ister Diria, and the Observers had urged that the commission actively en-
gage on the questions of ceasefire violations and ethnic violence that had 
enflamed the rhetoric and slowed the process of political negotiations on 
the peace accord. Yet, at its third meeting, the commission did not live up 
to its mandate.
p ost and rip oste
 The opening remarks of Dr. Mapuranga, as deputy secretary general 
of the OAU, highlighted a core problem: OAU’s monitoring group, which 
was to have been the international guarantors of the ceasefire, would only 
be fully deployed by October 23. Mapuranga also reported that the delimi-
tation of the neutral zone between forces had only just begun. In other 
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words, the ceasefire was tenuously holding all by itself, without interna-
tional mapping or monitoring. Mapuranga noted that this was a “pioneer-
ing role for the OAU, hitherto outside the domain of the Organization’s 
preoccupations.” He hoped that the work of the JPMC and the experience 
of the NMOG “would be of immense benefit to the organization.”62
 Meanwhile, all had not been quiet on the northern front. The NMOG 
commander, General Opalaye, reported seventy-one ceasefire violations 
since the last JPMC, including a series of attacks and counterattacks 
around the northern town of Byumba. The JPMC report characterized 
the discussions on violations as “exhaustive”; it also found the debate on 
the withdrawal of foreign troops to be “lengthy and at times heated.” 63 The 
chair and the Facilitator had to intervene to keep the discussions on track.
 The issue of radio propaganda brought an admission from the OAU 
that it was not able to monitor radio broadcasts because they were in 
Kinyarwanda.64 When the RPF raised the issue of human rights abuses, 
General Opalaye noted that NMOG had no mandate to deal with 
human rights violations per se.65 Similarly, administrative questions met 
with bureaucratic referrals to heads of state, the Rwandan government, 
or a study committee.66
 When the commission received a report from the Facilitator on the 
progress of the negotiations, the government side endorsed the brief, 
whereas the RPF blamed the slow progress of negotiations on Habyari-
mana and the MRND party. In the RPF’s view, the government’s negotiat-
ing team was not representative of the government or the political parties 
in Rwanda. This outburst, calling into question the negotiating process, 
brought rejoinders from the Facilitator, the commission chairman, Uganda, 
and Germany. Observers noted their confidence in “the eventual success of 
the negotiations.”67
the jpmc—an assessment
 The October meeting of the Joint Political Military Commission 
started cordially enough. Some of these representatives had met before 
in Addis; some had fought against each other on the battlefield; there 
were embraces all around. In the meetings, however, postures were hos-
tile. As usual, the rhetorical points went to the RPF, with the government 
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representatives thrown on the defensive. Both courtesies and contestations 
belied the seriousness of the issues being considered.
 The Patriotic Front’s interventions showed two core concerns: the 
continuing power of Habyarimana as well as that of the MRND hierar-
chy, and the continual ethnic attacks within Rwanda, for which the RPF 
blamed the president. The government’s liberality in suggesting an Inter-
national Human Rights Commission did not mitigate the reality of local 
ethnic conflict, which the government was either unwilling or unable to 
control, and for which the OAU/NMOG disavowed any responsibility.
 The facts that the NMOG was not able to monitor incendiary radio 
broadcasts, had not delimited the neutral zone three months after the cease-
fire agreement, and was just moving out of Kigali to the field as an observer 
force all pointed to how poorly the OAU was prepared for the task at hand. 
The Joint Political Military Commission did serve a useful purpose in being 
a point of some convivial contact, a sounding board for complaints, and a 
channel for reporting ceasefire violations, but the ceasefire held because both 
sides wanted it to, not because of any international deterrent.
The Peace Process Flounders
 Arusha IV closed down on October 31, 1992, with the promise of recon-
vening a fortnight later. Few of the government delegates returning from 
power-sharing discussions in Arusha were prepared for the political hail-
storm that attended their return to Kigali. After all, the basic framework 
of transition institutions had been agreed to in Arusha III and confirmed 
by the Council of Ministers. Habyarimana had committed to “a battle of 
ideas rather than arms,” and in a “Referendum Day” speech on September 
25 he asked the RPF to do the same.68 After angry exchanges of letters 
and apparent disarray in regime and opposition circles, the cabinet had on 
September 29 negotiated open-ended instructions for Arusha IV. Foreign 
Minister Ngulinzira took that mandate as a confirmation of his leadership 
and in Arusha negotiated within what he considered his parameters.69
 During the long October negotiations, distance grew between the 
presidency and the government’s negotiating team. Habyarimana several 
times complained to diplomats that the negotiating team had exceeded its 
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authority.70 Supporting the Arusha negotiations and calling on Habyarimana 
to resign, opposition parties organized massive demonstrations in Kigali on 
October 10, thus linking progress in Arusha with the end of Habyarimana’s 
rule. Meanwhile, in Kigali, the Hutu supremacist party, the CDR, flexed its 
muscle in violent demonstrations over the arrest of party members suspected 
of politically inspired murders and in protest of the Arusha negotiations. 
On October 29, MRND ministers angrily protested biased coverage of the 
October 27 cabinet meeting by the opposition minister of information.
 In a postnegotiations meeting, Habyarimana gave Ambassador Flaten 
and me a pessimistic assessment. He clearly felt that negotiations had got-
ten out of hand by going beyond the agreed terms of reference and not re-
sponding to presidential queries. The president detailed at length an offer 
he made to meet with his old companion-in-arms Alexis Kanyarengwe, 
now chairman of the RPF. A leak to RPF negotiators aborted the offer 
of a meeting. The president thought he should rather meet with General 
Kagame, the true power in the RPF. He was worried about the lack of 
progress in discovering a formula for the transitional national assembly 
and the uncertainties regarding allocation of seats in the cabinet.
 Habyarimana was clearly having second thoughts about the deroga-
tion of his powers to a council that other political forces might control. 
And he was particularly sensitive that an elected parliament, the CND, 
might be replaced by an appointed assembly. The president felt that some 
electoral sanction on the transition process was needed, either through an 
elected assembly or a referendum on the negotiated agreement.
 We tried to convince the president of the significant role he could 
still play: under the protocol on power sharing, he would remain chief of 
state and commander-in-chief, he still would name high government of-
ficials, and he could propose legislation and build coalitions to pass his 
program. The protocol of October 30 was but an outline of the interim 
order. With strong leadership, the president could seize the moral ground 
as peacemaker and provide substantive direction for the next negotiations. 
Habyarimana did not appear convinced.71
 The Arusha political negotiations had stalled on the core question of 
power sharing. While the negotiating team had made major progress in 
coming up with power-sharing structures, it had failed to communicate 
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effectively with Kigali authorities or to gain the adherence of the president, 
the MNRD, and more radical parties like the CDR to the provisions being 
negotiated. Moreover, political parties within the internal opposition were 
at odds as to next steps in the negotiating strategy.72 Within a couple days 
of the protocol’s signing, the suspension of talks was pushed to November 
23. The understandings of Arusha on power sharing were now to be tested 
within the Rwandan political landscape.
 Everyone had expected this to be a difficult negotiation; most under-
stood that sharing of power was the keystone of the negotiations. The RPF 
said that devolution of executive power was the most important aspect 
of these power-sharing talks. That process had in fact progressed rather 
steadily with the apparent support of the Council of Ministers in Kigali. 
The negotiations had proceeded in a businesslike manner, with most of 
the debate going head-to-head in closed session. In the plenary, there was 
less of the rhetorical sparring that characterized both the ceasefire talks 
and the rule of law negotiations. Informal conversations with Observers 
were frank, with serious discussions of options. Yet, the talks were hung 
up; impasse loomed on the horizon.
Lessons We Learned
 These two sessions on power sharing carried some hard lessons. The 
high plateau of constitutional principles gave way to a valley of contest and 
contrariety. International interveners took some valuable instructions in 
political conflict.
•	 If	you	want	a	realistic	projection,	do	not	ask	the	negotiators.	Negotiators set 
October 10 as the terminal date of political negotiations. By October 
30, negotiators suspended talks on agenda item two: power sharing. 
More was at stake here than the optimism of the negotiators suggested.
•	 If	politics	is	about	keeping,	increasing,	or	demonstrating	power,	then	negotia-
tions on power sharing are counterintuitive.73 At the end of the negotiat-
ing game, the contending parties want it all. We considered inclusive 
decision making and sharing of power to be intrinsic elements of a 




Rwanda, an entrenched regime, a newly birthed internal opposition, 
and an armed insurgency were all vying for a durable and dominant 
share of power in a tripartite tug of war. In fact, among government 
negotiators were some who wanted Habyarimana’s regime out of the 
way. The RPF often pressed for positions of the internal opposition as 
well as its own.
•	 You	do	not	have	to	define	power	before	negotiating	it.	But once negotiations 
had devolved powers from the president to the broad-based transi-
tional cabinet, the locus of power and the focus of negotiations were 
clear. The RPF’s call for early allocation of portfolios in that cabinet 
stirred up a hornet’s nest within the internal parties and undermined 
cohesion of the coalition government.
•	 Politics	is	about	numbers.	Initially, power-sharing negotiations in Arusha 
had the assent of the coalition cabinet; all ministers should benefit 
from the devolution of presidential powers. But when MRND min-
isters saw their dominance sliced back in the projected allocation of 
portfolios, they realized that they would be outnumbered, unable to 
achieve their political goals or even to defend their political future.
•	 Why	not	elections;	why	not	test	the	people’s	will?	Security and social disrup-
tion were the reasons given, but delegates at Arusha realized that the 
MRND would win any near-term election. Negotiators at Arusha 
were actually vying for place in an elitist arrangement of designated 
government portfolios and appointed parliamentary seats that could 
guarantee their influence over the transition.
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Impasse
 President Juvénal Habyarimana was in a dour mood when Ambassa-
dor Flaten and I met him after suspension of negotiations on power shar-
ing. According to the protocol just signed, the power-sharing agreement 
would devolve his executive powers to a multiparty cabinet. Initial nego-
tiations on the makeup of cabinet posts suggested that his ruling party, 
the MRND, would be shorn of critical portfolios and assume a minority 
status. Moreover, the chance of gaining influence in interim institutions 
through elections for the national assembly now dimmed as the political 
elite gravitated toward the notion of a nominated assembly. All this was 
negotiated by a delegation out of reach in Arusha and through a foreign 
minister and prime minister who were not consulting with or reporting to 
the president. We tried to convince the president to get out in front of the 
negotiations and put his imprint on the interim structures. As subsequent 
events would show, the president instead let the temporary suspension of 
negotiations fall into a full-fledged impasse.1
 In this chapter, I will again examine the issues at stake, review the 
period of formal suspension, dissect the solutions offered by the clergy 
contact group, and assess the roles of diplomats and the Facilitator in get-
ting the peace process back on track. Resurgence of ethnic violence and 
renewed war on the front brought the impasse to its denouement.
Issues at Stake
 For all the hope generated by the initial success of power-sharing ne-
gotiations, we should not have been surprised to find a barricade at the end 
of this road. The process of conflict mitigation often leads to “impasse,” as 
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practitioners and analysts have attested.2 Issues that occasion such block-
ages are multiple.
 Is	 power	 sharing	 a	 viable	 objective	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 in	 a	deeply	 rooted	
conflict?3 Power-sharing negotiations often end up being more about con-
trolling power than sharing it. Neither at Arusha nor in Kigali was there 
much focus on “a necessary shared future.” The belief that “if we do not 
dominate, we will be dominated” remained the leitmotif.4 The first ques-
tion then was whether a future for the contenders could be so constructed 
that real power might be shared.
 If communication is the key, who is talking to whom?5 What appeared to 
us Observers as improved communication in face-to-face talks in Arusha 
was, in fact, indicative of the distance between understandings arrived at 
in Arusha and politics in Kigali. Moreover, in the close-knit circles of 
Rwanda’s tiny capital, the breakdown of communication was patently evi-
dent. Communication breaks down and impasse creeps in.
 How do negotiators or interveners discern between opening bids and fun-
damental interests of the contending parties? While basic human needs might 
undergird the antagonists’ positions, it may be sufficient to realize that re-
spective parties saw their political future at stake.6 At this point, the particu-
lar ambitions and visions of the parties become paramount and difficult to 
unravel; solutions to the conflict also become particular, sui generis.
 How does geographic distance affect the course of conflict resolution? Off-site 
negotiation is a classic technique in getting parties in conflict away from 
their usual haunts and focused on the common problem, but such isolated 
negotiations begin to take on a dynamic of their own. Negotiators develop 
a sense of empowerment and camaraderie; international interveners add 
to the local feeling of importance.7 Thus, returning to the domestic scene 
is disruptive, especially if the achievements of the negotiation are frontally 
challenged in the political marketplace.
Slowdown or Breakdown?
 Did the suspension of November 1992 confirm the intractability of 
the Rwandan conflict, or was this the proverbial “speed bump on the high-
way to progress”? Resistance in Kigali to the terms and direction of the 
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political negotiations was profound. Partisans of the pro-Arusha position 
confronted an anti-Arusha constellation. Denigration remained the mode 
for characterizing the other’s position. The pro-Arusha “Concert for Peace” 
organized mass demonstrations deriding the president while the anti-Arusha 
Hutu extremists considered the pro-Arusha parties as “traitors.”8
 The profitability of continuing the conflict was questionable for either 
side; the war was bankrupting the Rwandan government, and President 
Museveni now was pushing the RPF to keep on the peace track.9 None-
theless, the costs of going ahead with negotiations on terms the other side 
could accept were unbearably high: either continued domination of the 
political process by the Habyarimana regime or revolutionary change of 
state institutions by the RPF and its allies. Thus, the impasse became a 
stable and self-serving stalemate.10
 In retrospect, the second part of the power-sharing negotiations at 
Arusha failed in two ways. First, although the instructions for that session 
were flexible, some of the “creative” solutions put forward—especially an 
appointed national assembly and a classification of government portfolios 
by type—went beyond the negotiators’ mandate. Second, the resultant dis-
tribution of portfolios in government, along with the proposed two-thirds 
voting override when consensus failed, were not realistic given the political 
landscape in Rwanda. It asked the presidential party, still dominant in all 
institutions and across the country, to give up its ascendency for a minor-
ity position where it could not protect its own interests. No wonder that 
Habyarimana started looking for “off-the-table” solutions.11
suspension dynamics
 Wanting a suspension but worried about a possible breakdown of the 
ceasefire and renewed armed conflict, Habyarimana hesitated to request 
a recess. At Arusha, however, the RPF, frustrated by the lack of progress, 
proposed the pause.12 It remained possible that the disagreements and ten-
sions that occasioned a suspension could crystallize into a hardened an-
tagonism or that the two parties, relying on assumed goodwill, might fail 
to record achieved understandings.13 The Tanzanian Facilitator, sensing 




 According to US embassy reports, once the suspension of negotia-
tions was decided, internal political discussions took on a rhythm and a 
seriousness that they had not seen in some time. The president and prime 
minister met October 30 to hash out their differences, the first meeting 
in weeks. Habyarimana’s MRND agreed to meet and discuss differences 
with opposition parties; all internal parties agreed to meet with the presi-
dent. Out of these meetings came two new initiatives. Both were efforts to 
break the negotiating logjam but, in effect, they sidestepped the negotiat-
ing process. With the newfound amity, the parties revived the notion of 
the parties in government meeting with the Front at some neutral spot 
and working through differences on power sharing. This would, in effect, 
take the political negotiations out of government control and out of the 
Arusha process.15
 On the other hand, President Habyarimana, at his November 3 meet-
ing with the political parties, broached the idea of inviting religious leaders, 
as representatives of civil society, to broker an equitable political solution.16 
This idea short-circuited the intraparty dialogue. All parties decided to 
wait and see what the church leaders would come up with before taking 
their own stance.
 Even as church leaders met with political parties to open discussions 
on a common position for the Arusha negotiations, the debate over the 
Arusha process took on its usual manifestations. On November 4, at a 
meeting of the MRND National Committee, some delegates castigated 
the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing of October 30 as a coup 
d’état in the making. Of particular concern were protocol articles 14, 21, 
and 46: article 14 gave the RPF veto powers over any expansion of the po-
litical field; article 21 provided for a two-thirds override in case consensus 
broke down in government; and article 41 called for the replacement of 
communal mayors without establishing criteria for the change. With no 
chance to expand representation in government, MRND leaders felt that 
proposed portfolio allocations would take away their ability to control na-
tional policy or influence local government.
 While not specifically attacking the power-sharing protocol in the 
meeting’s communiqué, the MRND leaders criticized the prime minister 
and foreign minister for their conduct of negotiations.17 Moreover, four 
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of the MRND ministers sent a letter to the prime minister “rejecting” the 
offending articles.18 As if to assuage his party leadership, on November 15, 
President Habyarimana gave one of his more notorious speeches in which 
he characterized the Arusha protocols, in contrast to the institutions of the 
Rwandan state, as mere “pieces of paper.” This drew an open-letter rebuttal 
from the prime minister and an opposition demonstration march in Kigali 
four days later in which some fifty persons were injured.19
 Tanzania as the Facilitator had been active in the pause, receiving visits 
from President Museveni, Habyarimana’s cabinet director Ruhigira, and 
RPF military commander Kagame. The Tanzanians twice convoked rep-
resentatives of Observer states to discuss ways to get over the impasse.20 In 
the November 20 meeting, the Facilitator and the Observers agreed that 
to preserve momentum and avoid endangering the ceasefire, talks would 
reconvene on November 23 as scheduled. The Rwanda government had 
proposed at the end of the last session that the talks open with discussions 
on military integration. This would give time for decision makers in Kigali 
to work out compromises on power sharing. The Facilitator was willing to 
put military integration at the top of the agenda but had not yet secured 
the assent of the RPF.21
 So, on November 23, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira led his negotiating 
team back to Arusha. Since the talks had formally only been suspended, 
he was still theoretically operating under the instructions issued at the end 
of September. In reality, the foreign minister had already exceeded the pa-
rameters of his mandate at the end of the last session. He was now going 
back without a consensus about power sharing in the transitional cabinet 
or an agreement on how to constitute the transitional national assembly. 
Moreover, military integration did not lead the discussions. The RPF team 
insisted that political discussions be on the agenda as well. Formal nego-
tiations opened November 25 but accomplished little as the negotiators 
awaited word on the church leaders’ deliberations.22
The Bishops’ Proposal
 It had been President Habyarimana’s intention to have religious leaders 
present at his first postsuspension meeting with the governmental parties 
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on November 3. That did not happen; instead, Habyarimana informed the 
parties of his desire to engage church leadership in the search for an equi-
table solution. The first meeting between the clergy and political leaders 
could not be arranged until November 11, even as the clock was ticking on 
a return to the negotiating table.
a bifurcated prop osal
 After many informal and formal discussions, the bishops finally came 
forward with their suggestions.23 Initially, the religious leaders outlined 
two options: one predicated on a percentage breakdown, and the other 
on a numerical allocation of seats. Under the first proposal the presi-
dent’s party, the MRND, would get 35 percent of the seats, the “Concert 
Parties” (MDR, PL, and PSD) 35 percent, the RPF 20 percent, and other 
parties 10 percent. The second proposal would have a government com-
posed of three members each from the MRND, MDR, PL, PSD, and 
RPF, one member from the PDC, and three others from other parties. 
With an MNRD president and MDR prime minister, this would make 
a twenty-one-member cabinet.
 Along with these possible formulas for the cabinet, the bishops pro-
posed that article 14 of the October 30 “Protocol on Power-Sharing” be 
interpreted as encouraging the inclusion of other parties, hence the per-
centages of seats allocated to an unspecified “other.” It also recommended 
that the national assembly be composed of members appointed by the “na-
tional conventions” of the parties, that it be named “The National Legisla-
tive Council,” and that it be constituted of no more than forty members. 
Parties would decide distribution of seats in concert with the RPF. The 
bishops also recommended a code of ethical and institutional standards for 
party participation in government and the assembly.
 The fruit of this consultation was noteworthy in several respects. First, 
the pattern of allocation in the first proposal gave the president’s party, the 
MRND, an automatic block on hostile motions in government; in the second 
proposal, single parties would have at most four votes and need a coalition of 
seven to block the two-thirds override. The president liked the first option 
since it gave his party the protection against radical reform (not to mention 
punitive sanctions) that his regime so desperately feared. The prime minister 
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from the MDR preferred the second since it ascribed equality among the 
major parties and gave the MDR, with the prime minister’s seat, the same 
power in government as the MRND with its presidential vote.24
 Second, the issue of inclusiveness (article 14 and the Code of Party 
Ethics) circled around a major problem, namely, the CDR (Coalition for 
the Defense of the Republic), a throwback to Hutu majoritarian politics of 
the Kayibanda regime and northern regional ascendency of the Habyari-
mana era. Since the RPF was obviously opposed to the CDR and its pro-
Hutu ideology, the CDR seemed to many a barrier to peace and tranquility 
in a new Rwanda.25
 Of parties not in government, the CDR claimed the largest political 
base and proved this in antigovernment, anti-Arusha demonstrations on 
October 18.26 Although CDR leaders were intellectuals educated abroad, 
its cadre came from restless, landless youth given to thuggery. Some rank-
ing officials in the MRND detested the CDR, but it was connected to the 
presidency through Habyarimana’s wife’s lineage.27
 Third, the bishops’ contact group and its proposals had no standing in 
the Arusha political negotiations. While their status as counselors to the 
domestic political process had a long tradition in Rwanda, in the context of 
political negotiations with an insurgent force, the president had, in effect, 
deputized them. The hard political questions were delegated to a religious 
committee rather than bargained out in the political market place. As chief 
representatives of civil society and institutions committed to civil peace, 
the religious leadership was bound to look for a solution that they felt 
would be salable to the greatest number within Rwanda’s now fractured 
social and political order and would hurry the peace process along.
a final  prop osal
 Both the president and the prime minister asked the bishops to find a 
compromise between the two modes of allocating seats in government that 
they had initially put forward. The bishops met with party leaders to work 
out a synthesis while negotiators in Arusha waited for instructions.28 While 
many expected a final proposal that would find a compromise between the 
two options, the church leaders’ proposal tabled November 27 was a slight 
variant on the second option that favored the internal opposition. Three 
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ministerial portfolios each would be allocated to the MRND, MDR, PL, 
PSD, and RPF, as well as two seats for the PDC and three for other par-
ties. The Council of Ministers the next day hurriedly endorsed the pro-
posal before the MRND ministers arrived at the meeting. The MRND 
ministers then announced that they would not participate in the transition 
government on the basis of that proposal.29
 The presidential ploy to involve civil society in the negotiating process 
had backfired. The clergy had specified a formula that curtailed the weight 
of the president and his party in council with no apparent trade-off. The 
allocation of seats, if the “progressive forces” held together in coalition dis-
cipline, assured a two-thirds majority and a hammerlock on decisions in 
cabinet and an appointed assembly. The religious leaders’ intervention, far 
from bridging party differences on power sharing, had in fact solidified 
divisions.
 President Habyarimana would, over the next several months, articu-
late in various ways his deeply felt antagonism to the bishops’ formula, even 
as he agreed under pressure to accept the proposal, at least as a framework 
for future negotiations.30 He felt that the alliance of opposition parties in-
tended to overthrow the president, not to share power. And he continued 
to hold that an electoral process, not arbitrary allocation of positions, was 
the only real way to tell who represented the people. Moreover, to be legiti-
mate, any negotiated agreement should be sanctioned by representatives of 
the people or by referendum.
Diplomatic Engagement
 The suspension of the Arusha talks and the failure of the Rwandan 
political elite to agree on a formula for power sharing in government 
brought the position of the diplomatic corps into heightened relief. Al-
ready the papal nuncio and dean of the diplomatic corps, Monsignor Gi-
useppe Bertello, was deeply engaged as chair of the clergy contact group 
and thus committed to their final recommendation. The inference was that 
the corps would line up behind the bishops’ position. The ambassadors of 
Western states having “Observer” status in the Arusha negotiations, how-




 In contrast to the Observers in Arusha who were daily buttonholing 
the representatives of the two sides, offering options, suggesting negotiat-
ing formats, or even proposing language for protocols of agreement, the 
ambassadors in Kigali took a more discreet diplomatic stance. As the 
Arusha process lost momentum and intraparty communication in Kigali 
dried up in October, the Western ambassadors concluded that “the parties 
need to find a mechanism for dialogue.” Embassies could not force the par-
ties to talk.32 After the Arusha talks had been suspended, the Western am-
bassadors in Kigali decided to “continue to urge internal dialogue among 
parties but not to press any specific formulas to break the impasse.”33 As 
the arguments among political elite in Kigali grew in fervor, Ambassador 
Flaten concluded in mid-November, “I believe it is still too early for us 
to select a preferred plan. I will remain in touch with the other ambassa-
dors to explore the possibility that a concerted effort by foreign diplomats 
might at some time be appropriate in breaking these difficult impasses.”34
 Once the bishops had presented a concrete proposal, the question then 
became what the Kigali diplomats should say about it. The nuncio felt that 
the president had no alternative but to accept the proposal he had asked 
the bishops to devise. Bertello wanted the Western ambassadors to join 
him in a demarche to the president supporting the proposal. The Belgian 
and French ambassadors were not that enthusiastic about the proposal 
but willing to go along with the nuncio. Moreover, the French ambassador 
warned that should the president refuse the proposal and try an end run 
around the Arusha process, France would, no doubt, have to reevaluate its 
support for the regime.35
 In a personal initiative, Habyarimana’s director of cabinet Enoch 
Ruhigira came to see Ambassador Flaten, recommending a demarche by 
the United States and possibly France to persuade the president to accept 
the bishops’ proposal. He specifically discouraged a joint approach with 
the nuncio since many around the president were suspicious of the nun-
cio’s role in the bishops’ discussions. Flaten replied that instructions from 
Washington and consultation with Paris would have to precede such an 
approach. In his dispatch to Washington, Flaten recommended that, if 
there were an opportunity to see the president, diplomats should take “a 
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general approach to President Habyarimana, urging him to work with 
the context of the bishops’ proposal, but stopping short of endorsing its 
specifics.”36
 In Kigali, ambassadors, accredited to the president and carrying on 
state-to-state bilateral programs, were also dealing with multiple claimants 
to power in the personalities of party leaders. The claims and interests of 
the RPF were known in Kigali only from external reporting. In this con-
text, a tilt toward any particular formula inevitably favored one side over 
the other in the internal debate and discounted RPF interests. As Am-
bassador Flaten noted, “There is a reasonable consensus among Western 
ambassadors that for the moment our role is essentially one of encouraging 
dialogue among internal parties.”37
 But success in bilateral diplomacy began to wear down when con-
fronted with specifics of the Arusha negotiations. Relations with the presi-
dent, well known as a champion of bilateral rural-development programs, 
became more challenging as diplomats promoted democratic opening 
and supported the Arusha process. Not only was the French ambassador 
beginning to question the value of French engagement with the regime, 
but the American ambassador was never sure of the Rwandan president’s 
commitment to democratization.38 Belgium, with a domestic constituency 
focused on human rights, had increasing problems with the presidency. 
Germany, which took an economic brief concentrated on its two-year 
development program, was drawn into the political fray by its advocacy of 
democratic ideals.
 What propelled Western cooperation on the issues at Arusha was a 
common commitment to human rights and democratic governance, which 
were seen as constituent elements of true development. The governance/
development nexus had become a mantra for all major donors. The dip-
lomatic structure of this commitment was regular trilateral consultation 
among the governments of Belgium, France, and the United States on 
Central African issues and among the governments of Belgium, France, 
and Germany as members of the European Community. With their capi-
tals closely coordinating from the same ideological orientation, coopera-




tanzania deals  bil aterally
 On November 30, the president made an unannounced trip to Dar es 
Salaam to meet with President Mwinyi. While the presidency suggested 
that the visit had been in the works for some time, it seemed obvious that 
the president was looking for a means of not acceding to the bishops’ pro-
posal. However, the Tanzanian president apparently convinced Habyari-
mana to move forward in negotiations using the religious leaders’ proposal 
as a basis for discussions, as long as no major political bloc was perma-
nently marginalized.
 On December 1, Habyarimana addressed the nation in a speech that 
seemed to incorporate this understanding. Negotiations must avoid giving 
any single political group a permanent majority; the transition assembly 
could be appointed, but only if the transition was a brief, twelve-month 
period; local administration officials should be chosen by an early election; 
and the accords should be approved either by the current legislature or by a 
referendum.39 In a follow-up letter to the prime minister, Cabinet Director 
Ruhigira referred to the president’s discussions with the political parties 
and with the religious leaders whom he knew to be supported informally 
by the diplomatic community, although the diplomatic community had 
in fact avoided taking a position on the religious leaders’ proposal. The 
letter asked the prime minister to transmit instructions to the Rwandan 
delegation in Arusha based on principles that followed the guidelines of 
the president’s speech.40
 Despite the Mwinyi-Habyarimana understanding, as interpreted by 
Habyarimana’s speech, the coalition cabinet in Kigali was not able to for-
mulate any instructions to the negotiators. But back in Arusha, Foreign 
Minister Ngulinzira claimed in a November 29 radio interview that the 
(truncated) cabinet’s November 28 adoption of the bishops’ recommen-
dation gave him the legal mandate to move ahead in political negotia-
tions.41 On December 2, Ngulinzira told Observers in Arusha that in 
accord with the president’s speech the day before, he was ready to move 
ahead on discussions on a transitional national assembly while awaiting 
further clarification on the assignment of portfolios within the transi-
tional cabinet. The government side did not want to reopen articles in 
the October 30 protocol but rather to discuss their implementation in 
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such a way as to avoid “blockages on the one hand and marginalization 
on the other.”42 The RPF still questioned the delegation’s authority, but 
they agreed to continue discussions.
 Meanwhile, actions taken by the government, without MRND agree-
ment or presidential sanction, so angered Habyarimana that he refused to 
meet further with Nsengiyaremye. The MRND cabinet members threat-
ened not to participate in whatever might be negotiated in Arusha. The 
CDR and some fringe parties took this impulse to its extreme by disown-
ing the Arusha process in its entirety. Thus, as Ngulinzira was pushing 
toward a power-sharing agreement in Arusha, the political atmosphere in 
Kigali became increasingly rejectionist.43
diria  comes  calling
 As political gridlock in Kigali undermined discussions in Arusha, the 
Tanzanian foreign minister and facilitator, Ahmed Hassan Diria, paid a visit 
to the Rwandan capital on December 9 and 10. This, Diria’s first visit since 
taking over as facilitator of the peace process, gave him a chance to burnish 
his credentials as mediator.44 Moreover, Diria needed to know what the real 
positions of the president and the prime minister were, as well as those of the 
MRND (a major part of the government), on an appointed assembly, divi-
sion of portfolios, and duration of a transitional government. Finally, there 
was a growing impression at Arusha, held insistently by the RPF but increas-
ingly by the government negotiating team and by the Tanzanians, that the 
main obstacle to settlement of outstanding issues was President Habyari-
mana himself.45 From his meetings with the president, Diria had to extract 
concessions that would let the negotiations go forward.
 At the conclusion of the foreign minister’s visit, the Tanzanian ambas-
sador in Kigali informed her colleagues that Habyarimana had agreed to 
a flexible time frame for the transition, an appointed transitional national 
assembly, and elections of local communal officers after the transition gov-
ernment was in place. The president was still insisting on 35 percent rep-
resentation for MRND in the transition cabinet. Diria told him that was 
too high, that the president had to work out a compromise with the prime 
minister. He also suggested taking issues on which the cabinet was dead-
locked to the Joint Political Military Committee for arbitration.46
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 The foreign minister was obviously anxious to put the understandings 
arrived at in Kigali in the best possible light. But the president’s agree-
ment to an appointed national assembly was conditional on some accom-
modation with the interests of the current elected assembly (the CND), 
as well as on some electoral process (whether popular referendum or en-
dorsement of the CND) whereby the agreements made in Arusha would 
become the law of the land. Similarly, the president always wanted a short 
transition whose endpoint would be elections for all national institutions. 
Habyarimana’s concessions were all made in view of extracting the princi-
pal point—namely, 35 percent of the portfolios in the transition cabinet for 
the MRND. In other words, there was to be no marginalization of a major 
political player. President Mwinyi had agreed to nonmarginalization as a 
cardinal principle of future negotiations.
 Now Foreign Minister Diria had declared that Habyarimana’s formu-
lation of that principle was asking too much; he should rather work out 
an equitable allocation with the prime minister (who wanted Habyari-
mana and his party marginalized). In other words, the foreign minister 
punted, leaving Kigali with the major issue to be resolved further down 
the field at a later time. The Tanzanian team was aware that it was playing 
for field advantage. Ambassador Mpungwe told the US embassy in Dar es 
Salaam that, despite their doubts, the Tanzanian government had decided 
to let the parties press ahead on the basis of assurances from President 
Habyarimana to President Mwinyi and from President Habyarimana 
and Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye to Foreign Minister Diria that they 
were fully committed to the Arusha process and would accept the results 
of negotiations.47
a diplomatic  demarche
 Meanwhile, the Western ambassadors in Kigali finally agreed to join 
the papal nuncio in a demarche to the president and prime minister. Rather 
than directly endorse the clergy’s recommendation, they would inquire 
whether the president or the prime minister saw any difference between 
principles enunciated in the president’s speech of December 1 and the re-
ligious leaders’ recommendations. If so, what were the means of bridging 
differences? The diplomats finally met with the president on December 10 
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and the prime minister on December 11. Habyarimana refused to be drawn 
out on the clergy’s proposal or to meet with the prime minister to discuss 
differences. He went back to the formula of one-third of governmental 
seats for the MRND and proposed a technical team that would work out 
various scenarios as the bases for political compromise and for developing 
a national consensus.48
 The prime minister, who had fully accepted the clergy’s proposal, felt 
that a technical study of the problem rejected the religious leaders’ interven-
tion and could be manipulated by the president. Nsengiyaremye wondered 
whether the president was willing to use the clergy’s proposal as a beginning 
point for efforts to build a consensus. He finally agreed to ask the presi-
dency and the clergy to resolve remaining differences. General discussions 
could proceed in Arusha, but negotiations on cabinet positions would await 
harmonization of differences at home.49 Taking the clergy’s proposal as a 
basis, the negotiators saw that the critical issue was how to fill the unat-
tributed portfolios so that no political bloc had a two-thirds majority or no 
particular party had a permanent blocking third of the positions.50
 The diplomats’ hope for a speedy conclusion to subsequent discus-
sions was not to be realized. Their intervention did stir up renewed contact 
between the presidency and the prime minister’s office—and as a conse-
quence, renewed dialogue among the political parties—but no consensus 
emerged. Political leaders bandied a number of ideas for breaking the 
impasse, all centered on allocation of governmental seats and looking to 
finesse the two-thirds controlling vote (article 21) issue.
the united states  steps  back
 In view of the delay in the formulation of negotiating instructions and 
the chasm between Kigali and Arusha, US participation in Arusha ne-
gotiations came into question. By the time Foreign Minister Ngulinzira 
finally took his delegation back to Arusha in late November, my mandate 
as Observer had lapsed and I had gone on to another assignment. Lt. Colo-
nel Anthony Marley, military advisor for the Bureau of African Affairs, 
stood in the wings in case Arusha negotiations opened with military talks. 
When the Front insisted on picking up on power-sharing discussions, Se-
nior Deputy Assistant Secretary Edward Brynn prepared to take on the 
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Observer role. Meanwhile, the political officer from the US embassy in Dar 
es Salaam, Robert Bentley, a member of the US delegation in the Septem-
ber and October talks, went to Arusha for the opening of negotiations.51
 But the embassy in Dar es Salaam was shorthanded, with Ambassador 
Raymond Ewing on temporary status as chargé d’affaires and due to leave 
in mid-December. He needed Bentley back at his regular duties. Moreover, 
it was clear that political, not military, matters would dominate the agenda, 
so in late November, the embassy in Dar es Salaam urged Ambassador 
Brynn to come out.52 From Kigali, however, Ambassador Flaten suggested 
that Ambassador Brynn delay his departure from the United States until 
there was an agreed Rwandan government position in Kigali and clear in-
structions to Arusha.53 By December 8, that consensus had not developed. 
Ambassador Flaten urged that Brynn delay once again and that Bentley 
remain in Dar es Salaam until the situation clarified. A matter of person-
nel rotation and a decision not to grace Ngulinzira’s freelance negotiations 
resulted in the United States not having a presence in Arusha in critical 
December days.
 The action shifted to Kigali, where Ambassador Flaten was deeply en-
gaged in urging parties to dialogue and compromise. According to French 
and German Observers on site who kept Bentley informed, nothing much 
was happening in Arusha. But the lack of a US presence was keenly felt 
by the negotiators, who had looked to the United States for leadership in 
the construction of peace.54 After the February recess and subsequent 
RPA offensive, RPA commander Kagame told Colonel Marley that “the 
apparent lack of US response to the events of January, and the failure to 
maintain (in permanence) an Observer in Arusha, led many Rwandans 
to fear that the United States had withdrawn from the peace process.”55
a diplomatic  contretemps
 Since the revival of international efforts to promote a ceasefire in the 
Rwandan conflict, the United States and France had worked closely on 
the peace process. Coordinated US policy called for keeping the French 
out front in “GOR-RPF negotiations.”56
 Now, even as diplomatic consultation and cooperation seemed to reach 
a high point with the joint demarche on the president and prime minister, 
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tensions flared between Washington and Paris. It began in the field as 
French advisors helped Rwandan frontline troops choose and reinforce 
more defensible positions. The forward movement of the troops brought 
fire from the RPF side, with a riposte from government forces. The Neu-
tral Military Observer Group (NMOG), finally in the field and by chance 
at this site, was caught between exchanges of fire. Whereas previous re-
ports on ceasefire violations had detailed exchanges of fire or movements 
of frontline forces, General Opalaye, the NMOG commander, this time 
highlighted his concern about the activity of the French advisors.57
 The United States saw this reported activity as a “blatant disregard for 
the cease-fire line,” confirming in Washington’s mind the reports of “French 
military involvement on the front lines.” Ambassador Flaten was instructed 
to discuss the issue with his French counterpart, Ambassador Martres, to 
ask that such violations not be repeated and to suggest some symbolic ges-
ture (like replacing the commander responsible) that would calm the situ-
ation. The US embassy in Paris was instructed to “signal our concern to 
the Quai” and to report that the US ambassador in Kigali had been told to 
discuss “damage limitation” with the French ambassador.58
 The French, in Paris and in Kigali, did not take lightly to the US scold-
ing. For one, NMOG had only recently been deployed amid great squabbling 
about salaries and per diem. In the French view, the peace that had held along 
the ceasefire line since June was wrought not by the NMOG presence but 
out of the parties’ desire for peace, as well as French restraint on government 
forces and deterrence of the RPF. Instead of NMOG arranging a withdrawal 
from the front, as the ceasefire agreement had demanded, hostile forces still 
faced each other; thus, the French did not consider reinforcement of front 
lines to be a violation of ceasefire terms. Moreover, the French considered 
the Nigerian NMOG commander highly prejudiced toward his fellow An-
glophone Africans, the RPF, and wondered why the United States took the 
commander’s report without question. Finally, the United States, which had 
so strongly pushed the idea of conflict resolution through the Joint Politi-
cal Military Commission ( JPMC), was now bypassing that institution in 
a direct approach to the French government. Quai officials reminded their 
US interlocutors that ceasefire issues were matters between the Rwandan 
government and the RPF parties and were to be resolved in the JPMC.59
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 The RPF did not appear to be as concerned about General Opalaye’s 
report as the Department of State was. When Colonel Kanyarengwe met 
with OAU secretary general Salim Salim on December 8, the RPF chair-
man was preoccupied with larger issues. Foremost was the fact that the 
human rights situation in Rwanda was deteriorating, putting innocent 
civilians within areas controlled by the government at risk. The chair-
man challenged in general terms the continued French support for the 
Rwandan government. He also accused the government team of dallying 
on important issues at the political negotiations, especially the attribution 
of government portfolios. In briefing diplomats on the meeting between 
Kanyarengwe and Salim Salim, RPF representative Dr. Rudasingwa did 
not mention Opalaye’s report. Rather, he commented presciently that a 
“good soldier does not sit around and react when attacked, a good soldier 
preempts his attackers.” The RPF, he said, was not positioning itself to take 
the offensive, but that option was a future possibility.60
Back and Forth in Kigali
 Even as interveners sorted out their differences, opposition parties 
in Kigali finally recognized how much the clergy formula had marginal-
ized the MRND. There seemed to be a growing awareness that working 
in lockstep with the Front to hem in the MRND had gone to the point of 
national schism, threatening the whole democratic enterprise. Suggested 
adjustments included adding another seat for the MRND, more seats for 
more neutral parties like the Christian Democratic Party (PCD), or seats 
for independents. Common to all discussions was a vision of the inter-
nal political scene in terms of political blocs: the internal opposition, now 
known as the “Concert for Change” (MDR, PL, and PSD), and the allies 
of the Habyarimana regime, now brought together under the banner of the 
“Alliance for the Reinforcement of Democracy” (MRND, CDR, PADER, 
PECO, and PARERWA). Intrinsic in the formulations was the search for 
an allocation of seats that would give the MRND enough cabinet votes 
to protect its interests. As the American embassy reported, “President 
Habyarimana is clearly in a very difficult position. Although he gives signs 
personally of wanting to work out a compromise, his party, his family and 
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his loyal supporters of years are terrified of being marginalized, unable to 
defend themselves, possibly being persecuted or prosecuted or worse.”61
scurrying for a  solu tion
 The discussions among the political elites in Kigali since Habyarimana’s 
December 1 speech and Diria’s visit had been intense. The president of the op-
position MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu, and the president’s director of cabi-
net, Enoch Ruhigira, met four times between December 11 and December 16. 
Proposals from the presidency and the MRND encompassed Habyarimana’s 
wish not to vote in council, but to preside above the partisan fray.62
 In addition to the calculus on government portfolios, Kigali politicians 
came up with a number of operational notions designed to make the alloca-
tion more palatable to all sides. The idea of an inner cabinet, with a single 
representative from each party, was first broached by the presidency and then 
taken up by the prime minister’s office. Many proposals provided that min-
isters in the transition period would not be candidates for office in the post-
transition regime. There was the proposal that parties establish their ethical 
commitment to Arusha principles with an oath of office that rejected ethnism 
[sic], regionalism, and violence—a pledge that, in the view of many Kigali 
politicians, would be as onerous to the RPF as to the CDR. MRND leader 
Bizimungu even raised the possibility that President Habyarimana might 
not seek reelection if the opposition would agree to an amnesty for the presi-
dent and his family to protect them against politically motivated reprisals.
 After the visit of the Tanzanian foreign minister, Habyarimana sent 
two special envoys to Paris in hopes that at least one of them might see 
Mitterrand and arrange a later audience for the president. On December 
22, Habyarimana went to Bujumbura with Burundian president Buyoya 
and Ugandan president Museveni in an effort to shore up regional sup-
port.63 And he accepted an invitation to the National Prayer Breakfast in 
Washington in the first week of February, always a good means of making 
high-level contacts in the United States.
parallel  part y negotiations
 Both the party leaders and the Facilitator kept working at the idea of 
a party meeting parallel to the political negotiations at Arusha as a way of 
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building confidence and breaking through the political impasse. Pushing 
this option were parties like the PL and PSD, which felt underrepresented 
on the governmental negotiating team. The MRND finally agreed to par-
ticipate in such a meeting if the parties chose a chair to lead the discus-
sion and adopted a common position before the meeting.64 That, of course, 
went back to the initial problem—the lack of consensus among internal 
parties on power sharing in government.
 Although the RPF had had meetings in Brussels with the “unarmed 
opposition” before the June ceasefire, it was reluctant to now undertake a 
“major parties” meeting, rejecting Kigali as a locale because of security and 
Arusha so as to avoid confusion with the formal negotiations. By the end 
of December, it was obvious that a five-party discussion was not going to 
take place. The president’s cabinet director began talking instead of a direct 
meeting between the RPF and the MRND, a variant of his boss’s desire to 
meet not with Chairman Kanyarengwe, whom he considered but a front 
man, but with General Kagame, who was calling the shots.65 That neither 
a meeting between the leaders of the two sides nor RPF/MRND party 
talks took place suggests that the RPF was determined to avoid preempt-
ing with high-level talks the negotiations in Arusha, where it was most 
likely to achieve its objectives.
a p ortentous prop osal
 It was in this context of political gamesmanship in Kigali, absence of 
the United States from the Arusha negotiations, contention among the 
Western Observers, and growing RPF impatience that another proposal 
emerged. On December 22, Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye briefed key 
diplomats on a modification of the clergy’s plan: four cabinet positions 
would go to the MRND, four to the RPF, three plus the prime minister to 
the MDR, three each to the PL and PSD, two to other parties or persons, 
and one to the PDC. The proposal took into consideration the president’s 
position that he would not participate in cabinet but stay above the po-
litical fray. If the negotiators could not agree on balancing parties to be 
seated in government, the prime minister was open to the naming of inde-
pendent prominent persons to ministerial portfolios. He would work with 
the president to assure that the persons nominated for the portfolios were 
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acceptable to both sides. Nsengiyaremye thought, as well, that an agreed 
governmental program of action would reduce areas of confrontation.66
 Previously, Ambassador Flaten had concluded that the prime minister 
would not “press the foreign minister to go forward with negotiations on 
cabinet positions on the basis of the clergy proposals until there is further 
clarification.”67 Now Nsengiyaremye told Flaten that he would quickly ne-
gotiate with the MRND on this proposition and then instruct the foreign 
minister to begin negotiations. Flaten cautioned that the formula, how-
ever laudable an initiative, would certainly be questioned by the MRND 
and would require modifications before becoming the basis of negotiations 
with the RPF.
 Suddenly, without either presidential agreement or a cabinet meet-
ing, Arusha announced a breakthrough on negotiations, with both sides 
agreeing to a formula that closely paralleled the one described by the prime 
minister. Indeed, it is not clear that the proposal was the prime minister’s. 
Ambassador Mapuranga, the OAU representative at the talks, told the 
US embassy in Dar es Salaam that he was surprised that this particular 
proposal was even under discussion in Kigali. It apparently had been put 
forward in Arusha by the Tanzanians as a means of pushing forward dis-
cussions, with a view to signing a protocol by Christmas. The agreement 
was indeed characterized in the Kigali press as a proposal made by the 
Tanzanians and accepted by the negotiating teams in Arusha.68
 Never had the negotiating team in Arusha and the political realities 
in Kigali been further apart. As the US embassy reported, “There is no 
joy in Kigali at the announcement of agreement in Arusha, because every-
one knows that the president’s party (MRND) did not participate in the 
agreement and has not accepted it.”69 The MRND, in a party meeting 
on December 21, had approved a white paper detailing the weaknesses of 
the bishops’ proposal and accusing the prime minister of being the main 
source of blockage in government and in the Arusha negotiations.70 After 
the announcement of agreement in Arusha, the MRND, in a press com-
muniqué, noted that it had no interest in a government where it could 
not influence events and expressed astonishment that the chief negotiator 
would accept an agreement in Arusha when parties in Kigali were locked 
in discussions on distribution of portfolios.71
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 The processes in Kigali and Arusha proceeded within their own dy-
namic; toward the end of December, each new day seemed to bring yet 
another idea about power sharing in Kigali and yet another report of an 
agreement about to happen in Arusha. Tensions grew with two bombs ex-
ploding in Kigali, one occurring in a crowded nightclub and injuring some 
twenty people. Ethnic clashes broke out in the northern regions of Gisenyi, 
leaving dozens hurt and numerous homes destroyed. Meanwhile, the RPF 
Radio Muhabura streamed a litany of charges against the French presence 
and “the obstructions of the president of the Republic and his party to the 
Arusha negotiations.”72
a multipart y solu tion
 The negotiating sides in Arusha had agreed that the unattributed seats 
in government would be filled by independent personalities because, in 
their view, none of the non-concertation parties fit the bishops’ party ethic.73 
However, in Kigali, negotiations took a different tack. Party officials, like 
the president of PL, Justin Mugenzi, resented the quick agreement in 
Arusha, which sought to forestall ongoing discussions among party lead-
ership in Kigali; he even conveyed “his apologies” to the MRND for the 
surprise action in Arusha. Interparty discussions in Kigali sought to bal-
ance out political forces in government by giving seats to smaller parties 
rather than to “independent” individuals. Central to these discussions was 
the question of giving a role to the CDR, which had a considerable politi-
cal following, especially in the northwest, but also a reputation for engen-
dering violence. By December 28, the president’s director of cabinet had 
worked out with the MDR president a new variant that would have three 
independent seats in the government, one of which was to be the CDR; 
inner cabinet decisions would decide most issues.74 In a modification of 
this proposal, the MRND offered an extensive analysis of the options and 
proposed a cabinet in which MRND seats would be held to a minimum 
proposed level, but the CDR would be given three portfolios.75
 The United States, which was not present in Arusha but active in 
promoting discussions in Kigali, urged inclusion of all parties that would 
commit “to accept the Arusha process, eschew violence and renounce re-
gional and ethnic politics,” a formula equally applicable to the CDR as to 
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the RPF or any other party wishing to play a role in the transition pe-
riod.76 In Washington, when RPF chairman Kanyarengwe came calling, 
Assistant Secretary Cohen told the RPF that the French by their presence 
were helping prevent military hardliners from launching an offensive. He 
cautioned the RPF not to ask President Habyarimana to commit political 
suicide by leaving him no authority within the institutions. Specifically, as 
regards the CDR issue, Cohen urged the RPF to reflect on the danger of 
excluding an extremist group from the new government. As participants in 
the system, the CDR members would have to commit themselves to gov-
ernment decisions and respect its rule. Excluded, they would have nothing 
to lose by sabotaging the process itself.77
blo cked again
 Back in Kigali, it looked like political leaders were moving toward a sal-
able compromise. MDR president Twagiramungu concluded that “if the 
Rwandans wanted to have real national reconciliation, they had to reach 
out not only to the RPF but also to the Hutu supremacists in the CDR.” 
However, given his previous public position against the CDR, he wanted 
someone else, perhaps the bishops, to recommend inclusion of the CDR.78 
On the other side of the question, in a long letter to the prime minis-
ter, Habyarimana expressed a strong desire to see the Arusha negotia-
tions succeed. True, he complained that negotiators were taking positions 
in Arusha without consultation with government and without informing 
him. He reiterated the principles of “arbitration” on the portfolio question 
communicated in his letter of December 1. He “encouraged” the prime min-
ister not to flee the interior debate or to leave the negotiators to adventures 
that a large part of the national population would contest. But for all his 
qualifiers and admonitions, Habyarimana reiterated a foundational desire 
to see a peace accord signed at Arusha that would guarantee a real peace 
and the return of displaced persons to their properties, as well as a definite 
resolution of the refugee problem. The president favored any solution that 
was based on frank dialogue without exclusion, looking essentially toward 
national reconciliation and a solid peace in the country.79
 There were, however, limits as to how far party leaders were willing 
to go in including others. They were willing to consider another seat for 
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the MRND or a portfolio for another minor party, but most did not 
favor any representation in government for the CDR. In a long meeting 
on December 30, four top party leaders and Enoch Ruhigira (repre-
senting the president’s office) met with Nsengiyaremye to establish a 
common position on cabinet allocations. Although the prime minister’s 
chief of staff had previously signaled that the CDR might be seated if 
it committed to the Arusha process,80 this time the prime minister did 
not follow Twagiramungu’s new openness but continued to insist that 
the CDR could not be part of the next government. MRND national 
secretary Ngirumpatse again warned that the MRND would not par-
ticipate in the new transition government without the CDR being part 
of it.81
 When this interparty effort to keep the MRND from being marginal-
ized within the context of the negotiations failed, the Alliance for the 
Preservation of Democracy went out in street demonstrations in Kigali 
and northern towns of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri on December 31 to prove 
their political strength. The demonstrations stopped all traffic and virtu-
ally paralyzed the country. An MRND communiqué after the demonstra-
tion claimed that the foreign minister in Arusha continued to commit 
treason in an effort to pass all power to the RPF and its internal allies. The 
communiqué denounced the parties who continued to support the RPF 
and called on the prime minister to give up the policies of assassination 
and murder that he had been using in the past.82
arusha goes  ahead
 Meanwhile, in Arusha, despite the presumed agreement of Decem-
ber 22, the issue of portfolios persisted. The RPF favored dividing the 
government among parties currently within it and was categorical in re-
fusing a portfolio to the CDR. The government insisted, however, that 
no agreement could work if significant forces were excluded from partici-
pation.83 Tanzanian facilitator Ambassador Mpungwe, in letters to both 
delegations, noted that negotiations over the distribution of portfolios 
had stalled over two unallocated portfolios and thus had threatened to 
derail the whole peace process. He reminded the negotiating teams that 
their objective was peace and that the transition was not an end in itself 
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but an opportunity to prepare Rwanda for “a new order of national unity.” 
The Facilitator called for flexibility and realism and pointed to the need 
to “work for a solution which allows for maximum cooperation by all po-
litical forces with due regard to the existing realities in Rwanda.” Laying 
down the gauntlet, Ambassador Mpungwe told the delegations that if 
they were not able to find an acceptable solution by Wednesday, January 
6, 1993, it would be advisable to the delegations to adjourn the talks for 
further reflection and consultation.
 Faced with this deadline, the Rwandan government delegation de-
cided to find a formula on portfolios. By January 6, the two sides reached 
an agreement and began drawing up a final protocol. In Kigali, President 
Habyarimana asked Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye to stop the signing 
of the protocol. A letter from Director of Cabinet Ruhigira drew Nsengi-
yaremye’s attention to the consequences of the signature of an agreement 
“on which the head of state has not taken a position and on which there is 
no consensus concerning the implementation of such an accord.”84
 At the same time, the MRND held a press conference at which it 
reiterated its intention not to participate in a government in which it 
would not play any significant role. In its press communiqué, the MRND 
argued that the agreement at Arusha does not come from any national 
consensus, that the interest of a major political bloc had been ignored in 
both the allocation of portfolios and the attribution of seats in the na-
tional assembly, that the issue of CDR participation had not been given 
the kind of consideration recommended by the clergy, and that the prime 
minister and foreign minister had made the negotiations a personal affair. 
The communiqué pointed out that the government had not met on the 
issue in two months and, in effect, demanded the resignation of the prime 
minister.85
 As signatures awaited translation and the production of documents, 
the US State Department called Ambassador Mpungwe to urge that the 
parties not sign a protocol but rather a communiqué that summarized 
their agreement, thereby leaving the door open for modifications later.86 
Mpungwe called back two days later to say the protocol was the best deal 
possible and failure to sign it now would make resumptions of negotia-
tions impossible later on. Mpungwe reported that the parties would sign 
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a protocol of eighty-five articles that gave five seats each to the MRND 
and the RPF, four to the MDR, three each to the PSD and the PL, and 
one to the PDC. Seats in the national assembly would be appointed, with 
eleven each to major parties, four to the PDC, and one each to eleven 
other registered parties including the CDR, so long as they conformed 
to a code of ethics based on the principles of the Arusha agreement.87 
The negotiating parties signed the protocol on January 9, 1993, after what 
was characterized as intense negotiations undertaken in an atmosphere of 
frankness and fraternity.88
 Back in Kigali, where the reaction was reported as negative on all sides, 
party leaders acted as if no definite conclusions had been reached. The 
PL’s Mugenzi said that the MRND would eventually see the reasonable-
ness of the opposition position and that serious talks would continue in 
a couple of days. MRND national secretary Ngirumpatse, after a meet-
ing with MDR president Twagiramungu, said that talks would continue 
on changes that seemed necessary. Twagiramungu in turn argued that 
article 21, covering voting in council, could be reopened. Even President 
Habyarimana seemed jovial and relaxed at a January 7 farewell dinner for 
French ambassador Martres. It was as though nothing of consequence was 
happening in Arusha, and political dialogue would continue in Kigali un-
impeded. Nonetheless, the Western ambassadors reflected on the earlier 
warning of presidential counselor Ruhigira that Arusha negotiators, by 
presenting Kigali with yet another fait accompli, would this time not bring 
acquiescence but might engender violence. This possibility was so serious 
that the ambassadors agreed to collaborate in the event of a breakdown of 
law and order in the capital city.89
 By mid-January, the president had convoked the ambassadors and 
summarized themes that had been the background of his speeches, letters, 
and meetings since late October:
•	 The	proposed	division	of	power	was	not	the	result	of	real	negotiations	
between opposing sides but discussions among friends who want to 
divide up power.
•	 The	alliance	of	opposition	parties	had	as	its	intent	to	overthrow	the	




gave the opposition a permanent blocking third.
•	 The	configuration	of	the	proposal	thus	offered	to	opposition	parties	
and the RPF the opportunity to change everything: every mayor, every 
civil servant, and all who had worked in the Rwandan administration.
•	 Ultimately,	elections	were	necessary	so	that	one	can	really	know	who	
has how much power.
•	 In	any	case,	the	existing	assembly	or	a	popular	referendum	must	sanc-
tion the final agreement if it is to have any legitimacy.90
 The opposition wavered between wanting to cash in on the political chips 
they had taken from the negotiating table and a realization that they must 
somehow shuffle the president and MRND a better hand. The PL’s Mugenzi 
and the MDR’s Twagiramungu talked of firing the foreign minister and 
reallocating the portfolios he so glibly gave away in Arusha. They discussed 
acceding to a ratification process but rejected both a popular referendum and 
a vote within the CND, which was now hostile to an accord that would put 
them out of business. Most of the opposition was not amenable to giving a 
government portfolio to the CDR, whose hostility toward the Arusha process 
was growing more vocal each day. Despite opposition, both the prime minis-
ter and the foreign minister were determined to go ahead on the basis of 
negotiated protocols, noting the historically unpopular position of peace-
makers. Yet, they rejected any notion that peace and reconciliation required 
reaching out to the president and the MRND to keep them in the process.91
 The president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) from the south-
ern city of Butare, Félicien Gatabazi, analyzed the issue from a regional 
perspective. In a realistic assessment, he admitted that the opposition 
had “played the game thus far to weaken Habyarimana,” but no one knew 
where it would end or what to expect from the RPF. Nonetheless, he would 
rather have a Tutsi from the RPF than Kanyarengwe as minister of Inte-
rior, given the possibility of collusion between the northern-based CDR 
and this Ruhengeri political figure. His party was willing to compromise 
on territorial administration and push for the notion of an inner cabinet, 
even though the RPF had rejected the idea.92
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A Human Rights Imbroglio
 As politicians dickered in Kigali, ethnic violence broke out in the 
president’s home area of the northwest against the Bagogwe, who were 
traditional Tutsi pastoralists. By the end of January, some three hundred 
persons had been killed and over four thousand had been displaced. This 
was happening just after the International Commission on Human Rights 
Abuses, invited to Rwanda under terms of the Arusha negotiations, com-
pleted a two-week inquiry into the civil violence that had plagued Rwanda 
since the inception of the civil war. Having witnessed the tensions and 
intimidation that had become a daily part of life in Rwanda, and cognizant 
of the political debate being argued out during the time of its inquiry, the 
commission held press conferences in Brussels and Kigali and issued an in-
terim report highly critical of the Habyarimana regime.93 At the same time, 
the commission released a graphic video that included footage of skulls 
and skeletons unearthed by its forensic team during the visit. Shown on 
German, Belgian, French, and Canadian TV and rebroadcast on a French-
language cable program in Washington, the video and press conferences 
quickly drew public attention to the commission’s conclusions.94
 The findings of the commission were not news to Western embassies. 
In its human rights report for 1993, the US embassy noted that “human 
rights abuses plagued the first quarter of 1993.”95 According to the report, 
the victims of these violations were minority Tutsi and opposition political 
party members. The embassy tied the human rights abuses to the ongo-
ing political debate, namely, “the dissatisfaction on the part of the former 
sole party (MRND) . . . over the power-sharing arrangement agreed to on 
January 9 between the multiparty Government and the RPF.”96 Notwith-
standing previous reporting on human rights abuses, the graphic revela-
tion of human rights atrocities and the charges of government complicity 
changed the outlook of local diplomats and of their home governments.
 Since the suspension of political negotiations in October, and espe-
cially since the signature of the January 9 protocol, the Western ambas-
sadors had seen the once omnipresent and powerful MRND and the 
president outflanked by collusion between the internal opposition and the 
RPF. Keeping Habyarimana committed to the peace process and getting 
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his opponents to recognize his interests was the diplomatic objective. Now 
the regime stood charged by an international commission with human 
rights atrocities that no Western government could ignore. The energies of 
the Western diplomats were now directed toward encouraging the presi-
dent to deal with the human rights crisis rather than in getting him back 
to the negotiating table.
back to p olitics
 In Kigali, however, it appeared to be politics as usual. On January 27, 
the five parties of the coalition government issued a communiqué proposing 
a parallel meeting with the RPF outside of Arusha to work out a compro-
mise over the disputed articles in the January 9 protocol, implicitly agree-
ing that the protocol was nonbinding.97 The RPF apparently accepted such 
a meeting in principle but did not favor a parties’ conclave as an arena for 
negotiations. Meanwhile, Habyarimana asked that Minister of Defense 
James Gasana replace Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira as head of 
the government delegation. This was in part because military matters were 
supposed to be the object of discussions and in part because the president 
and his party, the MRND, had completely lost confidence in the foreign 
minister. Ngulinzira’s tactic of pushing forward negotiations and then pre-
senting Kigali with the results had reached a dead end.
 The RPF accepted the change in the government delegation but an-
nounced two preconditions to the resumption of talks: that the violence in 
the north stop, and that the outcome of the Arusha negotiations be bind-
ing on all political forces in Rwanda. At the first plenary, the RPF asked 
for guarantees that mixed near-term operational objectives (that perpetra-
tors be brought to justice, for example) with strategic goals (that foreign 
troops be withdrawn or that the gendarmerie be placed under the prime 
minister.)98
 Dr. Gasana said that he could not possibly comply with those de-
mands, bringing negotiations at Arusha immediately to a halt. Observers 
(which now included the United States) agreed to work with both delega-
tions over the weekend to look for points of flexibility and possible com-
promise. By February 3, according to information received from Arusha, 
the talks appeared on the brink of collapse. The Rwandan government 
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delegation was preoccupied with interparty discussions in Kigali on the 
negotiating mandate. The RPF, vexed by communal violence in northwest 
Rwanda, refused further negotiations until the Rwandan government met 
its demands for security guarantees within the country. By focusing on 
different priorities, the two sides ended up talking past each other.99
 International opinion began to build against the Rwandan government. 
Some Canadian and Swiss human rights groups were demanding a cutoff 
of aid. French statements from the Quai seemed to be responding to cri-
tiques of its large role in support of the Rwandan state. The Belgians let it 
be known that Habyarimana would not be received by anyone should he 
come to Belgium. Habyarimana canceled his trip to Washington and the 
National Prayer Breakfast. In the view of the US Department of State, “the 
bargaining position of the MRND and CDR has eroded along with their 
credibility. . . . It will be harder to elicit international sympathy for their 
fears of marginalization in the transitional government.”100 The department 
concluded that the president and Rwandan government would need to take 
some significant action to guarantee that violence would not recur.
 That action was too slow in coming. Following the president’s visit to 
the northwest on February 4, Habyarimana and Nsengiyaremye set up a 
commission to determine which local officials were responsible for abet-
ting local violence and which had taken appropriate action. The report 
was to be submitted within one week. The government met in long session 
from February 3 to 5, apparently hammering out a mandate for Arusha. 
Among its decisions was the suspension of six administrative officers for 
presumed involvement in recent violence.
 In Arusha, the RPF welcomed the suspension of the officials as a “posi-
tive first step” but insisted that more actions were needed. Meanwhile, the 
Tanzanians, who were hosting the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es 
Salaam, called for a pause in the talks to permit their diplomats to return 
to the capital; US and European Observers joined the exodus from Arusha 
to Dar es Salaam. The RPF lost patience with the pace of negotiations and 
the slowness of the government’s response to recurring violence against 
their kin in Rwanda. Despite assurances of its negotiating team to the con-
trary, the RPF broke the ceasefire and on February 8 attacked across the 




 The Arusha peace process, solidified in the power-sharing protocol of 
October 30, had not taken on substance and dynamism in subsequent ne-
gotiations. The real negotiations moved to Kigali amid wrangling of major 
parties over who would get what in the interim government. President 
Habyarimana failed to lead the process forward; in Arusha, a negotiat-
ing team led by the foreign minister tried to override the Kigali debate by 
preemptive agreements. So the distance between leadership in Kigali and 
negotiators in Arusha brought a deepening impasse.
 How did a speed bump on the road to peace become a roadblock? 
Ugandan president Museveni told me before the second power-sharing 
negotiation that the agreement in Arusha had to reflect “the political land-
scape of Rwanda” if it were to endure. At the same time, Museveni claimed 
that the RPF had prevailed on the battlefield and deserved a 50/50 split 
in the integration of security forces; the Front would need that kind of 
force structure to guarantee security to their people. Museveni had identi-
fied the two elements that seemed most missing in the Rwandan political 
discussions: realism about what was possible given Rwanda’s political com-
plexity, and security in the face of ethnic violence.
realism
 Looking over this opaque history, one wonders why President Habyari-
mana let the peace process slip back into violence and war. There was a 
constant mantra from the presidency, his staff, and the MRND after the 
October power-sharing protocol: the internal opposition, in league with 
the RPF, intended to use the Arusha political negotiations to carry out a 
civil coup d’état against Habyarimana and the MRND. In retrospect, what 
seemed a rhetorical device was Habyarimana’s perception of political real-
ity. By law and decree in the interim period, the internal opposition parties 
intended to uproot the Habyarimana’s regime and replace it with one of 
their own design.101 The Front had the same ambition, albeit with a differ-
ent regime in mind, and would make common cause.
 At the initiation of the political negotiations, the president enjoyed 
full control of the central administration, local government, the army, and 
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the gendarmerie, while the ministers of his party dominated the coalition 
government. He carried out his own diplomacy, using the foreign ministry 
for the most mundane of tasks. To ask him to give all this up for a cer-
emonial role as president, with his party in a position to be consistently 
outvoted in cabinet, was not realistic. To believe that most decisions would 
be taken by consensus and only extraordinary measures would need the 
two-thirds overriding vote was to deny the realities of Rwanda’s fractious 
politics. If Habyarimana was right about the intent of the opposition to 
move him out, then it was vain to hope for an ad hoc coalition to protect 
the interests of the president and his party. Hence the need for the addi-
tion of minor parties amenable to working with the MRND. Of these, the 
CDR had the largest political base, with strong support in Habyarimana’s 
home region and links to his wife and in-laws.
 The internal opposition was notably hardened to the president’s in-
terests. Party leaders gloated over the quick vote in cabinet on October 
28, which approved the October protocol before MRND ministers got to 
the meeting. Their attitude did not change much in the subsequent two 
months of parlaying. Any party, other than those of the Forces de concerta-
tion, was considered not suitable for government. The CDR, which had 
earlier indicated its interest in playing by Arusha rules, was again rejected 
by the prime minister in the December 30 party leaders’ conclave. The 
internal opposition wanted a cabinet and agenda in the interim regime 
that they would control without MRND interference. And the MRND 
persisted in its October declaration that it would not participate in such 
a government. All the variations on the theme—internal cabinet, portfo-
lios to neutral personalities, prior elaboration of a government program, 
or designation of subcabinet positions for minor parties—were efforts to 
get around the core reality, namely, the need for a mechanism that would 
induce the president and his party to play the game.
 Meanwhile, in Arusha, the foreign minister was trying to create an-
other reality, a negotiating process that would create momentum to draw 
in political acquiescence from Kigali. Operating off his loose instructions 
from early October, he agreed to positions favorable to the internal opposi-
tion and acceptable to the RPF while ignoring other political claims from 
Kigali. As he journeyed back to the negotiating table in early December, 
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Minister Ngulinzira told diplomats in Dar es Salaam that “some sort of 
amnesty or indemnification would be needed . . . so that parties . . . would 
not be threatened by the prospect of change.”102 This he offered not out 
of sympathy for amnesty as a peacebuilding instrument—a notion that 
had been decried by both sides during the rule of law negotiations—but 
as an indication that he intended to move ahead with a formula that 
would politically marginalize the president and his party; consequently, he 
needed to provide them with legal cover.103
 By the end of December, the foreign minister did not yet have a nego-
tiating mandate from the coalition government. In the highland isolation 
of Arusha, he was surrounded by a delegation that wanted to get on with 
the show. Very negative reaction from Kigali to the December 22 agree-
ment on portfolios may have thrown a bit of reality into the process. Early 
January reports show the government delegation still arguing for inclusion 
of the CDR, for example.104 Nonetheless, Ngulinzira determined to press 
ahead. The allocation of portfolios and the nominated assembly he agreed 
to in the protocol of January 9 had no sanction from the Rwandan gov-
ernment and hence rested on questionable legal authority. Yet the OAU, 
the Tanzanian facilitator, and the Observers present pushed for signature 
on power sharing and rapid consideration of the rest of the agenda. Only 
the United States, kibitzing from the margins, urged recording agreements 
rather than signing a formal protocol. Getting on with the process became 
the imperative of the day.
 The most curious element in these deliberations was the role of the 
clergy contact group. That priests and preachers should make high pol-
icy strikes devotees of secular democratic government as odd indeed. In 
Rwanda, however, there had always been a close link in traditional politics 
between the court and ritual lineages or, in the modern age, between the 
ethos of church and state.105 One might well understand religious leaders 
facilitating contact and conversation between contending groups; they are, 
after all, peacemakers by vocation and had previously played that role in 
informal meetings between the RPF and Rwandan political leaders. In this 
case, however, the contact group offered not hortatory advice but a numeri-
cal division of the cabinet. Once it came out, the bishops’ formula was con-
sidered the “right” solution not because it was representative, inclusive, or a 
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negotiated compromise (all operational virtues of a democratic order) but 
because the bishops had proposed it. However “right” it may have been, the 
formula was not realistic. It marginalized the MRND in ways that made it 
suicidal for that group to accept the proposal without modifying it.
securit y
 So instead of moving forward into a new era of power sharing and 
coalition politics, Rwanda went back to politics as usual: a public discourse 
punctuated by the intimidation, coercion, and violence that have been part 
of Rwandan political history for as long as oral history can record.
 The issue of security should seemingly have been part of conversa-
tions on the repatriation of refugees. However, as negotiations picked up 
again in November, the RPF insisted on finishing discussions on power 
sharing before addressing the issue of refugees. For them the problem was 
the creation of a new order in which those refugees would be secure and 
fully able to play their part. Indeed, the initial RPF attack in October 
1990 was executed at that time in order to forestall implementation of an 
agreement between the UNHCR and the Habyarimana regime for the 
orderly return of refugees.106 Free and untrammeled right of return had 
been emotionally claimed in the sessions on the rule of law. In the RPF 
view, before conditions were secure enough for that right to be exercised, 
regime change was necessary.
 In this context, returning to the intimidation and violence that accom-
panied previous interethnic crises proved dysfunctional. First, the RPF 
was at the door with proven superior forces. Second, the international in-
terveners, the internal opposition, and a good part of the president’s own 
party wanted a durable peace in which the rights of all were secured. It is 
possible that President Habyarimana was complicit in the ethnic violence 
of December and January that broke out in his home region of Gisenyi 
as the MRND lost its quest for a blocking third in the interim coalition 
government; in this case he was not to be trusted. Hutu extremists whom 
the president did not control could have carried out the attacks; in such a 
scenario Habyarimana was not in charge even in his homeland. Elements 
of the president’s administration could have supported the attacks with his 
acquiescence, in which case, Habyarimana was opportunistic.
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 The effect was the same: insecurity within Rwanda at this point in the 
peace process only supported the RPF’s demand for a new political order 
that Habyarimana could not control. The RPF were clear on this; in every 
demarche during the period of impasse, they blamed Habyarimana for ob-
structing the negotiations and decried political violence within Rwanda. 
The implication was that to have a secure Rwanda to which refugees could 
return, the Habyarimana regime must go. Political negotiations had not 
brought this about, so the RPF resorted to their standard practice, a mili-
tary attack with a political objective. Would that tactic lead to prolonged 
war or back to negotiations? Events in the next month would tell.
Lessons We Learned
 At the end of the power-sharing negotiations, we could sense Presi-
dent Habyarimana’s deep reluctance to move down the negotiated path. 
None of the interveners fully understood the impediments along that path. 
Looking back, we can extract useful lessons from this roadblock.
• Sharing power was an oxymoron, both in the traditions of African political 
hierarchies and in the specter of winner-take-all democracy. The parties did 
not want to look forward to a game of compromising or to coalition 
politics; the contenders wanted to control power all through the interim 
and beyond.
•	 Negotiating off-table, a preeminent tool of conflict resolution strategists, can easily 
backfire. Off-table initiatives included the president’s call for intervention 
from the clergy, the parties’ pursuit of an all-parties meeting, the stag-
ing of protest marches, the releasing of ethnic violence in the north, and 
the RPF attack in March. Each essay failed to move peace forward and 
greatly complicated the prospects for subsequent negotiations.
•	 Both sides were counting on the process of attributing seats in the cabinet and 
the assembly. The proposals for allocation left the president’s party 
without a blocking minority against hostile decisions by the cabinet or 
the assembly. Corrective notions within the vague terms of the bishops’ 
formula were all proposed in ways that would not diminish any of the 
internal opposition’s newly devolved power.
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• Exclusion and control, not compromise and sharing, became the prevalent 
values. Any outside party proposed under the bishop’s formula was 
declared unfit by parties that already had a place in the cabinet. All 
efforts to seat the CDR in the cabinet or assembly, even by those who 
said they personally favored such a move, came to naught.
•	 Moving the peace process forward was the international goal. Getting agree-
ment took precedence over clear-eyed examination of whether terms 
of the agreement were toxic. Unity on that objective was easier in 
Arusha in the conference mode than in Kigali, where bilateral di-
plomacy was encumbered by different national stakes and interests.
144
F i v e
Endgame
 The new year opened with violence, ending the two-month debate over 
composition of the interim government. The process of peace had de-
volved into acts of war. Ethnic massacres in Rwanda’s northwest looked 
like another effort to win through violence what had not been achieved in 
political negotiation. The attack by the RPF across the front lines was both 
a reprisal against the ethnic violence and a means of coercing agreement in 
negotiations.
 This retreat toward war was not a surprise to the international Observ-
ers mentoring the Arusha peace process. Despite the Front’s assurances, 
the political atmosphere in Kigali and the distance between positions in 
Arusha pointed toward a possible return to arms. In their conversations 
with the parties, the Observers emphasized the fragility of the ceasefire 
and the tremendous human and political costs should either side again 
resort to arms.
 Meanwhile, investigations into the responsibility for the mid-January 
massacres in Rwanda’s northwest proceeded glacially. On February 4, 
Habyarimana finally made a visit to the area. He and the prime minister 
agreed to set up a special commission whose report was due in one week. 
Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye was poised to announce the suspension of 
some officials and the arrest of some perpetrators.1
 In meetings February 3–5, the government apparently agreed on an 
agenda for Arusha, whose terms were briefed to the diplomatic corps on 
February 6 and were to be announced to the nation in a radio address on 
February 7.2 In Arusha, Minister of Defense Gasana briefed the RPF and 
Observers on progress in Kigali. The RPF’s immediate response was that 
more action was necessary in punishing those responsible for the massacres.3
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 As talks stalled on this issue, the Tanzanians announced a pause so 
its officials could return to Dar es Salaam to host an OAU Liberation 
Committee.4 European and American Observers joined in the exit to Dar 
es Salaam. While recognizing a pause in Arusha as “probably necessary,” 
the American embassy in Kigali warned that a lengthy halt could lead to 
RPF military intervention. Ambassador Flaten suggested the possibility 
of a coordinated statement putting international pressure on President 
Habyarimana “in the next few days.”5 Both in Arusha and within the 
government in Kigali, decision makers apparently felt that there was time 
for due deliberation.
 The Arusha negotiations were, thus, in a “pause” when, on February 6, 
the Rwandese Patriotic Army attacked. Rwandan government forces fell 
back in some places to within twenty-seven miles from the capital. But the 
insurgent forces did not press their advantage. Instead, they offered a truce 
on February 8. The government accepted the truce with the understanding 
that the ground the RPF had taken would become part of a neutral buffer 
zone.6 While there were, from that date, movements and skirmishes along 
the line, neither side launched a major offensive. Diplomats urged both 
sides to cease hostilities and get back to negotiations.
 The improbable story of this chapter is that a peace process ending 
in political gridlock and renewed hostilities was pushed back on the rails 
and to a successful conclusion five months later. The chapter opens with 
a review of issues at stake and details of French government initiatives to 
get the peace process restored. A summit in Dar es Salaam in early March 
successfully reinstated the ceasefire and restarted talks, while encumbering 
those talks with a secret codicil on French military presence in Rwanda. 
But the summit failed to determine who would police the new ceasefire: 
the OAU or the UN. Attempts to launch an all-parties dialogue with the 
RPF exacerbated the divisions among the factions. While talks on refugee 
matters were quickly concluded, disputes on military integration persisted 
to the last moment. On August 5, President Habyarimana and RPF chair-
man Kanyarengwe finally signed the series of negotiated protocols now 





 How do you get back from a culture of renewed war to one of peace? 
This question, common to many peace negotiations, has several dimensions.
 What is the relative weight and effect of international intervention in pushing 
forward a peace process? Two and a half years after the October insurgency, 
the combined efforts of neighbors, donors, and international organizations 
had not brought peace back to Rwanda. How might a concerted new effort 
succeed?
 How does an international presence within the negotiating process affect the 
course of decision making? Contending parties may play to known interests of 
interveners; or antagonists may take the international presence as a safety 
net for their practice of negotiating brinkmanship. Both happened on the 
road to peace in Rwanda.
 What can the role of great powers be in an international intervention puta-
tively led by African mediators and facilitators? In a crisis moment, great-power 
pressure and presence may be the critical element in getting a peace 
process restarted.7 But contemporary peacemaking requires multilateral 
approaches.8 In the February crisis, it was France working bilaterally and a 
multilateral summit that got the peace process going again.
 Can the push to conclude an agreement override analysis of the realities in place 
and	 judgment	on	 the	durability	of	an	agreement?	The desire for forward mo-
mentum toward an agreed framework for peace is a compelling motive in 
international humanitarian intervention. “Lock it in!” is the mantra. And, 
in a system of sovereign states, the diplomatic assumption is that if the 
parties agree, then the accord settles the problem (pacta servanda sunt). It 
proved to be quite the opposite in Rwanda’s case.
Getting Back to Peace Talks
fighting fails
 For the international interveners, whether the Observer states, Tanza-
nia as Facilitator, or the OAU as Convener, the question was how to return 
to the peace process. That the negotiations should have unveiled funda-
mental predispositions to violence rather than to peace was not surprising 
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given the bumpy record of this peace-building initiative. A ray of hope was 
that the recourse to violence had not worked for either side. The Interna-
tional Human Rights Commission rushed to publish its report that impli-
cated the Habyarimana regime in the January pogroms as well as in a long 
history of ethnic violence.9 The United States and the European Union 
condemned the killings. Belgium canceled President Habyarimana’s visit 
with King Baudouin and recalled their ambassador to Kigali. Violence had 
isolated the Rwandan government and alienated its best friends.
 On the other hand, the Patriotic Front’s move across the ceasefire line 
had triggered the deployment of three hundred additional French troops 
from Bangui to Kigali and the displacement of nearly a million internal 
refugees. Should the RPF have persisted in moving forward, it would have 
had to engage disciplined, well-armed French forces protecting the capital 
city and to subdue hostile, frightened people. So now, both sides accepted 
a truce and were willing to discuss terms. The question was: could the 
Arusha political negotiations develop a “breakthrough strategy” that would 
finally lead to an established peace?10
the french initiative
 The French government, recognizing the seriousness of the crisis pro-
voked by the RPF attack, quickly engaged within the window of opportu-
nity that the truce of February 9 offered.11 France’s top Africanists, Bruno 
Delaye from the Elysée and Jean-Marc de La Sablière from the Quai 
d’Orsay, hurried to the area. In Kigali, the envoys reportedly read the riot 
act to Habyarimana, telling him that he must pull his government together 
in the face of a military rout and a perpetual government crisis. France’s 
continued assistance was contingent on Habyarimana’s leading a united 
government. Under French pressure, the president and prime minister met 
together for the first time in two months and agreed on February 13 to a 
joint declaration.12
 Convinced that RPF battlefield success would not have been pos-
sible without materiel support from Uganda, the French diplomats flew 
to Kampala to lodge their protest and to seek Museveni’s help in getting 
a renewed ceasefire. The French, having bolstered the regime in Kigali by 
the deployment of two more companies, now wanted to be certain that 
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the RPF was not being resupplied by Uganda. While in Kampala, they se-
cured Ugandan agreement in principle to accept a UN monitoring patrol 
on the border of Rwanda and Uganda.
rise  and demise  of  part y accommodation
 President Habyarimana apparently decided to listen to the French en-
voys. Perhaps he knew that the army was demoralized and could not be 
mobilized for an all-out assault. (The French assessment considered the 
Rwandan army to be only 40 percent effective at this time.) In any case, 
Habyarimana met with leaders of the key political parties for the first time 
in many months. He committed his own MRND party to participate in 





 The parties on their part agreed to urge the RPF to return to the lines 
of the previous ceasefire, to support continued French presence in Rwanda, 
to argue for maintenance of the gendarmerie within the Ministry of De-
fense, and to dismiss administrative officials only upon proof of wrong-
doing. The parties’ meeting with the RPF, in the air since the suspension 
of talks in November, was finally scheduled for February 23.14 However, by 
this time, the Facilitator had, in view of the truce on the ground, invited 
the contending leaders to a summit meeting in Dar es Salaam. The parties 
believed their meeting with the RPF should come before decisions were 
made at the summit.
 Through convoluted consultations, the parties finally agreed to accept 
Burundi’s invitation to a meeting in Bujumbura; negotiations with a view 
to restoring the ceasefire and returning to the Arusha political talks were 
to be pursued later in Dar es Salaam. On February 20, the parties adopted 
a paper outlining their common position based on what had been agreed 




 In turn, the RPF had given public notice of its positions. According to 
its Radio Muhabura broadcasts, the RPF wanted the government to sack all 
officials who took part in the violence and demonstrate the will to prevent 
future violence. French troops should leave Rwanda as soon as possible.16
the bujumbura meeting
 The parties were to have left by chartered aircraft for Bujumbura 
on February 22, but the meeting was delayed. By the time of departure, 
the hard-fought agreements of the “Party Paper” were in shreds and the 
MRND was once again on the outs with the other parties. The only par-
ties to show up in Bujumbura from February 25 to March 3 were the MDR, 
the PSD, the PDC, and the PL. Without the restraint of an MRND pres-
ence, the internal opposition parties returned to form, using the all-parties 
meeting as a platform for denouncing the “racist, regionalist, warlike, and 
dictatorial policy of President Habyarimana, his party the MRND, and 
his entourage.” The meeting’s communiqué also asserted that Habyari-
mana’s policy of systematically blocking the government program had not 
changed since the establishment of the multiparty government on April 16, 
1992. The parties claimed that innocent blood had flowed in several regions 
of the country, transforming an organized terrorism into a true genocide. It 
was because of these killings that the RPF was drawn into renewing hos-
tilities. The communiqué then called for an effective ceasefire, withdrawal 
of foreign troops, reprise of negotiations, and return of displaced persons 
to their homes.
 Insisting that immediate administrative sanctions be applied in the 
areas where massacres took place, the communiqué considered that the 
protocols already signed were “untouchable” and called on political parties 
that were obstructing the Arusha negotiations to honor their responsibili-
ties. At the end of the discussions, there was little difference between what 
the RPF was demanding and what the parties agreed to. In the process, 
they had deserted the carefully negotiated agreement with the MRND 
on a common position and turned on Habyarimana with an invective that 
rivaled anything the RPF might have said on its own.
 The parties’ reunion in Bujumbura had shredded the common under-
standing on how to proceed at Arusha. Nonetheless, the president could 
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not return to stalling tactics. A truce was in place, but the RPF was quite 
capable of pushing ahead in an offensive that government forces could not 
withstand.17 Moreover, France, with its forces protecting Kigali, demanded 
a return to negotiations. To turn the truce into a formal ceasefire, Habyari-
mana would have to send Nsengiyaremye to the summit in Dar es Salaam 
and find a way to reengage in political negotiations.
p ositioning for the summit
 Thus, despite the dissolution of the newly minted party consensus, 
the president and prime minister continued to meet together to prepare 
for the summit. A communiqué from their meeting with the chiefs of staff 
of the army and gendarmerie announced the common determination to 
proceed with negotiations and with democratization, to defend the rights 
of all citizens, and to reject the call for removal of French troops. In a non-
partisan working session, President Habyarimana (MRND) and Prime 
Minister Nsengiyaremye (MDR) met with the minister of foreign affairs 
(MDR), the minister of interior (MRND), and the minister of agriculture 
(PSD). The communiqué from that meeting spelled out objectives for the 
Dar es Salaam summit: to consolidate the ceasefire agreement and to 
create a climate for pursuing the peace process.18
 On that same day, the religious leaders got back into the fray by chair-
ing a meeting of twelve political parties, including all the major ones. The 
position taken by the parties at this meeting was in glaring contrast to 
the Bujumbura communiqué that excused the RPF for having been “drawn 
into” combat. Now back home and under church auspices, the parties con-
demned the RPF effort to take power by force of arms, praised the armed 
forces, invited the government to organize the whole population in civil de-
fense, supported the presence of French troops, asked the United Nations 
to condemn Uganda and control the frontier, and called for consensus 
within the government and agreement between the president and prime 
minister.19
 The political bureau of the MDR met March 1 without the presence 
of its president, Faustin Twagiramungu, who was still in Bujumbura. In a 
communiqué published the next day, and despite the position of Twagira-
mungu at the parties’ meeting in Bujumbura, the MDR came out in favor 
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of the presence of French troops, which assured security for foreigners, did 
not interfere with the Arusha negotiations, reinforced the democratic pro-
cess, and sustained the process of reconciliation. As if to square the circle, 
the communiqué reported the party was “convinced that the presence of 
French troops in Rwanda did not in any way have the effect of supporting 
directly or indirectly the dictatorial regime of the retired Major General 
Habyarimana,” and “it reaffirms its determination to combat this regime 
with all its force.”20
 The MDR statement reveals the dissonance in Rwandan politics at 
this critical juncture. This largest opposition party was beginning to show 
deep division in its own hierarchy: witness the convocation of the polit-
buro meeting in the absence of the putative party president. Furthermore, 
the communiqué’s pro-French stance, confronting the clear RPF demand 
for French withdrawal, seemed to reinforce roadblocks to negotiation at a 
time when continuing political stalemate and ethnic violence had brought 
on renewed fighting. Having paraded its commitment to negotiations, 
democratic process, and reconciliation, the communiqué then took a swing 
at Habyarimana that would have made the RPF proud.
Dar es Salaam and After
 A leader of the MDR party, Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye, 
now equipped with a position paper worked out with President Habyari-
mana, went to negotiations in Dar es Salaam with the president of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe. These March 5–7 
discussions did what everyone wanted—namely, they formalized the cease-
fire on the ground as of March 9—and what everybody had hoped: they 
promised the return of the RPF to the former ceasefire lines. The agree-
ment also had in it a major point on which the Front had been insistent—
suspension or dismissal of those administrative officers deemed to have 
been “directly or indirectly” involved in the January massacres and “those 
who failed to prevent massacres or other forms of communal violence.”21
 In paragraph 4, the communiqué calls for the withdrawal of foreign 
(read French) troops and their replacement by a neutral international 
force organized under the aegis of the OAU and UN. The communiqué 
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claimed that the main purpose of the force was a humanitarian mission 
under article 11 of the ceasefire agreement of July 12, 1992, namely, to allay 
the fears and ensure “the security of expatriate personnel wherever they 
may be.” Most entrancing is paragraph 5 that follows: “The two par-
ties agreed on the modalities of the implementation of the preceding 
paragraph. Those modalities are contained in a confidential document 
known to the Facilitator.”22
 According to French commentators, this confidential agreement gave 
a timetable for French withdrawal: first the reinforced company sent to 
Rwanda after the Rwandan Patriotic Front offensive on February 8, then 
the withdrawal to barracks in Kigali of the forces held in Rwanda since the 
October 1990 war. These would stay in Kigali until their replacement by 
a neutral international force. France would retain in Rwanda a few dozen 
officers who were training the government army.23
international  reactions
 As the Dar es Salaam Summit moved toward putting the peace pro-
cess back on course, the international community picked up the Rwandan 
issue again. At the Security Council session of March 5, Under Secretary 
General James Jonah briefed the Security Council on the first meeting of 
the goodwill mission that the secretary general had sent to Rwanda. The 
mission found the RPF reluctant to withdraw from their forward posi-
tions, the Rwandan government uneasy and demanding quick UN action, 
and the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group not helpful in explaining 
the situation on the ground. At the same meeting, France circulated a draft 
resolution that was intended to reinforce the Dar es Salaam agreement 
and support the resumption of talks in Rwanda. It included a proposal 
for a UN observer mission on the Uganda-Rwanda border. In presenting 
his government’s draft, Ambassador Ladsous noted a desire to support the 
new effort of the secretary general. He also encouraged close UN-OAU 
cooperation in the peacekeeping effort.24
 On March 10, the United States, France, and Belgium, in trilateral dis-
cussions of Central African matters in Brussels, concentrated their atten-
tion on Rwanda. The Belgian side reported that the ceasefire seemed to 
be taking hold across the front and expressed strong appreciation for the 
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political and military effort undertaken by France to stabilize the situa-
tion. The American representation seconded the appreciation for France’s 
role. France, in turn, said it would respect the terms of the Dar es Salaam 
agreement concerning the withdrawal of foreign forces, barring a break-
down of the ceasefire. Although the French resolution before the Security 
Council called on the secretary general to examine the possibility of an in-
ternational force under UN-OAU auspices, the Belgians wondered about 
a clearer division of responsibilities. They would give the OAU, reinforced 
by UN blue hats, support for the peace process, including patrolling the 
demilitarized zone. Belgium also favored handing protection of civilian 
populations, especially around the capital city, to a UN force.
 The American side contended that human rights violations in Rwanda 
had their genesis in generalized fear of Tutsi hegemony as well as in acts 
abetted by elements allied to the president; the way to stop the human 
rights attacks was to stop the combat.25 France entirely agreed, and the 
French representative urged his colleagues to concentrate on ending the 
fighting before dealing with human rights issues. Belgium, on the other 
hand, before it would send its ambassador back to Kigali, asked the 
Rwandan government to stop arming civilians, to stop stirring up anti-
Tutsi sentiment, and fully to meet its commitments in the Dar es Salaam 
agreement. It was also preparing emergency assistance for the more than 
one million victims of the fighting who were displaced.26
 The summit agreement that foreign troops should withdraw from 
Rwanda created a new dynamic in the international intervention. Not-
withstanding support from the Rwandan government and political par-
ties, French forces would not be a permanent part of the peace process. 
Without article 5, worked out with French representatives as a side pro-
tocol, the RPF would not have signed an agreement to turn the truce 
into a ceasefire and withdraw to their original position. Indeed, it would 
seem that the French were looking for a way out of their heavy engage-
ment with a state that could not defend itself on the battlefield, was em-
broiled in endless bickering on the political front, and had given up the 
moral high ground by conniving in ethnic massacres. The only official 
French comment on article 5 was the government’s statement that it ac-
cepted the plan for withdrawal of its troops decided upon in the Dar es 
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Salaam Agreement on the condition “that the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
honor its commitments and withdraw from the regions where it took up 
position after 8 February.”27
Who Should Keep the Peace?
 The protocol and the new ceasefire agreement thus raised with urgent 
immediacy the question of an international monitoring and peacekeeping 
presence in Rwanda. Approaches of the major donor countries reflected 
their policy differences. The United States took a bureaucratic and human 
rights perspective, wanting a larger role for the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, public review of human rights in Rwanda within the 
Human Rights Commission, and the appointment of a special rapporteur 
as well as a strengthened OAU presence. Belgium looked at the human 
rights dimension from an internal Rwandan purview, demanding that the 
Rwandan government clean up its act before the Belgian ambassador could 
return. France, with troops on the ground, took a military focus, wanting 
to stop the flow of arms to the RPF from Uganda, to find a way of keeping 
the belligerents on opposite sides of a new buffer zone, and to secure a reli-
able, internationally sanctioned replacement for its troops protecting the 
expatriate community in Kigali.28
securing the border
 The idea of a monitoring force along Rwanda’s border with Uganda 
had been implicit in the security agreement that Assistant Secretary Cohen 
had urged on the parties in May 1992 and that the parties had signed that 
August. But realization of that aim had been slow. The Rwandan govern-
ment, for all its complaints about the Rwandese Patriotic Army being a 
de facto Ugandan force, had been caught up in canonical arguments about 
which side of the border a monitoring force would patrol. Uganda initially 
took the position that a monitoring force was an affront to its assurances 
that there was no operational link between the Ugandan government 
and the RPA.
 French envoys to Uganda in February 1993 had apparently overcome 
Museveni’s opposition to the idea. By the time of the March Security 
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Council discussions, Rwanda and Uganda had together forwarded notes 
requesting the deployment of United Nations observers along their com-
mon border.29 France’s draft resolution on Rwanda, among other things, 
invited the secretary general to examine the request of Rwanda and 
Uganda for the deployment of observers at the border between these 
two countries.30
 Security Council discussions on the French draft resolution raised two 
curious but prescient points. Djibouti said it could support a peacekeep-
ing force only if the Rwandese Patriotic Force withdrew to the frontier of 
Rwanda, a naïve notion given the alignment of forces on the ground, but 
one that highlighted the problem of a chapter 6 “monitoring” force inter-
posed between two belligerent camps. Spain agreed with the resolution 
as a whole but noted that the contending sides had different visions of 
what kind of force would most effectively support the peace process: an 
OAU force or a UN-OAU force. Although the US mission at the United 
Nations characterized the Spanish intervention as “carping,” in fact the 
Spanish representative had foreseen a major issue: Would peacekeeping in 
Rwanda continue to be regional, under the auspices of the OAU, or inter-
national, under leadership of the United Nations?31
patrolling the demilitarized zone
 The second optic for an international military presence arose from the 
withdrawal of the RPA to its previous positions, which created between 
the two forces a no-man’s-land ten to eighteen kilometers wide. The 
American embassy in Kigali recognized immediately that the fragile cease-
fire accord needed a credible interposition force to patrol this area and that 
the fifty-plus OAU observer mission could not quickly be geared up to this 
task.32 The OAU had already been talking for months about reinforcing its 
observer mission, but nothing had happened. A complicating factor was 
that the February fighting had created nearly a million internally displaced 
persons who needed to return to their homes before the end of the rainy 
season and the beginning of harvest. Moreover, the OAU forces had done 
nothing to report on or deter the RPF attack, which led the government 
to question the NMOG’s neutral role.33 For lack of a better alternative, the 
embassy made an eloquent, well-reasoned argument for rapid deployment 
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of a temporary UN force until a neutral international force under OAU 
auspices could take over.34
 This recommendation of action by the United Nations in what had 
heretofore been an African-led peace process stirred the policy machine 
at the Department of State. Three principles informed the department’s 
analysis: the plight of the displaced with the specter of another large-scale 
humanitarian disaster; the need to keep the initiative in African hands; 
and the difficulties of securing UN involvement. The department’s sum-
mation also notes the fundamental difference between a border monitor-
ing force and a ceasefire interpositional force.
 What the State Department did not consider was a force that would 
restore confidence and protect the international community, the only force 
actually mentioned in the Dar es Salaam communiqué. In a classic use 
of diplomatic indirection, the department reported that “any suggestion of 
UN involvement in Rwanda will face resistance.” The text does not suggest 
where the resistance might come from. Reporting from the US Mission 
to the United Nations (USUN) suggested that among the Permanent 
Five members, Russia and Great Britain were reluctant to consider UN 
involvement because of potential costs. China was opposed to larger peace-
keeping roles for the organization.35 In effect, the United States was taking 
the sovereign positions of other states into consideration in formulating its 
response to this humanitarian crisis. Moreover, the US government, then 
in the process of formulating the new Clinton administration’s approach to 
UN peacekeeping, had its concerns, namely, the following:
•	 The	UN	is	already	overstretched	financially	and	managerially.
•	 With	similar	situations	existing	elsewhere	(Sudan	and	Zaire),	 





peace and security; this internal dispute will require convincing  
arguments to fit this criterion.36
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 Given the difficulties of getting the UN involved, the State Depart-
ment concluded that the OAU should be urged to take the initiative, 
recruit additional monitors from African countries, and seek technical as-
sistance and monitoring experts from the UN. But the initiative for any 
OAU involvement must come from the African parties to the conflict. “It 
would not be appropriate for the USG to take the lead.”37 A role for the 
United Nations, whether in border or ceasefire monitoring, would have to 
have the approval of the OAU, the Tanzanian Facilitator, and the RPF, as 
well as the Rwandan government.
 The RPF had indicated that the border-monitoring force was a matter 
between the Ugandan and Rwandan governments. However, it would have 
to be consulted as regards areas on the border that it controlled. Moreover, 
the RPF wanted an enlarged OAU force to monitor the ceasefire, unless 
the OAU should prove incapable of handling the new job and requested 
UN observers. Though aware that the Rwandan government mistrusted 
OAU-NMOG neutrality and wanted UN forces, the Department of 
State, nonetheless, came down in favor of the OAU: “The OAU should 
be urged to take the initiative in the Rwandan conflict, to seek additional 
monitors from African countries and to provide better support and super-
vision to the existing operation.” What drove this conclusion were the costs 
of burgeoning UN peacekeeping responsibilities, the desire to enhance the 
OAU’s peacekeeping capacities, and the intent to keep conflict resolution 
in Rwanda under African control.38
covering both bases
 In any case, when the first Security Council resolution on the situa-
tion in Rwanda (based on the French draft) came to a vote, it reflected a 
strong humanitarian concern for displaced persons and refugees, offered 
appropriate tributes to the OAU efforts to arrange a political solution, 
and invited the secretary general to examine the request of Rwanda and 
Uganda for the deployment of observers at the border between these two 
countries, as well as “to coordinate closely his efforts with those of the Or-
ganization of African Unity and to provide it with the necessary assistance 
to the peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda.” In equivocal language, the resolu-
tion also invited the secretary general “to examine in consultation with the 
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OAU the contribution that the United Nations, in support of the OAU’s 
efforts, could bring to strengthen the peace process in Rwanda, in particu-
lar through the possible establishment of an international force under the 
aegis of the OAU and the United Nations, entrusted inter alia with the 
protection of, and humanitarian assistance to, the civilian population and 
the support of the OAU force for the monitoring of the cease fire.”39
 The resolution thus opened the door not only to a UN border-
monitoring force but also to some sort of UN interpositional force. The 
resolution suggests, ambiguously, that the UN force (under OAU approval 
or aegis) might operate on its own for the given objectives of civilian pro-
tection and humanitarian assistance, while supporting the OAU in its 
ceasefire monitoring responsibilities.
a new un role?
 The reopening of the Arusha talks on March 16 brought a mixed reac-
tion to a possible new role for the United Nations. The Rwandan govern-
ment favored UN assistance to the OAU effort and a UN operation in 
Kigali to replace the French forces. Commissioner Bizimungu, speaking 
for the Front, claimed that the Rwandan government was attempting to 
encircle and strangle the RPF with a number of UN forces and demanded 
the retention of the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) as 
an interpositional force.40
 Ms. Florence Pomes, special representative of the UN secretary gen-
eral, was present at the plenary session as the political negotiations re-
opened. In her remarks, she noted that “the UN is ready to cooperate with 
and support the OAU efforts in Rwanda; it has neither the intention nor 
the means to replace the OAU in African affairs.”41 Ms. Pomes’s remarks 
seemed designed to allay the fears of African participants that the UN 
would move in on the OAU effort. Only the Rwandan government and 
France seemed anxious for that to happen.
 The special representative may also have been addressing US con-
cerns, already voiced in Security Council discussions. After the plenary, 
the new US ambassador to Tanzania, Peter De Vos, discussed with Ms. 
Pomes the US position: the quickest way to stand up an interpositional 
force for the expanded demilitarized zone was to enhance the field capacity 
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of the OAU’s Neutral Military Observer Group, thereby developing as 
well “effective OAU capabilities in the area of conflict resolution.” More-
over, early, effective intervention by the OAU could keep conflicts off the 
UN’s plate, reduce the magnitude of the crisis, and diminish the scale of 
human suffering.42
 Behind this position was the determination of the new Clinton ad-
ministration, with its focus on multilateral diplomacy, to get some or-
ganizational grip on US involvement in peacekeeping initiatives. The 
bureaucracy in Washington, led by the Department of State, was in full 
process of drafting peacekeeping guidelines under Presidential Study Di-
rective No. 13. Part of the new strategy was to find alternatives to expensive 
UN operations through peacekeeping by regional bodies. Since the United 
States had already invested in strengthening the peacekeeping office within 
the OAU, the Rwandan situation offered a chance for that office to get 
operational. Furthermore, a force made up of African contingents under 
OAU captaincy fit the guiding principle of US policy: “African solutions 
to African problems.”43
 The US position discounted the obvious deficiencies of the OAU 
monitoring operation. The ceasefire of June 1992 was to have come into 
force with the promised deployment of the OAU’s Neutral Military Ob-
server Group. The force was not in Rwanda until October and not really 
operational until November or December. Force leadership was more con-
cerned about pay rates than effectiveness on the ground. The force was 
underequipped, undermanned, and underfunded from the start, despite 
funds held by OAU headquarters that could have been designated for this 
cause. The NMOG’s reports on border confrontations during the chaotic 
December ’92–February ’93 events convinced the Rwandan government 
that it was not really a neutral force. Yet, the ceasefire held until February 8, 
in large part owing to the restraint of the two contending parties, but also 
because of the belated but dissuasive presence of OAU officers. Now after 
the RPF advance and then withdrawal under the Dar es Salaam agree-
ment, there were much larger responsibilities, both of policing the demili-
tarized zone and of replacing the French military force in Kigali. There was 
little in the record to suggest that the OAU was up to those tasks, but the 




 By March 15, international Observers, who had left Arusha February 
6, were headed back toward the negotiations. The talks reconvened in the 
afternoon of March 16 in plenary session. Foreign Minister Ngulinzira 
(back leading the delegation) took the high road of conciliation, commit-
ting the government to full implementation of its responsibilities under 
the various protocols while stressing the importance of human rights and 
reconciliation. On the other side, the information commissioner for the 
RPF, Pasteur Bizimungu, picked up his customary attack. He listed past 
massacres of Tutsi, complained of government ceasefire violations, denied 
all allegations of RPF improprieties in the recent fighting, and claimed that 
the Rwandan government was holding the Rwandan population hostage 
for political purposes.45
 With usual optimism, the revised schedule allocated ten days for mili-
tary talks, five days for refugee matters, and a final three days for remain-
ing political issues. A review of the events that led up to these resumed 
negotiations should have given all Observers pause over the possibilities 
of such a schedule, and concern over the portents of impending discus-
sions.46 Having been proved ineffective on the battlefield, the government 
entered into the new negotiations suing for peace. Habyarimana’s side had 
gained nothing in the months of political bickering since October, except a 
cessation of renewed hostilities. The opposition envisioned a rapid devolu-
tion of power, if they could quickly accommodate RPF interests in refugee 
and military matters. Ironically, a MRND moderate, Minister of Defense 
Gasana, had chaired the aborted February talks that fell apart on “politi-
cal” issues. Now that the Dar es Salaam summit had wiped out formal 
objections to the January 9 protocol, the MRND minister of foreign affairs 
Ngulinzira was to preside over renewed “military talks.”47
keeping pace  with the peace  talks
 As renewed talks entered this critical period, the Convener (OAU), 
the Facilitator (Tanzania), and Observer states geared up for the final 
phase of negotiations. The rapid return to the conference table caught 
delegations off guard. At the opening plenary, delegations from Senegal, 
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Uganda, Belgium, and Germany were absent. Four days into the talks, the 
OAU leadership had yet to appear, being detained in Addis for discussions 
with the Rwandan government over the makeup of a ceasefire monitoring 
group. This graphically illustrated the shallow bench on the OAU team 
and the challenge that the new peacekeeping opportunities presented 
to OAU leadership.
 The Observer groups were in transition. The Belgian director of Af-
rican affairs was ill, so Brussels sent in rotating second-level Observers or 
used their personnel from the embassy in Dar es Salaam. The Germans 
similarly rotated in Dar es Salaam personnel, sometimes the ambassador, 
sometimes lesser embassy officers. The French used either their ambassa-
dor in Dar es Salaam or, more frequently, the deputy chief of mission, Jean-
Christophe Belliard, by this time the most experienced of the Observers.
 The State Department put high premium on pushing the renewed 
talks along. Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen, in a message to 
Ambassador De Vos in Dar es Salaam and Ambassador Flaten in Kigali, 
noted, “We attach great importance to this final (we hope) round of talks. 
Serious delays or a complete breakdown could result in renewed fighting 
that could prove tragic for both sides. We want to provide to the peace 
process the greatest support we can. I have therefore made the difficult 
decision to allow AF/RA sole military adviser at the moment, Lt. Colonel 
Marley, to remain in Arusha to observe the military talks until the first 
week in April.”48
 To move that process along, Cohen picked a particularly skilled team. 
In addition to Col. Marley, Cohen asked Kigali to send Deputy Chief of 
Mission (DCM) Joyce Leader, who had deep experience in refugee affairs 
and had represented the United States at the Dar es Salaam refugee con-
ference. She was to observe the refugee part of the negotiations. Finally, 
Cohen asked Dar es Salaam to send political officer Robert Bentley to 
observe at the concluding political discussions and offered up his legal ad-
visor, John Byerly, to assist in the last part of the negotiations, if there were 
constitutional issues to be resolved.
 But meanwhile, there was a changing of the guard within the State 
Department. The newly elected Clinton administration was gradually 
settling in. Ambassador George Moose, who had served on the Clinton 
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transition team, would take over from Hank Cohen as assistant secretary 
of state. Virtually all of the policy makers who had been working the 
Rwandan issue, excepting the desk officer, Kevin Aiston, would move 
on to other things. Reflecting the new administration’s interest in global 
issues, Moose gave his former DCM in Senegal, Prudence Bushnell, a 
new portfolio for global affairs, regional conflicts, and peacekeeping. As 
members of the new team at the State Department worked out details 
of policy management, it fell to embassies of the region to assure a US 
presence at the Arusha talks and the Observer in Arusha to promote 
US perspectives and interests.
Military Integration
 Serious discussions at Arusha started right after the plenary, with high 
hopes for rapid progress to the conclusions of the talks. Since the agree-
ment on the coalition government in Rwanda was to expire on April 16, 
the parties wanted the negotiations concluded and transition institutions 
ready to install before then. Almost immediately, the two sides went into 
face-to-face bilateral discussions, canceling the scheduled plenary sessions. 
Observers finally asked for a plenary session so they would know what 
progress was being made and would be able to report to their capitals. 
Amid mutual accusations of ceasefire violations, the plenary began with 
discussions of the mission and principles of the armed forces, the partici-
pation of military in civil society, and the relative virtues of a national gen-
darmerie or a national police.49
 Unfortunately, initial high hopes and apparently productive face-to-
face sessions gave way to intractable conflicts over the notion of a gendar-
merie, percentage of RPF representation in the officer corps and ranks, 
and the nature and mission of a “neutral international force.” By the time 
Colonel Marley left on April 20 and DCM Leader replaced him, none of 
the critical issues of military integration had been resolved. The proposed 
April 8 date for signing the Arusha agreement was long past. The Facilita-
tor was pushing for “early agreement” on the gendarmerie issue but recom-
mending that force proportions be deferred until the end of the military 
talks. The Arusha negotiations appeared stalled again.
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 Meanwhile, OAU military observers in Rwanda were essentially hang-
ing around waiting for a new order. Absent an effective OAU plan for moni-
toring the ceasefire, the two parties proposed a high-level meeting in Kigali 
between RPF chairman Kanyarengwe and Prime Minister Nsegiyaremye, 
to be advanced by technical talks on the regime of the demilitarized zone. 
The purpose of the meeting would be to work out a plan for providing secu-
rity to the buffer zone so that displaced persons could return to plant their 
fields and participate in elections to set up local government. The parties sug-
gested that forces on each side field teams under NMOG supervision within 
each commune. On all other matters of security, the talks were deadlocked.50
an internal  securit y  force
 Since independence, Rwanda had cared for its internal security with 
communal police, who reported through authorities of local government 
to the Ministry of Interior, and with a national gendarmerie, which had 
the classic mission of protecting public facilities and highways as well as 
public order and reported through the minister of defense. The army was 
theoretically deployed for territorial defense, although under the Second 
Republic, its leaders had devoted themselves to running the country. This 
was the institutional form of security forces that the government nego-
tiators sought to perpetuate. The Rwandese Patriotic Front, on the other 
hand, took its vision from its experience with the national police force in 
Uganda, the National Revolutionary Army, as well as the Ugandan intel-
ligence services.
 Three issues found the parties on opposite sides. The first issue was ef-
ficacy: the history of ethnic violence within Rwanda, often abetted by local 
police and with hesitant reaction by the gendarmerie, made the RPF ques-
tion whether the Rwandan model was up to dealing with the increased 
tensions of the transition period. As a reserve reaction force, Rwanda’s gen-
darmerie had a sorry record of slow response; the RPF wanted an active, 
engaged, constraining police force. Yet, the Rwandan government could 
hardly imagine a secure state without a paramilitary gendarmerie to de-
fend the public interest.
 Bureaucratic oversight of the gendarmerie was a second issue. Under 
the January protocols, the RPF was to hold the interior portfolio, and the 
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MRND, their prime political opponent, would hold the Ministry of De-
fense. The RPF wanted the control of internal security within the Minis-
try of Interior. The Rwandan government did not want to cede an armed 
force to a ministry that had always had an administrative rather than a 
coercive role. The government also saw the possibility of two competing 
security forces, each under politically opposite ministerial authority, as a 
recipe for continuous internal conflict. Even the internal opposition parties 
wanted the Ministry of Defense to oversee the gendarmerie, which is why 
the parties were still arguing about the issue one month after the start of 
military talks.
 Finally, institutionalization of the new security organization during 
the transition was an issue. A new national police organization would put 
the two parties on level ground, each having to be trained into the practices 
and principles of the new organization. Although there was nothing in the 
ceasefire agreement requiring that the gendarmerie be integrated, if the 
RPF accepted a gendarmerie, it wanted it to undergo the same process as 
the army: disarmament, confinement to assembly points, and remobiliza-
tion by training within an integrated force. The government was opposed 
to demobilization and integration, wondering how security would be pro-
vided for the transition without an active gendarmerie. The RPF thought 
the neutral international force would provide internal security during the 
reintegration process. Obviously, command responsibilities and force-level 
issues devolved from whether one would be integrating outside forces into 
an existing institution or creating a new organization.
 By April 21, the talks were still stalled on the issue of the internal se-
curity force. Observers heard from the RPF that the major issue was not 
oversight of the force but its function and role. Later that day, the Facilita-
tor, represented by Ambassador Mpungwe, convened a meeting with the 
parties and the Observers to express concern over the slow pace of negotia-
tions. The parties explained that it was not a matter of bad faith in ne-
gotiations but the “need to discuss issues in depth.” They agreed to consult 
with the Facilitator on a target date to end military talks.51
 Four days later, the parties had reached an agreement in principle. 
The RPF dropped its proposal for a national police force in return for a 
commitment from the Rwandan government that the gendarmerie would 
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shift its focus from paramilitary intervention to regularized protection at 
the communal level. Coordination mechanisms between the two minis-
tries would be improved and civilian control over operations of all armed 
services assured. Having etched the outlines of that agreement, the par-
ties then turned to other military issues: the composition and use of the 
neutral international force, force proportions, force demobilization and 
integration, and the security status of Kigali.52
international  force  intervention
 How February’s ceasefire would be monitored and the transition pro-
cesses upheld remained a disputed issue. Despite US enthusiasm for the 
OAU taking on a larger monitoring role through an expanded NMOG 
reinforced by UN expertise, the NMOG contingent remained largely 
what it had been before the February hostilities. OAU secretary general 
Salim Salim had stopped by the talks on April 4 and promised an opera-
tionally expanded NMOG by April 15, but all the OAU had managed was 
a survey mission to determine the needs of an expanded presence. Accord-
ing to its findings, the OAU would have to deploy a battalion-sized OAU 
force until the UN force came in.53 The OAU pled a lack of personnel 
and resources necessary to the task despite the fact that Senegal, Tuni-
sia, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria had tentatively agreed to provide troops for 
an OAU demilitarized-zone force. By late April, France, Belgium, and the 
United States had presented a demarche to the OAU in Addis and in New 
York urging the organization to accelerate its efforts. The United States 
pointed to $400,000 of a US contribution to OAU peacekeeping the pre-
vious year that had yet to be spent and urged rapid deployment of forces 
with monies at hand as well as a simultaneous fundraising session among 
concerned “Friends of Rwanda.”54
 Observers in Arusha envisioned an evolving international force: an 
OAU monitoring force assisted by the UN would police the demilitarized 
“buffer” zone until the peace agreement was negotiated. After the parties 
had signed the agreement, a UN peacekeeping force assisted by the OAU 
would bolster the peace process and help implement its military provi-
sions. But, the contending parties did not share this vision. The Rwandan 
government was not impressed with the neutrality of the existing OAU 
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force. Although it had agreed to a larger NMOG, the Rwandan govern-
ment had also requested a UN force on the ground in Rwanda imme-
diately. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, satisfied with the NMOG and its 
light observer presence on the ground, feared an overweening buildup of UN 
forces that would encumber the peace process (and override the RPF’s field 
advantage).55
 Immediately after the two parties had briefed observers on their break-
through agreement on the gendarmerie, Ambassador Mpungwe convened 
the two sides to review progress in implementing the March 5 Dar es 
Salaam agreement. His government was concerned that nonimplementa-
tion of the agreement might be used as provocation by one side or the 
other to resume hostilities. The parties agreed to quell doubts by formally 
reiterating their request for an expanded NMOG and their interest in a 
continuing OAU role in the Rwandan peace process.56 Most significantly, 
the OAU notified the two sides that the UN secretary general categori-
cally turned back the OAU’s request for technical and financial assistance, 
even though that request had been supported by a trilateral demarche by 
France, Belgium, and the United States on April 30.57
getting into the act
 Despite Boutros-Ghali’s reticence, the United Nations’ presence in the 
region was growing. The secretary general’s goodwill mission to the region 
in March had set the stage for a follow-on survey team in early April to 
look at requirements for a possible UN force on the Rwandan-Ugandan 
border. That was after all a classic UN responsibility: interposition be-
tween two sovereign states. In conversations with Ambassador Flaten in 
Kigali, the survey team leader, General Baril, invited comments on the pos-
sible makeup of a buffer-zone force.58 Nonetheless, Observers in Arusha 
were led to conclude that there was no chance of a UN role within the 
Rwandan peace process until the Arusha Accords had been signed.
 Having foreclosed on the possibility of military assistance in Rwanda, 
the United Nations then began to modulate its position. For one thing, the 
Rwandan government was still pressing for a UN force on the ground as 
soon as possible, an objective for which Habyarimana sought the help of 
newly installed US assistant secretary for African affairs, George Moose, 
Endgame
167
in their May 27 meeting in Gabon.59 Moreover, the trilateral partners re-
fused to take “no” for an answer. At a May 11 trilateral meeting, France, 
Belgium, and the United States agreed to reopen with the secretary general 
the question of UN support for peacekeeping in Rwanda. The partners 
put the best face on Boutros-Ghali’s initial refusal, attributing it to misin-
formation on the Ugandan position regarding a border force.60
 In late May, UN assistant secretary general Iqbal Riza told Secretary 
Moose that the UN would send experts to Rwanda to help the OAU plan 
for the introduction of a peacekeeping force into the demilitarized zone. 
According to Riza, the secretary general had also approved a report rec-
ommending eighty-one military observers with twenty-five support staff 
for the Rwanda-Uganda border. A report on deployment in other areas 
would be presented after the Arusha talks concluded.61 Three and a half 
months after the demilitarized zone had been set up by the Dar es Salaam 
agreement, the peacekeeping bureaucracies were still in the “early planning” 
stage. By June, international partners of the Arusha process were still de-
bating the authority, mission, and staffing of a neutral international force 
in Rwanda.
patrolling the border
 Only the plans for a UN monitoring force on the border between 
Rwanda and Uganda seemed to be going forward. On this the French had 
become quite insistent. They had inserted the notion into their draft Secu-
rity Council resolution, which sought to bolster conclusions of the March 
summit in Dar es Salaam. Having secured the agreement of Uganda and 
Rwanda to the idea, France then lobbied hard in the Security Council and 
among its trilateral partners for support. Other than arguing for a clear 
delimitation of international security roles in Rwanda, the Belgians were 
quite willing to go along with the French proposal.
 The United States, on the other hand, raised a series of procedural 
objections and initially said it could not, without further clarification, sup-
port France’s idea. Giving the UN a direct and immediate role in Rwanda 
countered the US effort to promote OAU peacekeeping. It also added 
another costly ad hoc UN peacekeeping operation just as the new US 
administration was trying to outline a policy for limiting and rationalizing 
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international peacekeeping. Eventually, a high-level political and military 
mission came from Paris to New York and Washington to hash out differ-
ences. France largely conceded to US operational nitpicking. The United 
States decided to go along with France on border monitors in hope of 
French support for an expanded NMOG in the buffer zone.62
force  prop ortions
 The discussions about the gendarmerie’s function and role and the 
nature of the international peacekeeping force were but sideshows in the 
military negotiations. The real issue was integration of the army. The 
ceasefire agreement of July 13, 1992, had set as one of its objectives the 
“formation of a national army consisting of Government Forces and 
those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.” Within a week after the reopen-
ing of talks in Arusha, Colonel Marley reported that “the Facilitator and 
both Rwandan parties have grasped the nettle and initiated negotiation 
of the integration ratios of the new Rwandan Army.” The nettle stung! 
Even though the Facilitator decided to treat force ratios with “shuttle 
diplomacy” rather than face-to-face talks, RPF spokesman Bizimungu 
treated Rwandan government proposals with such ridicule that the Fa-
cilitator decided to defer discussions on force levels until the negotiators 
had come to agreement on other military issues: cantonment and assem-
bly points, demobilization, and the status of Kigali, as well as the nature 
of the international force.63
 The original positions of the two parties on force levels were far apart. 
The Rwandan government’s initial conception of the negotiations was to 
include the Rwandan Patriotic Front as a political element within the ex-
isting multiparty government. The army would remain as it was instituted. 
Even the notion of integrating a few RPA officers into command positions 
was hard for Rwandan leadership to swallow. At the beginning of military 
talks in March, the Rwandan government was willing to offer an eighty-
twenty split, a proposal the Front found risible.64 Yet, by May 3, the Rwandan 
foreign minister said he did not expect a major problem in this area, al-
though he did not elaborate on the basis for his optimism.65 Certainly, his 
president a fortnight later characterized the discussion of percentages that 
would be integrated into a unified army as “sensitive and complex.”66
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 The Front, early in the negotiations, talked in general terms of a fifty-
fifty split in integration levels.67 This position was buttressed by President 
Museveni’s candid assessment that the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) 
had proved its military superiority on the ground and, given its concerns 
for the security of Tutsi in Rwanda, had a right to an equal share in secu-
rity responsibilities. The RPF were certainly aware of Museveni’s views, 
and that he had forcefully shared those views with Arusha Observers and 
their governments.68 In the military talks, the RPF again raised the idea of 
a fifty-fifty split between the two forces. When Colonel Marley suggested 
that different ratios be applied at different command levels, the RPF pro-
posed a fifty-fifty split in troop levels and in command functions down to 
the company level.69
 The Facilitator did not feel that the “conference diplomacy” of Aru-
sha provided the appropriate means to resolve the sensitive issue of force 
proportions. So the Tanzanians took the issue off the table and dealt with 
it by a message-carrying facilitation. But the talks stalled with only the 
slightest movement on proportionality. Proximity talks with the Tanzani-
ans brought the government bid to 75 percent for the government and 25 
percent for the RPF. The RPF, however, stuck to a proposal for 55 percent 
for the government and 45 percent for the RPF.70
 Tanzanian minister of defense Kinana joined the facilitating team 
carrying messages between Arusha and Kigali.71 On May 11, Ambassador 
Mpungwe returned to Arusha after discussions with Tanzanian foreign 
minister Rwegasira and President Mwinyi with a strategy for negotiations 
on force proportions. As the US Observer Joyce Leader dryly commented, 
“He did not advise Observers on the substance of his discussions or his 
strategy.”72 Minister Kinana was to arrive shortly to assist in the negotia-
tions. Thus, force proportions had become the preserve of the Tanzanian 
Facilitator, and agreement on those ratios was not quick in coming.73
 While the Tanzanians pursued their shuttle diplomacy, the two sides 
met to consider outstanding issues they could resolve among themselves, 
such as the timetable for force integration and military discipline. They 
produced a document on “Proposed Confidence Building Measures” and 
asked that the twinned issues of an enlarged NMOG and a neutral inter-
national force be put on the agenda of the upcoming high-level meeting 
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in Kigali.74 The Observers met with the parties to discuss issues on which 
they requested advice: disengagement and demobilization, incorporation 
of the RPA into other security services, and the international force. Leader 
reported that as of May 23, “The Rwandan peace talks continue to turn 
around pending military issues without getting to key issues of force pro-
portions and participation of the RPF in the gendarmerie.”75
 When the Tanzanians finally came up with a formula that they con-
sidered fair and sensible, they tabled it with authority. On May 31, Ambas-
sador Mpungwe, “on instruction from President Mwinyi,” laid before the 
parties a proposal that would have RPF participation of 35 to 40 percent. 
Subsequent negotiations were to work out how that applied to various 
ranks.76 The following day, during follow-up consultations with the delega-
tions, RPF told Mpungwe that it would not negotiate on that range and 
asked for a new proposal from the Facilitator. Mpungwe suggested that the 
RPF go back to its authorities for new instructions.77
 In a later briefing of Observers, Ambassador Mpungwe said the RPF 
rejected the proposal “with contempt and arrogance.” He suggested that the 
RPF was stalling to buy time for “other things” and questioned the Front’s 
commitment to the peace process. The Ugandan and OAU Observers en-
dorsed the Tanzanian view and urged maximum pressure to “bring reality 
home to the RPF.” Belgian and US Observers sought to keep the sides 
talking. That evening, the RPF boycotted a Tanzanian government recep-
tion honoring the opening of refugee negotiations. To keep their pique 
over force proportions public, the RPF representatives at refugee talks 
made confrontational interventions even though the RPF had few changes 
to suggest to the draft refugee protocol that the Rwandan government had 
tabled. Joyce Leader concluded that given the atmospherics, “the year-long 
peace process could come to an abrupt, premature end.”78
 Having failed to move the RPF in Arusha on the force proportions 
issue, the Tanzanians then sought to move the argument to the leadership 
of both sides in Rwanda. On June 7, the Tanzanian prime minister, foreign 
minister, defense minister, and Ambassador Mpungwe with staff flew to 
Kigali to sell the plan to the Rwandan government and then drove to the 
Mulindi Tea Plantation to discuss it with Chairman Kanyarengwe and 
Vice Chairman Kagame of the RPF. At the conclusion of the meetings, 
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Prime Minister Malecela expressed optimism but was otherwise closed-
mouthed. But Rwandan government sources reported that the Tanzanians 
were trying to secure the Rwandan government agreement to a split of 
sixty (GOR) to forty (RPF) in the army and a fifty-fifty split in the gen-
darmerie. The officer corps would be split fifty-fifty, but at what command 
level was not clear. The Tanzanians were also trying to sell a new tight 
schedule for concluding the talks, with signature of a peace agreement by 
June 12.79
 On his return to Arusha June 9, Ambassador Mpungwe convoked the 
Western Observers and asked their help in convincing President Habyari-
mana that the sixty-forty split was “the most realistic solution for integrat-
ing both the army and the gendarmerie.” Mpungwe said the force ratio 
was the best deal he could get from the RPF. President Mwinyi had called 
Ugandan president Museveni to ask his help in getting the RPF to accept 
a lower figure, but the Ugandans apparently had not got through to RPF 
leadership by the time of the Tanzanian delegation’s visit on June 7. The 
French and Belgian Observers said that their governments would accept a 
ratio of sixty to forty but cautioned about taking the fifty-fifty officer ratio 
too far down the command structure. Joyce Leader recommended US ac-
ceptance, but Ambassador Flaten in Kigali demurred, believing that this 
was not a matter for the United States to decide.80
Trying to Wrap It Up
 It had been eleven months since the Tanzanians had started facilitating 
the ceasefire talks under the chairmanship of then foreign minister Diria. 
Ambassador Mpungwe had warned the two sides on April 21 that the con-
tinuing lack of agreement was a threat to the possibility of peace. The Tan-
zanian government was running out of resources to continue to host and 
facilitate the talks.81 On May 25, Defense Minister Kinana, speaking on 
behalf of the Facilitator, called on the government and RPF delegations “to 
demonstrate their continued commitment to the peace process by picking 
up on the pace of negotiations.”82
 Kinana contended that there sometimes seemed to be deliberate at-
tempts to stall the talks and urged both sides to respect the advice of the 
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Facilitator’s representative as “sincere, honest and objective.” While the 
Rwandan delegation seemed to take the minister’s advice on board, RPF 
commissioner Bizimungu resisted Kinana’s contention that the Facilita-
tor’s word should be final. The negotiations were “between the two sides 
which should take expert views into consideration in reaching their own 
decision.83
a june s igning?
 By the end of May, the Facilitator’s shuttle diplomacy had failed to 
bring closure on control of storage depots, demilitarization of Kigali, in-
tegrating the RPF into the gendarmerie, and the timing for installation 
of the broad-based government. “The question of force proportions is not 
yet under discussion,” Leader reported. In the meantime, the uncertainty 
over the nature and timing of a neutral international force deployment to 
Rwanda was complicating discussions on all other issues.84
 The Tanzanian effort had by all standards been heroic, evenhanded, 
and artful in pushing forward the boundaries of a possible agreement. 
With the annual OAU meeting now looming, the Tanzanians were push-
ing hard to wrap up the talks. After a weekend of intense discussions, the 
Tanzanian defense minister told the Observers on June 13 that June 19 had 
been set as the date for concluding the negotiations and signing the agree-
ment. President Mwinyi was extending invitations to high levels of Ob-
server states and international organizations.85
 The package of remaining contentions was bigger than the Tanzanians 
wished to admit. The duration of the transition, the constitutional articles 
to be revised, the naming of the transition prime minister, and RPF par-
ticipation in “other security services” all held hidden blockages. For exam-
ple, Defense Minister Kinana considered the naming of Prime Minister 
Nsengiyaremye as transition prime minister a done deal. However, that 
nomination was engineered by the prime minister himself and was hotly 
contested by government ministers back in Kigali. The defense minister 
may have been right in holding that neither side in Arusha wanted popular 
or parliamentary ratification of necessary constitutional changes or of the 
overall accord; but the demand for popular ratification remained Presi-
dent Habyarimana’s position and that of a significant part of the Rwandan 
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body politic. US Observer Leader wondered if the Tanzanians were seri-
ous about the proposed date for signing or were trying to bluff the parties 
into speedy agreement. Given the track record on military discussions, the 
problems remaining to be resolved were not likely to be negotiated in 
five days.86
 Back in Kigali, it was also evident that the Tanzanian deadline could 
not be met. The Tanzanian mission had stirred local political forces to 
address the peace process. Initially, the government wanted a better force 
ratio, but the internal political parties formally accepted a 40 percent fig-
ure for the RPF participation in security services. The Rwandan cabinet 
decided to accept the Tanzanian integration range of 35 to 40 percent for 
the RPA, in effect making a sixty-forty split acceptable. The cabinet did 
reserve on the notion of making Kigali a demilitarized zone or moving 
the transition government to some demilitarized location. While the Fa-
cilitator had told Observers in Arusha that the fifty-fifty ratio for officers 
should apply to the top ten command positions, the RPF claimed that the 
Tanzanians proposed a fifty-fifty ratio down to battalion command as part 
of the package it was asked to accept. The process of integration in the 
gendarmerie also remained at issue.87
 The idea that inconsistencies between the Arusha Protocols and the 
constitution should be worked out in Arusha was not acceptable to the 
Rwandan government. Nonetheless, in a new initiative, Habyarimana had 
requested an opinion from the National Commission for Development 
(CND), parliamentarians elected under the one-party regime, on the 
Arusha process. The resulting two-day, closed-door debate essentially pro-
vided advance acceptance of the protocols and such constitutional changes 
as they might require. This process put to rest the demand for a popular 
referendum on the accords. However, the cabinet insisted on its right to re-
view the completed texts, and the CND wanted to see the final document 
for a final approval.88
 Even as the Tanzanians were trying to tie up military issues, party 
and government circles discussed the important question of who was to 
be the transition prime minister. While he had the backing of his party 
cadre, Nsengiyaremye had angered many of his cabinet colleagues by his 
lack of coordination and his practice of government by fiat. The cabinet 
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asked the MDR to name another person. But the MDR political bu-
reau confirmed Nsengiyaremye as their choice and reiterated their right 
under the current constitution and power-sharing protocols to make 
that decision.89
 The American embassy in Kigali, usually cautious in pronounce-
ments on the peace process, believed that there was enough accord on 
fundamentals that an agreement could be signed within a week or so of 
the Tanzanian visit. However, negotiators in Arusha failed to accept the 
Tanzanian proposal on proportions in command functions. The Facili-
tator blamed the RPF for reneging on an agreement; the RPF, in turn, 
claimed it had neither rejected nor accepted the Tanzanian package but 
needed further instructions from headquarters. Moreover, the RPF delega-
tion said they understood the Tanzanian deal to be a fifty-fifty command 
split down to the company level, while the Rwanda government believed 
that the compromise ratio was fifty-five to forty-five down to battalion 
level. Having failed to meet the signature deadline, the Facilitator sus-
pended talks, the Tanzanian and Rwandan foreign ministers went to the 
OAU summit in Cairo, and President Mwinyi promised to pursue the 
peace process there.90
who is  to  bl ame?
 While Foreign Minister Ngulinzira was quick to blame the RPF for 
the suspension, he also faulted the cabinet for interfering in the designa-
tion of the transition prime minister and President Habyarimana for not 
personally negotiating the last elements of the accord. The US view was 
that “the Tanzanians may have pushed too far too fast in an attempt to ar-
rive at the OAU summit with a peace agreement.”91 The effort to keep the 
decision making in Arusha or in closed-door shuttle diplomacy had in fact 
complicated the process. The cabinet was still insisting on final review. A 
deal the Tanzanians apparently cut with Chairman Kanyarengwe on force 
proportions seemed to have been overturned by RPF militants, hence the 
Arusha delegation’s “lack of instructions.” Moreover, the MDR persisted 
in its nomination of Nsengiyaremye despite cabinet objections. Hopes for 
the Arusha negotiations had once again become disconnected from politi-
cal realities in Kigali and in Mulindi.92
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The Politics of Negotiation
co operation
 Since the ad hoc reestablishment of a truce on February 9 and the 
confirmation of a ceasefire by the Dar es Salaam Agreement of March 5, 
the political mood in Kigali had fundamentally changed. The rhetorical 
opposition of the Bujumbura parties’ meeting gave way to cooperation as 
the internal opposition parties began to work with the MRND. The cabi-
net moved ahead on the nagging problem of cleaning up local administra-
tion, holding elections in thirty-one constituencies. The opposition parties 
drafted a thirteen-page memorandum to outline a common position for a 
meeting with the MRND on extension of the current transition govern-
ment and on Arusha issues.93
 The president and the prime minister met more often in the two 
months after February 9 than they had since the coalition government was 
established in April 1992. As they worked on a common strategy for Arusha, 
the usual mutual recrimination seemed a thing of the past. Indeed, when 
Nsengiyaremye engineered his own nomination for transition prime min-
ister, the opposition came not from the president and his MRND party 
but within the MDR and others of the internal opposition parties who 
resented the prime minister’s high-handed rule. In his speeches, the presi-
dent gave unequivocal signals of his willingness to accept the Arusha Ac-
cords. Habyarimana’s March 21 speech in Bujumbura was considered the 
clearest statement yet of his commitment to peace. He also set a consistent 
track record of accommodating the political opposition, finally even ac-
cepting the naming of PL leader Justin Mugenzi as minister of commerce 
in the renewed coalition cabinet, a move the president had opposed for 
months.94
 On the human rights front, the president and cabinet on April 7 
jointly issued a largely positive Response to the Report of the International 
Commission on Human Rights. The commission’s interim findings had previ-
ously been defensively dismissed for methodological errors. While insist-
ing that the human rights abuses took place in the context of an ongoing 
war, the Response acknowledged the abuses detailed in the report, admit-
ted the deficiencies of the government and undisciplined members of the 
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armed forces, and pledged to take appropriate measures “against authori-
ties who failed in their duties.”95 The Western ambassadors agreed that the 
most important aspect of the Response was the cooperation between the 
presidency and the government in producing the report. Its major failing 
was the lack of institutional arrangements to enforce its commitments.96
contention
 If cooperation was increasing within the Rwandan government, the 
newly established political parties were having difficulties. Fissures within 
the body politic began to show up in the communal elections. These elec-
tions, the result of continuous pressure by the internal opposition to get 
rid of MRND loyalists in the local administration, showed the fragility 
of the opposition base. The Liberal Party (PL) president Justin Mugenzi 
was furious at his political allies within the PL and in fellow parties for not 
supporting the candidates he had preferred. Although the Liberal Party 
was created as an interethnic party, these elections began to show local 
solidarity along ethnic lines, with Tutsi winning in significant numbers. In 
the MDR, the split between the old-line politicians carried over from the 
MDR Parmehutu and the newer players in the field led by party president 
Twagiramungu became readily apparent in contention over communal 
nominations in MDR strongholds. Immediately after the elections, the 
party-political bureau held an all-day session trying to restore cohesion in 
party leadership and ranks.97
 The April 1992 protocol establishing a multiparty coalition govern-
ment for Rwanda was to have lasted one year, or until the establishment 
of the transitional institutions. One year later, as Arusha negotiators failed 
to wrap up their discussions, the protocol was extended. On July 16, with 
crucial issues still outstanding in the negotiations, the parties negotiated 
a new protocol extending the mandate of the coalition government but 
dismissing Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye. Minister of Education (and 
a Twagiramungu ally) Agathe Uwilingiyimana moved from the Ministry 
of Education to the prime minister’s post.98 The immediate reaction of 
the MDR political bureau was to suspend both MDR president Twagi-
ramungu and the new prime minister. Ms. Uwilingiyimana was sworn in 
as prime minister on July 18, but an extraordinary MDR Party Congress 
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asked her to resign her post. Under pressure, she initially agreed but then 
announced to the nation on July 24 that as a “patriot” she would remain 
in her post and exercise her responsibilities as prime minister. Twagira-
mungu, meanwhile, challenged the legality of the congress since he, as 
president, had not been involved in convening it.
 Meanwhile, the split between Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye and 
Twagiramungu crystallized over their contest to be named prime minis-
ter of the interim government. The cabinet rejected Nsengiyaremye, and 
the MDR kept renaming him.99 This standoff intensified as Arusha talks 
picked up again after the OAU summit. Initially, there was speculation 
that the cabinet would have Ms. Uwilingiyimana stay on as prime minis-
ter under the Arusha Accords, but the political play came to its denoue-
ment when Twagiramungu arranged to get cabinet endorsement.100 The 
RPF appeared willing to accept the cabinet decision. What remained was 
for the MDR to accede to the new situation. On July 28, with the pos-
sibility of signature of the accords in sight, mediators met with Twagira-
mungu and Nsengiyaremye and sought the help of the diplomatic corps 
in pressuring Nsengiyaremye to face the facts. Western ambassadors en-
couraged reconciliation, but none were willing to “take a position on the 
merits of the case.”101
Pushing toward Signature
 Even as Rwanda’s second largest party was in full turmoil, negotiations 
continued. On the very day that the Tanzanian foreign minister arrived 
in Kigali to continue his shuttle diplomacy on outstanding issues, he was 
confronted with a new team: Foreign Minister Anastase Gasana was tak-
ing instructions from the newly installed cabinet led by Prime Minister 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The cabinet had designated Faustin Twagira-
mungu, without the support of the majority in his party, as the transition 
prime minister.
 What remained to be decided was RPF acceptance of the desig-
nated interim prime minister, force levels and command positions within 
the armed forces, and details on power sharing, especially provisions for 
impeaching the president and the place and timing for installation of the 
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interim institutions. The parties decided to bring negotiations to Rwandan 
soil and meet again in the demilitarized zone at Kinihira, where technical 
talks had previously taken place on the regime for the demilitarized zone.
 Negotiations stalemated early, but holding delegates in intensive ses-
sions (until 2 a.m. on July 24 and 3 a.m. on July 25), the Facilitator achieved 
what was called a breakthrough but was actually a capitulation to RPF 
demands. The command of the gendarmerie would go to the RPF. The 
officer corps of the gendarmerie down to the prefecture level would be split 
fifty-fifty. The command in the army went to the government, and com-
mand positions would be split fifty-fifty down to the battalion level. The 
transition government would be installed in Kigali; to protect RPF per-
sonalities in the transition government, a battalion-level RPF force would 
be stationed in Kigali until the security forces were integrated.102
 The RPF accepted Twagiramungu as transition prime minister. Al-
though Twagiramungu was suspended by the MDR Political Bureau on 
July 17 and expelled from the party by an MDR Congress on July 23, he 
was challenging both procedures in the courts. As the US embassy com-
mented, he was “clearly the choice of all parties in the current government 
and the future one, except his own.”103 The RPF also agreed to a com-
promise that would require a two-thirds vote in the transitional national 
assembly for impeachment proceedings against the president and prime 
minister. Additionally, the impeachment against the president could not 
proceed without consultation with the Joint Political Military Committee 
and with the international Observers of the Arusha process.
 The Kinihira agreement called for security in Kigali to be provided by 
a “neutral international force” under UN command. In the interim, security 
would be provided by an expanded NMOG under UN command. OAU 
authorities had previously argued that charter provisions would never per-
mit OAU forces to serve under UN command; operations of the forces 
of the two international institutions, whether in monitoring the demili-
tarized zone or patrolling the peace process, would have to be separate.104 
But it was clear that the Rwandan government would not accept a capital 
city force without UN control. Nor would the French leave under terms 
of article 5 of the Dar es Salaam agreement until a reliable (i.e., more than 
OAU) international force was prepared to take their place.105
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 Moreover, the OAU had shown itself incapable of responding to its 
new responsibilities in a timely way, even in the demilitarized zone. After 
months of talking about expanding its forces, the OAU Neutral Military 
Observer Group (NMOG) was expecting its first reinforcements from 
Senegal on July 31. Nigerian, Egyptian, and Tunisian contingents were 
also “promised,” with arrival dates uncertain.106 Even with an augmented 
force, the mandate under which the military observers were operating did 
not permit the kind of security operations that were being asked of them, 
whether in the demilitarized zone or in Kigali after signature of the ac-
cords. The OAU’s Mapuranga had earlier made the argument that the 
final signature of the Arusha Accords would make the NMOG redun-
dant. Thus, just as the much-heralded expansion was about to occur, and 
on the eve of final agreement on political negotiations, signals coming from 
OAU’s headquarters on the NMOG’s role were highly ambiguous.107
 The US embassy in Kigali concluded, “The RPF squeezed a little 
more out of this last round than they had a right to expect.”108 This was 
particularly true with regard to command-authority and command levels 
in the gendarmerie and to the admission of RPF troops into the capital 
city. There may have been two reasons for this. One was that the negotiat-
ing team on the Rwandan side was new, not fully aware of the implications 
of past debates and wanting to show success. Certainly, the Tanzanians, es-
pecially in the person of Foreign Minister Rwegasira, who had been work-
ing the traces in Kigali since July 16, were pressing hard for agreement. 
Then the political crisis within the second main party and the resultant 
cabinet changes left the Rwanda government looking unstable and hardly 
in a position to dig in its heels.
 A second factor was the heightened sense of insecurity brought about 
by the abrupt resignation and departure from Rwanda of Minister of De-
fense Dr. James Gasana. Gasana was an MRND loyalist but from Cyangugu 
rather than the northern heartland. As Rwanda’s first civilian minister of 
defense, he earnestly defended the government position. But he was always 
a reliable interlocutor and a proponent of the peace process. In his cautious 
departure statement, Gasana said that a radical vigilante group called the 
“Akasu” had threatened his life and that of his family. Rumor had it that 
Gasana had learned that elements of the army were training and arming 
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militia and that he had tried to stop them. An MRND stalwart had com-
mented, “If Gasana is not safe, then no one is.”109 The tenuous security 
environment seemed to justify the RPF demand for an enlarged command 
function within the gendarmerie and their own protection force in Kigali.
Endgame
 The Arusha Peace Accords had been scheduled for signing on June 19, 
June 24, June 25, July 15, and July 22. Now with agreements reached in Kini-
hira, the negotiations seemed truly to be at an end. In an extraordinary ses-
sion, the cabinet, meeting under chairmanship of President Habyarimana 
and in the presence of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, on Sunday, July 25 
approved the negotiated conclusions. Then the foreign minister returned 
to Kinihira to initial the protocols.110
 An early August signing looked possible. In fact, a larger part of the 
work on the agreements had already been prepared. Lawyers had worked 
long hours in the run-up to the OAU summit trying to get protocols in 
shape for signature.111 As the intended signing date of June 19 eased by 
and principles hurried off to the Cairo OAU summit where they were to 
continue discussions of remaining major issues, teams from both sides at 
Arusha met in direct discussions to tie up loose ends: the staging of gen-
darmerie training, the duration of the transition, and the relation of the 
peace accord to the constitution. A draft of the final agreement had been 
faxed to Habyarimana and to the cabinet. Working groups were putting 
final touches on the protocol on military affairs and on outstanding po-
litical issues. A June 24 signing seemed possible.112 Now a month later, 
remaining issues seemed, at last, to have been resolved. With confidence, 
the Rwandan government convoked the diplomatic corps to Arusha on 
August 4 for the final signature.113
 On August 4, as planned, President Habyarimana and Chairman 
Kanyarengwe signed the Arusha Peace Agreement, declaring, “The war 
between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front is hereby brought to an end.”114 President Mwinyi called 
the agreement the “first fruits of African conflict resolution,” showing pride 
in the accomplishment of the peacemakers that other African speakers 
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shared. Habyarimana said that all Rwandans were winners in this accord 
and committed himself to its implementation. Recognizing that the ac-
cord was not perfect, the president warned all Rwandans not to even think 
about rejecting it. Kanyarengwe called the accord an important first step. 
He joined many other speakers in seeing the deployment of the neutral 
international force as crucial, adding that an enlarged NMOG would 
be helpful and prodding Egyptians to send troops as promised. The US 
embassy reported, “The mood was serious throughout the ceremony and 
moved to self-congratulatory warmth afterwards . . . there was excellent 
mixing between the Rwandian [sic] delegations.”115
 Of the players at the signature scenario, President Habyarimana was 
generally deemed the most reluctant. In arranging a quick review of the 
texts by the CND and a stagy cabinet approval on the Sunday follow-
ing the Kinihira talks, the president, in fact, seemed anxious to wrap up 
the negotiations. His endorsement of the Arusha Accords had the ring of 
personal approval. Nonetheless, Habyarimana could not have been happy 
about the final product. He had wanted a cabinet in which the MRND 
would not be marginalized, but the marginalizing formulas for government 
decision making had been retained and no balancing parties admitted to 
the magic circle. He wanted a national assembly that had the approbation 
of the people, but he now would deal with an appointed assembly whose 
make-up could prevail against his intentions.
 Habyarimana had reluctantly agreed to the integration of security 
forces, but only on an eighty-twenty proportion; now the ratios were in 
essence the fifty-fifty allocation that the RPF had sought all along. He had 
wanted national elections so the people could decide who should rule, but 
elections had been delayed for the two-year interim period. In that period, 
both the internal opposition and the Rwandese Patriotic Front would cer-
tainly seek to transform his regime or bring him down by indictment.
 In the euphoria of the moment, few observers worried with the US 
embassy about RPF dominance of the negotiating process. Optimism was 
the rule of the day. The negotiation had been long, well structured, and 
keenly argued on both sides. Most importantly, the Arusha political nego-
tiations opened the door to the prospect of peace. As a French diplomat 




 Eight months later, ground-to-air missiles blew up President Habyari-
mana’s aircraft. In that fiery crash the hopes of the Arusha Accords per-
ished as well. A sad and chastening retrospective would instruct us that: 
•	 Successful negotiations must deal with core interests. The government’s 
dilatory response to ethnic violence in the north demonstrated a signal 
lack of concern for a key RPF interest: the safety of the Tutsi people. 
The result was an unyielding RPF demand for a larger share of the 
security apparatus.
•	 Successful	negotiations	must	structure	equity	for	key	stakeholders.	The 
insistence on signing the Arusha IV power-sharing protocol against 
the president’s protests showed a deep disinterest in the Habyarimana 
regime’s concerns or prospects. That power-sharing protocol provided 
no means to adjust the agreement to the realities of the Rwandan 
political landscape and to assure the president of some purchase on 
policy or process.
•	 In	international	intervention,	power	matters.	France’s deployment of 
another reinforced company, stern dealings with the president and 
prime minister, and vigorous demarche to the Ugandans on border 
supplies made possible a successful summit in Dar es Salaam on 
March 9 and a return to the negotiating table at Arusha.
•	 Putative	issues	may	camouflage	central	objectives.	Discussions on refugee 
return, delayed at RPF insistence to the end of negotiations, were 
wrapped up in a week. The regional refugee conference of 1990 may 
have paved the way, as did an agreement for unrestricted right of 
return in the rule of law protocol. For all its invoking of the refugee 
cause, the RPF was more interested in winning on military integration 
than on belaboring refugee questions.
•	 Changing	horses	midstream	of	negotiations	is	a	bad	idea.	In the push toward 
the end of negotiations, the government team, president, and prime 
minister were finally working together. But the split in the MDR, 
the change of government, and the deploying of a new negotiating 
Endgame
183
team brought inexperience and naivety to the fore. In the wrap-up 
negotiations, this new team gave way to critical RPF demands that 
left the agreements unbalanced militarily and politically.
•	 Bluffing	works.	Having won out on acceptance of the power-sharing 
protocols, the RPF promised quick conclusion to power-sharing talks 
but in fact dug in its heels, turning back Tanzanian mediation with an 
invective that left Tanzanians wondering about RPF intentions. In the 
interest of concluding the talks, the Tanzanians and the international 
partners as well as the new Rwandan government gave way.
•	 Does	geography	matter?	It is ironic that critical talks on the peace 
agreement were brought back from Arusha to Rwanda’s demilitarized 
zone: first in April to set up the administrative structures of the 
zone, and then in July to wrap up the talks. Could an expanded 
international presence (OAU or UN?) have made the zone an island 
of peace and negotiation after the Dar es Salaam summit, rather than 
returning to Arusha, with its failed history?
 Historical hypotheticals leave us with a lot of “what ifs” in the lead-up 
to the renewal of civil war and the launching of genocide in Rwanda. The 
reality at the time was a signed agreement after a year of hard bargaining 
and a euphoric enthusiasm for a return to peace. That something so care-
fully built and widely hailed should so quickly disintegrate is the sad story 




 The international community became engaged in confronting armed 
conflict in Rwanda immediately upon the incursion of the Rwandese Patri-
otic Front (RPF) onto Rwandan territory in October 1990. Numerous bilat-
eral and regional attempts finally produced a somewhat durable ceasefire in 
July 1992. Political talks began a month later. One year after that, following in-
tense debate and heavily facilitated talks, punctuated by renewed conflict and 
a return to negotiations, the contending parties finally signed a peace agree-
ment in Arusha on August 4, 1993. But four months later, the accords were 
still not implemented. Indeed, the peace process seemed to be falling apart.
 What happens when agreements about power sharing so carefully de-
bated and finally signed do not get initiated? What are the levers of suasion 
when the political parties, the units of power sharing within the transition 
institutions, break apart in internal contests for power? What are the rami-
fications when the euphoria of accomplishment and the spirit of coopera-
tion, induced by the peace agreement, give way under subsequent events to 
pessimism and suspicion?1
 In this chapter, I look at how the contending parties in Rwanda and the 
international actors supporting the search for peace sought to install interim 
institutions as outlined in the Arusha Accords. I begin with a review of the 
issues facing the implementation of the peace accords under the aegis of an 
international humanitarian intervention and an assessment of the particular 
challenges in Rwanda at this historic juncture. I then look at the recrudes-
cence of violence, intraparty negotiations on the edge of the abyss, the ne-
gotiating seesaw that nearly broke the impasse, and finally the determined 
interventions of the United Nations and bilateral partners in the weeks of 
February and March 1994. But on April 6, someone shot down the president’s 




Could the carefully knit tissue of the accords envelop Rwanda’s divided 
polity? Could the accord’s unraveling be stopped? Answers would have to 
engage these issues.
 What is the role of external force in any peace process engaging the intervention 
of international actors? How critical is the coordination of negotiating initia-
tives with appropriate deployment of military observers, border monitors, 
or an interposition force?2
 How do changing modes of diplomatic intercourse impinge on the effectiveness 
of international intervention? Which works best, bilateral suasion from near 
neighbors, bilateral demarches from development partners, conference ne-
gotiations in the presence of the above, or a full-fledged UN mission with 
accompanying peacekeepers? Or did we need all three at different stages in 
the conflict?3
 What is the constraining power of a peace accord, negotiated by two hostile par-
ties and certified by neighboring states and regional bodies? A cardinal principle in 
international politics is that an agreement once entered into will be kept.4 
But what if the agreement does not represent major parts of the body poli-
tic, which was the case in Rwanda?
 When in an implementation mire, should international interveners change tac-
tics to get out of the mess? Once engaged, can interveners disown a peace pro-
cess? The common assumption in resolution literature is that mediators go 
into a conflict with a commitment to see it through.5 But should mediators 
change strategies or tactics if negotiated formulas are not working?
 What are the limitations to diplomatic suasion or coercive inducements in an 
intractable conflict? If interveners have to use heavy pressure to gain nominal 
adherence to an agreement (a signature on the sly), is a durable solution 
within sight? When is a move from peacekeeping to peacemaking in order? 
Should UNAMIR have come in more heavily loaded?6
The Danger of Failure, the Challenge of Success
 There was no gainsaying the stakes involved in moving through Rwan-
da’s transition process. It was not simply a matter of setting up a government, 
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where executive power was to rest, or installing a national assembly, where 
the laws establishing the new order were to be adopted. The institution 
of a transitional presidency, when Juvénal Habyarimana was sworn in as 
transitional president under the Arusha Accords on January 4, 1994, did 
not guarantee success of the peace process. Failure to complete installation 
of the transition institutions was but symptomatic of a larger danger. Any 
turn away from the Arusha process would entail violent confrontation. It 
was also true that the very dynamics of the political situation in Rwanda 
pointed toward the possibility of civilian targeting, using mass atrocities as 
an instrument of war. The situation in Rwanda in many respects matched 
what scholars had established as a profile for genocidal potential.7
 Since the advent of the insurgency and civil war in 1990, Radio Mille 
Collines and other Hutu media had fed hatred and suspicion between so-
cial groups by defaming Tutsi as “cockroaches” and “the enemy,” while the 
RPF Radio Muhabura continually demonized the Habyarimana regime. 
The push toward multiparty politics increased anxieties among established 
elite who saw their power and privilege challenged. Furthermore, under 
the Habyarimana regime, the state dictated law and monopolized justice; 
but the development of indigenous human rights organizations threatened 
that monopoly and the traditional pattern of executive justice.
 After twenty years of rule, the Habyarimana regime had lost its ca-
pacity to control the course of politics. But, notwithstanding the demo-
cratic rhetoric of emergent civil society and the advent of multiparty 
politics, opposition factions and the RPF were reluctant to ground their 
negotiated agreement in any election, popular referendum, or exercise in 
consensus building. The people were left out of the Arusha equations; the 
accords were self-serving arrangements among elites.
 Diplomatic Observers were cognizant of these fault lines. One could 
not participate at negotiations in Arusha or talk to parties in Kigali with-
out sensing the deep animosities and mistrust that were subtexts of the 
talks. During the heated discussions on power sharing at Arusha in Oc-
tober 1992, I had reminded both sides that the alternative to accommoda-
tion and compromise could well be a take-it-all attitude accompanied by 
genocide, the effort to eliminate the other. The Belgian and French diplo-
matic missions, with intelligence networks on the ground, were privately 
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pessimistic about the possibility of peace but publicly totally committed to 
multilateral support for the Arusha peace process.
 Even the Convener (OAU) and the Facilitator (Tanzania) voiced doubts 
about intentions on either side. During the post-accords implementation 
efforts, the Observers continually argued that backing away from peace 
would bring disastrous war and great human suffering. Installation of the 
Arusha institutions seemed like the only way to avoid social cataclysm.
 There were hopeful signs. The parties had negotiated a power-sharing 
agreement in apparent good faith; had begun to plan the disarmament, 
demobilization, and integration of hostile armies; had jointly appealed for 
international help to accompany their peace process; and were at the very 
point of starting the transition. In Rwanda, interveners would ignore the 
worst-case scenario—social disintegration leading to genocide—and press 
forward toward the best option, namely, peaceful installation of a viable 
transition regime.8
getting to unamir
 Those accords called for an international neutral force that would ac-
company the peace process. But the accords did not specify who would field 
that force. The United Nations was noticeably absent from both the July 
1992 ceasefire arrangements and the follow-on political negotiations. The 
OAU secretary general did not inform the UN secretary general Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali of the ceasefire agreement and the subsequent Joint Politi-
cal Military Committee meeting until a fortnight after the events. For his 
part, Boutros-Ghali was content with a note of congratulations to the par-
ties, citing “the constructive approach that has been taken at the regional 
level and the important agreements which have resulted.”9 The UN would 
continue to stand aside until early 1993, when a governmental stall on nego-
tiations and ethnic violence against Tutsi in Rwanda brought an RPF at-
tack along the ceasefire line. As the RPF moved to within forty kilometers 
of Kigali, France reinforced its contingent and, with high-level diplomacy, 
convinced Habyarimana to return to the political negotiations. The UN 
sent a mission to urge the Front back to the conference table.10
 At the March 5 summit meeting in Dar es Salaam, the RPF agreed to 
return to their former lines if the Rwandan government would negotiate 
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in good faith and if French forces were withdrawn in favor of a “neutral 
international force.” Parties and donors debated the nature and provenance 
of that force. The Rwandan government, upset by the Neutral Military 
Observer Group’s (NMOG) failure to deter the RPF attack, favored a 
UN-led force.11 The RPF felt that the NMOG had been doing its job 
adequately and only needed reinforcement to patrol the now-expanded de-
militarized zone.12 France wanted an expanded force in the demilitarized 
zone as soon as possible and a reliable, robust force in place in Kigali before 
it would honor its commitment to withdraw.13 Belgium, having withdrawn 
its ambassador in January in protest of the Habyarimana regime’s human 
rights violations, was focused on protection of civilian populations, which 
meant “blue helmets.”14 The United States strongly favored reinforcing the 
OAU contingent with UN experts and expanding the NMOG’s moni-
toring mandate to include security functions.15 Such action would use the 
Rwandan experience as a training ground for OAU peacekeepers, support 
“African solutions to African problems,” and keep peacekeeping costs down.
 UN officials, engaged in the Rwanda crisis for the first time at the 
March 5 ceasefire meetings in Dar es Salaam, repeatedly affirmed that the 
United Nations had no intention of supplanting the OAU in this peace 
process. However, the UN was being dragged in the back door. In March, 
France proposed to the Security Council an international monitoring force 
for the Uganda-Rwanda border. Having secured a request from the gov-
ernments of Uganda and Rwanda for such a force, French diplomats fi-
nally convinced the United States to go along with the idea. Thus, under 
instructions from the Security Council, the secretary general had a good-
will/reconnaissance mission in the area as political negotiations at Arusha 
resumed. By June 22, France won Security Council approval of its reso-
lution proposing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
(UNOMUR).16
 Neither the United Nations nor the OAU was enthusiastic about a 
partnership in promoting the peace process within Rwanda. In early April, 
UN Secretariat officials, like General Baril, were openly contemplating 
modalities of UN assistance to the OAU. On April 30, however, Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali turned back a trilateral demarche of the French, 
Belgian, and US ambassadors for accelerated UN cooperation with the 
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OAU. The secretary general characterized the OAU as “inexperienced, 
corrupt, incompetent, and lacking in funds.” He later refused “to send a 
single observer” to Rwanda until the Peace Agreement was signed or even 
to launch a reconnaissance mission.17
 On the other hand, OAU secretary general Salim, after the March 5 
agreement renewing the ceasefire, campaigned for UN funding and tech-
nical assistance for an augmented OAU presence in Rwanda. But, he was 
not willing to have the OAU operating in Rwanda under a UN mandate 
and was “categorical in rejecting UN command of the OAU Neutral Mili-
tary Observer Group.”18 However, the OAU’s inability to expand its role in 
Rwanda was obvious to all; despite continuing pleas, there was no signifi-
cant augmentation of the OAU observer force until late July. By that time, 
high OAU officials were seriously considering disengagement rather than 
expansion.19
 As political negotiations in Arusha inched their way toward a conclu-
sion, parties to the conflict transmitted to the United Nations on June 14 
a request for stationing of a “neutral international force” in Rwanda upon 
the signing of a peace agreement.20 There was still disagreement about the 
size and mission of the force. The RPF wanted a modest force designed 
to monitor the peace process, assist in integration of forces, and facilitate 
humanitarian assistance.21 The government wanted, as soon as possible, 
a robust force that would provide the same kind of security the French 
troops were giving.22
 Among concerned partners, France most vigorously promoted UN 
engagement in the peace process. The Belgians were agnostic on details, 
convinced of only one thing: Belgium should not participate in the force 
structure. Both the United Kingdom and Russia questioned the necessity 
and the expense of a UN force.23 The United States, as usual, wanted to 
keep the costs down, the numbers low, and the Africans involved. As policy 
makers in Washington were deliberating, they wanted most to know what 
the UN Secretariat and the permanent members of the Security Council 
were thinking about the issue.24
 The UN plan, drafted by General Roméo Dallaire a month after the 
Arusha peace agreement had already been signed, called for a progressive 
deployment of peacekeepers up to a full contingent of twenty-five hundred 
Prelude to Genocide
190
troops. The force structure was to include a mobile company in Kigali, 
with twenty armored personnel carriers and four helicopters, capable of 
reacting quickly with decisive force. Force operations called for continuous 
patrolling of the capital city to keep Kigali as a weapons-free zone.25
 Although the State Department had pressed hard for an early deploy-
ment of the Dallaire reconnaissance mission and a quick report from the sec-
retary general, the US government continued to hedge on a full-fledged UN 
peacekeeping mission. Wedded to a mixed OAU/UN peacekeeping pres-
ence, US bureaucracies also debated whether a mission to Rwanda met the 
criteria for international peacekeeping being developed under presidential 
directive (PRD13/PDD25). In early September, the RPF and the Rwandan 
government launched a joint mission to New York and Washington pleading 
for an early deployment of the neutral force. In a coordinated effort, the Bel-
gian foreign minister wrote Secretary Christopher and the French president 
wrote President Clinton urging US support of a UN force. But it was not 
until October 1 that Ambassador Albright could tell French foreign minister 
Juppé that the United States was “prepared to be supportive of the Rwanda 
resolution.”26 The UN Security Council finally voted to establish the UN 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993.27
 This resolution brought together the three components of an inter-
national peace intervention in Rwanda: UNOMUR observers on the 
Ugandan-Rwandan border, the OAU observers in the demilitarized zone, 
and the security contingent soon to arrive as a “neutral international force.” 
The secretary general appointed General Dallaire as commander of the 
integrated force and former Cameroonian foreign minister Jacques-Roger 
Booh-Booh as special representative. Meanwhile, after the signing of the 
Arusha Accords on August 5, OAU secretary general Salim Salim, to the 
chagrin of the United States, considered the Rwandan problem to be “in 
the lap of the UN now” and sought to pull the OAU entirely out of the 
peace process.28
A Crescendo of Violence
 As this study has demonstrated, politically motivated violence has 
been a counterpoint to the issues central to political control and ethnic 
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division in Rwanda since before its independence. The failure to bring to 
justice those who perpetrated that violence had created within Rwanda a 
“culture of impunity.” Moreover, the short-term success in using violence 
to intimidate social and political opponents throughout Rwanda’s history 
underscored its utility in achieving political objectives.
a tentative  calm
 Once negotiations were restored by the March 5 summit, however, 
the period from then to the signing of the accords was a relatively qui-
escent one. There were no significant party demonstrations; the usually 
rambunctious CDR was holding its tongue, and street violence seemed to 
fall away. There were, however, two assassinations that stirred the internal 
peace. The first was that of Emanuel Gapyisi of Gitarama, a leader in the 
MDR and son-in-law of the party founder, President Kayibanda. He had 
lost out in the 1992 election for party president to his brother-in-law, 
Faustin Twagiramungu, but had organized an interparty forum, Peace 
and Democracy, dedicated to opposing both the Patriotic Front and the 
presidential regime. In May, he was assassinated by automatic weapons 
as he left his house. In August, Felix Rwambuka, a former burgomaster, 
was killed by a grenade thrown in his house. The perpetrators in both 
killings were never identified, despite the government protests that they 
were developing good leads. Rumors varied: some blamed the RPF, some 
talked of revenge killings for financial dealings, and some suggested the 
elimination of political rivals by others within the MDR, possibly even 
the prime minister-designate.29
 After the Arusha Accords were signed, Rwandans lived for a while 
within a euphoric culture of peace, hoping for the rapid institution of a 
new order. By mid-August, the US embassy was reporting that political 
youth were quiet; the Hutu extremist CDR party had kept a low profile 
since the RPF’s February offensive, even though “the availability of guns 
and grenades does nothing to reduce anxiety on this point.”30 MRND 
president Ngirumpatse was assuring embassy officials that the party 
youth, the Interahamwe, were now under control. He did not anticipate 
“any further violence at their hands.”31 Meanwhile, while the MRND was 
holding together as it named ministers to cabinet and deputies to the 
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national assembly, splits within the MDR and the Liberal Party deepened. 
As usual, the RPF showed strong cohesiveness as it planned to become an 
internal actor in cabinet and legislature.32
 By early September, when decisions on a neutral international force 
were stalled, the government and the RPF decided jointly to carry out 
some international diplomacy, pushing for the force’s early deployment.33 
On September 22, leaders of the Rwandan Government Army and the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army met under the chairmanship of Minister of 
Defense Bizimana in an important “confidence building” measure seeking 
to maintain the momentum of the Arusha Accords. The leaders planned 
more meetings and interforce sporting events.34 But, by the end of the 
month, through its spokespersons in Kampala, the RPF expressed concern 
about keeping the post-Arusha peace process on track, arguing that Presi-
dent Habyarimana, by encouraging intraparty splits, was undermining the 
spirit of the accords.35
reshuffling the deck
 On October 21, Tutsi military officers in Burundi assassinated the 
newly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, and attempted to take 
over the government. The Burundian assassination and attempted coup 
quickly changed the political atmosphere in Kigali. Meetings in Kigali de-
crying the event were, by their very nature, rallying calls to ethnic identity. 
Street demonstrations brought out politically active youth groups, who 
took advantage of the crisis to sack and pillage. Although the MRND 
and CDR refused to support an early November demonstration by MDR 
hardliners, the US embassy concluded that “it’s still too early to judge 
whether this aborted confrontation will lead to renewed efforts at recon-
ciliation . . . or more confrontation.”36
 Party divisions contributed to insecurity. Having failed to make more 
political capital out of the Burundi crisis, CDR officials sent open letters 
on November 4 and November 8 to the president protesting the choice 
of Belgium as one of the troop contributors to UNAMIR. Meanwhile, 
MDR hardliners sent a letter to the president threatening chaos if he did 
not remove Twagiramungu as prime minister-designate, challenging RPF’s 
right to bring troops into the capital city, and calling for a reopening of 
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negotiations on Arusha articles before the broad-based government was 
installed. The US embassy concluded,
There is a determined group of Hutu supremists [sic] whose fear 
of potential Tutsi domination is the . . . only political factor of 
significance. These people have been unreconciled to the Arusha 
Accords from the beginning and now are groping for an effective 
means of derailing the Accord which offers an honorable place 
for Tutsi in Rwandan society. First, they tried to exploit the 
Burundi tragedy to unite Hutus behind them in Rwanda. . . . Now 
the tactic was to go after the Belgians hoping to exploit post-
colonial antipathies. . . . Should they succeed in substantially 
delaying UNAMIR, they may have a chance to unravel the whole 
process.37
 Concrete acts of sabotage were not far behind. On November 16, the 
public prosecutor of the Kigali Appeals Court, Alphonse Nkubito, was 
attacked with grenades as he returned home. He managed to get behind 
a door and suffered only grenade fragments to his back and legs. His car 
was destroyed and windows in his home shattered. As usual, specula-
tions about the reason for the attack varied. Nkubito was the founder 
of Rwanda’s first human rights organization, ARDHO, and president 
of the Human Rights Consortium, CLADHO, both of which had been 
active in publishing reports of human rights abuses and making inter-
ventions on behalf of victims. As prosecutor, he had played a significant 
role in getting Tutsi detainees released from prison in 1991. Shortly be-
fore the incident, Nkubito had ordered preventive detention of Colonel 
Sagatwa’s protégé, a chauffeur accused of fraud in the diversion of relief 
foods. The chauffeur was thought to have known details of the unre-
solved 1988 death of a senior government officer, Colonel Mayuya, which 
might have reflected badly on the presidential household. In all instances, 
the attack could have come at any time. Its perpetration just as elements 
of the accords were coming together suggested “a renegade effort to derail 
the peace process by persons resisting the power-sharing arrangement so 
central to the Arusha Accord.”38
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trouble  in  the demilitarized zone
 On November 17, an attack in localities within the demilitarized zone 
just south of the RPF lines took the lives of some forty persons, several of 
them recently elected local officials. The attack was carried out with auto-
matic weapons, all the victims dying from bullet wounds. This time the 
minister of defense offered a helicopter to the newly arrived UNAMIR 
force commander General Dallaire so he could fly out to investigate the 
incident. Dallaire reported that the raid had been well planned, coming at 
four locations within two hours and leaving no witnesses as whole families 
were wiped out. But Dallaire reported no leads as to perpetrators.
 Once again, the attributions for the raids varied widely. President 
Habyarimana told Ambassador Flaten that he was convinced the RPF had 
carried out the raid and claimed the victims were MRND loyalists. RPF 
commander Kagame denied RPF involvement, as did the RPF radio. 
RPF coordinator Tito Rutaremara claimed the victims were RPF sym-
pathizers and blamed the MRND, who he said had been blocking local 
elections and had an interest in insecurity in the zone.39
 As General Dallaire set up a commission to pursue the investigation 
into the massacres, the minister of defense, who only a month and a half 
before had proudly presided over joint sessions of the two armies, on No-
vember 21 announced the suspension of all meetings and joint commis-
sions with the RPF. While firmly asserting the massacres had been carried 
out by the RPF, the communiqué somewhat inconsistently demanded 
the immediate formation of the broad-based government, punishment of 
those guilty, and an international inquiry into the incident. The communi-
qué also reaffirmed the commitment of the Rwandan armed forces to the 
peace process and its support for the mission of UNAMIR.40
 On November 23, the prime minister announced that the government 
would resume joint sessions with the RPF. In a hotly debated meeting, the 
government had voted unanimously to overturn the minister of defense’s 
unilateral communiqué. The minister seemed to take being overridden in 
good grace, but shortly afterwards, MRND ministers disassociated them-
selves from the government position and refused to participate in talks with 
the RPF. Meanwhile, the original charges that the victims were MRND 
loyalists murdered by the RPF drew increasing skepticism in Kigali. MDR 
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officials in the foreign ministry suggested the perpetrators might have 
been from the CDR, hard-liners from the MRND, or members of Inter-
ahamwe, “suspected of having presidential guard and gendarmes secretly 
among its ranks.”41
 On November 25, Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana convoked the dean 
of the diplomatic corps, Monsignor Bertello, and requested that the West-
ern diplomats make a demarche to the president “to take steps to lower ten-
sions both in the army and in the country.” The diplomats agreed that the 
security situation was deteriorating but that “rapid formation of the next 
government was the key to improving the security situation.” The head of 
the EEC delegation offered to use the occasion of a call on the president 
during a high-level visit from Brussels to underscore concerns of humani-
tarian agencies about insecurity in the DMZ.42
 No sooner had UNAMIR announced its “Committee of Inquiry” into 
the Ruhengeri atrocities than a nighttime firefight broke out at Kabatwa 
north of Mutara near the Visoke (mountain gorilla) Park and outside the 
demilitarized zone. The government blamed RPF aggression, while the 
RPF said the government was trying to provoke an incident. UNAMIR 
commander Dallaire went north to investigate the incident, as did gov-
ernment authorities. While there had clearly been troop movements on 
both sides in the area, it remained unclear what the firing was all about. 
Meanwhile, a Belgian Red Cross truck hit a mine, killing driver and pas-
senger and stopping Red Cross assistance deliveries in the demilitarized 
zone. A Rwandan health agent of Médecins du Monde was murdered near 
Byumba, which prompted the removal of that agency from the north. A 
booby-trapped franc note was set off in a schoolyard, killing seventeen chil-
dren; in a nearby school, a grenade was found and defused by the military.
 The intimidation and arrest of persons considered to be RPF support-
ers continued. A Tutsi judge of the Kibungu regional court received several 
death threats in December. During the week of December 22, the public 
prosecutor released five persons whom the military had put in the Kigali 
prison. Arrests and beatings reportedly took place in the north among the 
traditional Bagogwe herdsmen who pastured their cattle near the area of 
the November massacres. Some in the military were apparently continuing 
to prosecute the war after the peace agreement had been signed.43
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 In the capital, however, officials did not reflect the insecurity and anxi-
eties that these incidents caused in the north and west; planning by the gov-
ernment and the RPF on demobilization went ahead as scheduled, as did 
donor meetings with both camps on the same subject.44 What did make 
the capital nervous were UNAMIR’s preparations to bring into Kigali an 
RPA battalion to protect RPF officials. In late July at Kinihira, final, hur-
ried negotiations had agreed to the presence of an RPF defensive battalion 
in Kigali. By mid-December, the location for this battalion was still up in 
the air. UNAMIR proposed Camp Kami, seven miles out of town, but 
eventually the government agreed to put the RPF force in the hotel com-
plex connected to the CND, the national assembly. But Radio RTLM con-
ducted a “man in the street” interview in which “people” reported that “they 
considered housing the RPF in the national assembly complex a threat to 
democracy and to the independence of the legislature.”45
 Finally, rumors were rife of party youth becoming militarized. Party 
officials denied that MRND youth, the Interahamwe, were engaged in 
“counterproductive activities,” but human rights groups claimed that the 
Interahamwe were being deployed throughout the country and creating a 
climate of insecurity. Human rights advocates also asserted that the Rwan-
dan military were training Interahamwe in remote military camps.46 While 
other party youth had been responsible for thuggery and intimidation on 
behalf of their presumed cause, the Interahamwe was now being seen as 
a quasi-official third force. As spokespersons kept promising the instal-
lation of the new government, there emerged an autonomous and violent 
substructure, which the government could not control (witness the prime 
minister’s appeal to Western ambassadors) and which the president chose 
not to deter. If neither the cabinet, with its respective ministries, nor the 
presidency could insure security for the transition, then the neutral inter-
national force in the form of UNAMIR would have to do it.
the UN resp onse  to securit y  challenges
 On December 13, the special representative of the secretary general, 
Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, convoked the diplomatic corps to hear 
UNAMIR force commander General Dallaire, Kigali sector commander 
Colonel Marchal, and the UN security officer discuss security and outline 
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plans for UNAMIR deployment. General Dallaire reported that twelve 
hundred troops would be in Rwanda when the broad-based government 
was installed. Working-level negotiations on rationalizing the demilita-
rized zone, on troop assembly points, and on heavy weapons cantonment 
were to begin in two days. Colonel Marchal said that UNAMIR would 
establish an arms-secure zone in Kigali and the surrounding ten-kilometer 
radius “by controlling the movement of all arms and ammunition within 
the zone.” Both sides were to notify UNAMIR of numbers of personnel, 
types of weapons, and troop movements. In response to questions, the 
officers admitted that security for the international community was “a 
concern but not top priority for UNAMIR.” UNAMIR would be mak-
ing random patrols twenty-four hours a day, and police monitors would 
be working with local gendarmerie units. UNAMIR’s focus was on “reduc-
ing tensions of any kind.”47
 In a December 17 meeting with embassy security officers, UNAMIR 
staff expanded on their plan of action. Effective December 20, all weapons 
in the “Kigali Weapons-safe Area” were to be under direct UN control. 
Within this zone, eight hundred peacekeepers and eighty military ob-
servers would be responsible for security matters. The contending forces 
were not to move around the city or maintain roadblocks anywhere in the 
city. Movements of more than ten soldiers were to be under UN escort. 
UN observers, escorted by peacekeepers, would rove the city and monitor 
ammunition and weapons stockpiles. According to Colonel Nazrul, the 
UNAMIR operations officer, peacekeepers could fire if anyone seriously 
threatened bodily harm to them or the observers but not if the attack was 
against another Rwandan party. Colonel Marchal reported that UNAMIR 
was not taking the place of the gendarmerie or police but would work with 
them to assure that they responded to calls in an appropriate manner.48
 The colonels agreed that they were “under no illusion that weapons 
had been cached by both the GOR and RPF as well as by the civilian 
population.”49 UNAMIR would gather intelligence on weapons caches; 
the biggest concern was not weapons held by the military but those in civil-
ian hands, especially youth groups like the Interahamwe. The government 
had sent out a circular to all military commands and prefectures asking 
that all weapons be turned in, but few had been collected. The government 
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had also recently tried to buy back grenades, but the black market in gre-
nades continued to boom.
 While UNAMIR’s plans for dealing with insecurity in the capital city 
and around the country were well designed, effective implementation at 
the local level depended on UNAMIR’s interface with the national gen-
darmerie. This force was poorly trained, slow to react, and politically sus-
pect. In addition, UNAMIR needed better communication, more troops, 
and more materiel. Sector commanders did not have telephonic links with 
each other. Telephone contacts with patrols in the demilitarized zone were 
almost nonexistent. All public inquiries or requests for assistance had to go 
through the overstretched central at UNAMIR headquarters in the Ama-
horo Hotel. Peacekeeper numbers would not be at the desired level until 
the end of December, and that with troops completely unfamiliar with the 
Rwandan physical and social terrain. Only half the observer force was in 
place; some were being redeployed from the fragile demilitarized zone to 
bolster security in Kigali. Only two of five helicopters for air patrols and 
about half of the vehicles for mobile patrols had arrived. At that date there 
were no armored personnel carriers in country, and the reaction company 
had yet to be formed. The officers, in part, blamed these deficiencies on 
budget administration in New York. The Rwanda mission did not have 
high priority; headquarters gave attention to other peacekeeping opera-
tions like Somalia and Yugoslavia.50
At the Edge of Chaos
 As the year drew to a close, both government (through the foreign 
minister) and the UN special representative were announcing the instal-
lation of the transition government on December 29. The prime minister- 
designate had met two times with the president to discuss details of the 
transition ceremonies. One of the issues was who would certify the cor-
rectness of the lists presented by the parties or by party factions. The 
Arusha Accord was not clear on that point, nor could the two leaders come 
to an agreement. Diplomats were skeptical that the institutions could be 
put in place. Long meetings and innumerable informal conversations failed 
to break the impasse in the Liberal Party and in the MDR. Within the 
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Liberal Party, for example, two separate lists of deputies held only one 
name in common, and different candidates were named for the ministe-
rial slots. Particularly contentious was Justin Mugenzi’s determination to 
make his colleague, Agnes Ntamabyaliro, the new minister of justice. The 
other side of the party considered her a hard-nosed Hutu supremacist; 
having her in that office would deny Tutsi the new day of equity and justice 
they had so desired. Mugenzi pointed out that Ms. Ntamabyaliro was the 
most experienced civil servant within Liberal Party ranks and deserved the 
prestigious seat.
 Within the MDR, there were some differences in the choice of depu-
ties, but the main fight was over ministerial seats. The prime minister-
designate called for party reconciliation first before ministerial slots were 
handed out; reconciliation obviously meant that party leaders would ac-
cept Twagiramungu back into the party as president and agree that he 
was legitimately designated as interim prime minister. Twagiramungu in-
tended to eliminate from the government not only the MDR hard-liners, 
like Murego and Karamira, but also party leaders who had the political 
base to challenge his authority, such as former minister of foreign affairs 
Ngulinzira and Twagiramungu’s personal rival, former prime minister 
Nsengiyaremye. Diplomats could not see how Twagiramungu could install 
a government that excluded all the potential ministers in the Nsengiyare-
mye faction of the prime minister’s own party.51
stalemate
 The diplomats were right. December 29 came and went without an 
installation ceremony. On January 5, however, perhaps remembering the 
warning of the EU delegation about the UN Security Council review, the 
installation ceremonies began when President Juvénal Habyarimana was 
sworn into office as the president for the transition period of two years. 
But when the ceremony was held for installing the interim national assem-
bly, prior to swearing in of the government, chaos broke out. Two sets of 
deputies showed up. Police providing security for the event admitted some 
but not others. Finally, the president of the Constitutional Court cancelled 
the ceremony. Neither side had been able to bluff its way into an ad hoc 
acceptance of its lists.52
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 A day later, my wife Sandra and I arrived in Kigali, where I was to take 
up my duties as the next US ambassador to Rwanda. I was met, not by the 
usual protocol officer, but by Habyarimana’s political counselor, Ambassa-
dor Juvénal Renzaho. He explained that indeed the new transitional order 
had been launched with the inauguration of the president, but that there 
had been some “slight problems” with the establishment of the assembly 
and the government. I suggested that no doubt Rwandan political genius 
had found ways to create obstacles and that same genius would find a way 
around the obstacles.
 Thus began a period of most intense diplomatic engagement in try-
ing to pressure all sides into installing the institutions agreed upon in 
the Arusha Accords. The diplomatic community now engaged fully in 
rescuing the Arusha peace process. The activity took place around three 
groups: the papal nuncio leading the entire diplomatic corps; the West-
ern Observer group of France, Belgium, the United States, and Germany, 
sometimes associating Switzerland and Canada as major donors; and the 
continuing efforts of representatives of the Tanzania Facilitator, often 
working in tandem with the UN political office.
 The difficulties facing diplomatic initiatives became apparent on 
Saturday, January 8, when young gangs, intending to stop a second try 
at installing the assembly and government, blockaded a major crossroads 
between central Kigali and the airport. Depending on party or ethnic 
identity, some drivers were allowed to pass, whereas others, including 
prominent personalities of the opposition, were stopped and turned 
around. In some cases, occupants were taken from their cars and beaten, 
and the cars were trashed. The ability to obstruct this intersection just 
below the RPF headquarters and right by the presidential guard camp 
demonstrated the potential of street power. Witnesses claimed that mili-
tary personnel in civilian clothing were among the “protesters.” Neither 
the gendarmerie under the titular authority of the seated prime minister 
nor the UNAMIR forces were able to clear the area for several hours. 
Due at the government house for presentation of my credentials to Presi-
dent Habyarimana, I had to be extricated from our residence by presi-
dential guards in a speeding convoy. Clearly the country (or at least its 
capital city) was headed for chaos.53
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 Efforts through the government, the prime minister’s office, the presi-
dency, and the prime minister-designate failed to reorganize the installa-
tion ceremonies. Once again, as he had done in the November–December 
crisis in 1992, the papal nuncio took a lead role. He divided the diplomatic 
corps in teams. Some were to go to the RPF, some to the president, some 
to the current prime minister, and some to the prime minister-designate. 
Each team listened to the point of view of its interlocutor on the current 
crisis and then, in common language, urged dialogue, compromise, and an 
early establishment of the institutions. The president asked that, when the 
diplomatic round-robin was complete, the group might return to give him 
a readout on what it had found.54
the militia  threat
 Even as the diplomats were completing their rounds, UN special rep-
resentative Booh-Booh convoked the French, Belgian, and US ambassa-
dors and asked our support on a security demarche that, on instructions 
from UN headquarters, he was to carry to the president. General Dallaire 
gave us the background. The prime minister-designate had put him in 
touch with an informant, a member of the MRND Interahamwe militia. 
The informant’s role was to pass out arms from a cache in Kigali. Tired of 
his subversive task, he wished the UN to know where the arms were kept 
and how they were being distributed. The informant also wanted the UN 
to know that during the January 8 roadblock, demonstrators “were to have 
roughed up Belgian soldiers responding to the event as a way of further 
disturbing the peace, provoking an RPF reaction, and launching a militia-
led counter-reaction.” Sensing the possibility of a diplomatic or military 
trap, the UN officers had sought guidance from headquarters.55
 The guidance from headquarters was clear. General Dallaire was to 
take no action before Booh-Booh met with the president. Booh-Booh was 
to review his demarche with the ambassadors prior to delivering it and 
seek their subsequent support in bringing the issue to the president’s at-
tention. In his demarche, the special representative of the secretary general 
(SRSG) was to do the following:
•	 Apprise	the	president	of	the	UN’s	concern	over	solid	evidence	that	




establishment of an arms-secure zone in Kigali.
•	 Ask	that	the	president	within	forty-eight	hours	inform	the	United	
Nations of how he intended to retract the arms distributed and 
dismantle the militia apparatus within Kigali.
•	 Record	that	any	violence	carried	out	in	Kigali	would	be	fully	reported	
to the Security Council and publicized in the world press.56
 The ambassadors agreed to seek instructions from their governments 
and, if so instructed, make a joint demarche on the president on secu-
rity issues. The diplomats urged that the forty-eight-hour ultimatum be 
couched in a larger context of expected Interahamwe demonstrations on 
January 15. The president should be forcefully reminded of the Arusha 
provisions for an arms-secure Kigali and told that Interahamwe demon-
strations undermine current effort to bring about peace by implementing 
the accords.57
diplomatic  resp onse
 The Department of State agreed that the UN demarche merited sup-
port and found the proposed language of the joint demarche “right on the 
mark,” except that the third point was broadened to note that “security can 
best be achieved if all parties work together and abide by the peace accords 
and leave security to the UN and, ultimately, to the integrated security 
forces.” With instructions in hand, the ambassadors sought a meeting with 
the president.58 Meanwhile, the papal nuncio, having reviewed with the 
diplomatic corps the political situation in light of the demarches made on 
the major parties, decided to visit the president again, this time to impress 
on him the urgency of the security situation.
 In the meeting with Habyarimana, the nuncio reported on the dip-
lomatic round-robin and urged the president to play his role as leader of 
the transition institutions in breaking the impasse. Then, the nuncio pre-
sented on behalf of the entire diplomatic corps the elements of what was 
to have been a Western demarche. Each of the three Western “Observers” 
added a point of emphasis: the French chargé called for a public statement 
renouncing violence and calling for reconciliation; I noted how political 
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competition was now erupting outside of any framework and threatened 
the destruction of state legitimacy and control; the Belgian ambassador 
summarized concerns about the distribution of arms and the militarizing 
of youth organizations. The president expressed surprise at the diplomats’ 
allegations and said he would see what he could do. Then he called in his 
director of cabinet and whispered some instructions.59
 Meeting to review the situation, the Belgian and French ambassadors 
and I agreed that our demarche, while not trilateral, had more effect for 
being carried out within a broad-based diplomatic presentation. Since 
any further representations to the president would be counterproduc-
tive, we would wait and see if the president kept his promise to deal 
with the situation. In a follow-on meeting with the UN SRSG and force 
commander, we learned that the UN informant proved his bona fides as 
an insider by reporting back the content of the SRSG’s meeting with the 
president, and by giving specific details on arms locations and on orders to 
hurry up distribution.
 However, General Dallaire reported that his current orders would not 
allow him to carry out any operation against those caches. SRSG Booh-
Booh said that the president “had promised to set up an investigation into 
the security question, especially the distribution of arms and report back.” 
If Habyarimana failed to do so, Booh-Booh would so report to the secre-
tary general, who might then apprise the Security Council. The secretary 
general had made his own pitch to the president in a telephone conver-
sation in which he expressed deep concern over the security situation 
as well as the lack of progress in installing the Broad-based Transitional 
Government.60
 In a follow-up to these initiatives, the UN decided to brief Security 
Council members on what had been transpiring. As Western ambassadors 
in Kigali were being asked to take the lead in pressing for a political solu-
tion, UN Peacekeeping Office’s Hédi Annabi gave UN political officers a 
less-than-accurate account of the political stalemate and militarization of 
youth groups. Annabi reported that, in response to the reports that Presi-
dent Habyarimana’s militia were receiving arms, “General Dallaire planned 
a very aggressive demarche to the president; UN officials, however, con-
vinced Dallaire that a more subtle approach might be more effective at this 
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time. Accordingly, a few weeks ago, Dallaire simply discussed his concern 
with the president. Although the president denied involvement in such 
events, apparently he noted and was impressed by the General’s concern.”61
 In this innocuous brief, Annabi dissimulated regarding a direct chal-
lenge to UNAMIR authority in Rwanda and a major imbroglio within the 
UN peacekeeping office. He then requested that the “Friends of Rwanda” 
(Belgium, France, and the United States) take a more active role in bro-
kering the current stalemate, and “thereby avoid having to bring it to the 
Security Council.”62 All this might seem regular enough. After all, there 
was nothing extraordinary about General Dallaire raising concerns with 
President Habyarimana (except that it was SRSG Booh-Booh who did 
so); and Dallaire had not proposed an aggressive demarche but a raid on 
an arms cache. There was, moreover, nothing unusual about resident dip-
lomats weighing in on the peace process (they had been doing that for two 
years), nor about resolving crises at a local level without contentious Secu-
rity Council debate (except that it was precisely the Security Council’s role 
to hear of this crisis and review UN actions in that regard.) The briefing 
rather covered over the failure of the UN first to address the security issue, 
then to get anything more than a commission of inquiry out of President 
Habyarimana, and finally to have no political strategy for moving forward 
in installing the institutions. The bilateral diplomatic leaders, who had 
been on the sidelines since the UN took the field, were now being asked to 
take over the play and push the ball forward.
 Lessening of street violence and a renewed dialogue between the presi-
dent’s men and the other parties seemed to be the result of the mid-January 
demarches by the SRSG and the ambassadors. On January 26, however, 
violence had again raised its ugly head. At a provocative demonstration in 
front of the CND where RPF forces were headquartered, someone fired 
shots. No one was injured, and the source of the firing was not confirmed. 
This demonstration seemed to be related to similar demonstrations on 
January 23 and 25, all thought to be by “Interahamwe-related” youth. Things 
then calmed down for almost a month. But on February 20, an MDR- 
Hutu power faction blocked from holding a demonstration turned to rioting; 
the next day the CDR protested its lack of access to the Arusha Code of 
Ethics in front of the foreign ministry and offices of the high court.63
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a  minister assassinated
 That night, gunmen, waiting in ambush, assassinated the minister of 
public works and president of the PSD, Félicien Gatabazi, as he returned 
to his home from a political meeting. The brutal elimination of a high-level 
political personality shocked the Kigali community. Moreover, because he 
played a swing role in the internal opposition and was thought to be dis-
enchanted with the RPF’s stonewalling as well as with Twagiramungu’s 
leadership, he was a possible target of the political right, the political cen-
ter, and the RPF. The Radio Mille Collines blamed Twagiramungu for or-
ganizing the assassination, which immediately led some to suspect a death 
squad in the pay of Hutu extremists, possibly the CDR. Others claimed 
that only the RPF had the skills and weapons for such a well-executed 
ambush. UNAMIR, which was supposed to be protecting political per-
sonalities, could come up with no leads.
 Meanwhile, the founder of the CDR, Martin Bucyana, was on the 
road north from political campaigning in Gikongoro through Butare back 
to Kigali. North of Butare, in PSD heartland, he was recognized by PSD 
partisans. As if to demonstrate that the right had no monopoly on vio-
lence and bloody mindedness, the incensed PSD crowd lynched the CDR 
president. In reprisal, CDR gangs went out against PSD sympathizers in 
Kigali and against Tutsi neighborhoods. Local authorities imposed cur-
fews; UNAMIR forces, working with the gendarmerie, were finally able to 
restore order two days later.64
 On February 23, Rwandan clergy and government officials conducted 
Minister Gatabazi’s funeral service in solemn dignity. High-level represen-
tatives from all political parties, the RPF, the presidency, and the chiefs of 
mission of France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States attended 
the funeral mass in the southern university town of Butare. Organizers, 
smoothly handling an overflow crowd, demonstrated Rwandans’ capacity 
to do things right if they so desired. The ceremony also showed how much 
of Rwandan society remained intact. As I reported, “The gendarmerie 
smartly performed its policing role, the army provided an honor company, 
politicians of all stripes participated in the ceremonies. The mass was led 
by a Tutsi bishop who had been Gatabazi’s teacher many years ago and 




 We go back in this story to the failed installation ceremonies of Janu-
ary 5, 1993, which stirred embassies to incessant meetings with party of-
ficials and formal diplomatic interventions with leadership on both sides. 
Headquarters of Observer states were concerned as well. At a trilateral 
meeting in Paris on January 23, George Moose, the assistant secretary 
of state for African affairs, reviewed events in Central Africa with Lode 
Willems, chief of cabinet in the Belgian prime minister’s office, and Jean-
Marc de La Sablière, director of African affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. The 
officials agreed that implementation of the accords had been blocked by 
“political squabbling”; strong internal divisions within the parties further 
complicated the process. The representatives expressed concern that the 
stalemate might well exacerbate ethnic tensions; the assassination of the 
Hutu Burundian president in October at the hands of Tutsi military had 
weighed heavily on President Habyarimana’s mind and circumscribed 
his strategy. Habyarimana was concerned as well that “the Liberal Party 
will reopen questions about past government human rights abuses, es-
pecially if it receives the post of Minister of Justice in the transition gov-
ernment.”66 It was agreed that the three countries would again consider 
approaching the Rwandan government, the parties, and the RPF, “urging 
that they accelerate efforts to resolve their differences.” Assistant Secre-
tary Moose suggested having the Tanzanian ambassador, in his country’s 
role as Facilitator of the Arusha talks, bring the parties together to iron 
out differences. Others noted the importance of not undercutting SRSG 
Booh-Booh’s effort.67
a new demarche
 By January 28, the Department of State had issued instructions for a 
trilateral demarche to the president, the RPF leadership, the prime min-
isters, and leaders of all major parties.68 Other headquarters followed suit 
with similar talking points. It was February 11, however, before the chiefs of 
mission of the three states and the German ambassador (one of the Ob-
servers and chairman for six months of the European group) could jointly 
meet with President Habyarimana.
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 In the demarche, the German ambassador spoke for the Europeans in 
saying that the time was long overdue for setting up the institutions; if the 
Liberal Party could not get its act together, it should step aside. The French 
ambassador inquired why the “Code of Good Conduct,” which Habyari-
mana had wanted as a complement to the accords, was never even tabled by 
the president’s party. I reported a new flexibility on the part of the RPF as a 
result of Chairman Kanyarengwe’s meetings in Washington and urged that 
the opportunity for compromise be seized. I also noted that most other par-
ties were willing to go ahead with the installation, even without a common 
Liberal Party list; the MRND seemed to be the only recalcitrant voice and 
was being seen as such by the Rwandan people and outside observers. The 
Belgian ambassador reinforced previous comments and noted that former 
Belgian prime minister Maartens, now visiting Rwanda, would be pressing 
on the RPF the “same urgency, tolerance, and openness to compromise that 
the ambassadors were urging on the president.” Habyarimana questioned 
whether most parties did, in fact, favor going ahead with installing the in-
stitutions and gave a detailed explanation of the schisms within the Liberal 
Party. He recognized the pressure to install the institutions on February 14 
but said he wanted to have issues settled first and avoid the circus atmo-
sphere of the last failed installation on January 5.69
 In the week of February 8, SRSG Booh-Booh had brought together the 
contending parties in marathon sessions on Tuesday and Thursday; there were 
negotiations as well within the Liberal Party on Tuesday and Wednesday. 
While Booh-Booh had characterized the meetings as “constructive,” presiden-
tial cabinet director Ruhigira said the meetings were intense and confronta-
tional. The meetings did not, however, lead to installation on Sunday, February 
14, as Booh-Booh had hoped. Rather, perhaps stirred by the ambassadors’ 
prompting, the MRND had presented to the SRSG their draft of a “gentle-
men’s agreement” that it wanted all parties to sign as a prelude to installation 
of the interim institutions. Booh-Booh distributed the draft to the parties and 
convened a meeting at 3 p.m. on Sunday. By 5 p.m. only part of the parties 
had showed up. In frustration, the SRSG curtly dismissed the meeting with a 
sound scolding of those present for their dilatory approach to peace.
 On Monday, party leaders nursed bruised egos in their several camps, 
and the RPF said they were willing to discuss the “gentlemen’s agreement” 
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if all other issues were put aside. They invited Observers to a meeting con-
vened by the prime minister-designate on February 16. Other diplomats 
were reluctant to grace a meeting convened outside the UN framework 
and with an uncertain agenda, but I argued for supporting the prime min-
ister’s efforts.
 Meanwhile, I had invited all party and faction leaders to a breakfast at the 
US residence on February 15 to hear the South African evangelist Michael 
Cassidy talk about the South African peace process, in which he had played a 
vital role. The breakfast produced lawn conversations between the RPF and 
the MRND, between factions of the MDR and the PL, and among other 
parties. Later that morning, both factions of the Liberal Party contacted me 
regarding elements of a compromise in the deputies and ministerial lists. 
Discussions on this compromise went on throughout the afternoon, with 
the parties separated by one deputy and one ministerial seat.70
 On February 16, I found I was wrong about supporting the prime 
minister-designate at his morning meeting. There was no sign of new 
beginnings: no MDR members were present other than the two prime 
ministers, Mugenzi and his cohorts were missing, and the MRND did 
not show. Despite the ambassadors’ request for an unpublicized event, 
television cameras were there, and those engaged in this exercise tried to 
promote a public condemnation for those not attending. The ambassadors 
withdrew, and the “all parties” meeting became a closed-door caucus. On 
the evening of February 16, the parties finally met. The RPF tore apart the 
MRND proposal for a “gentlemen’s agreement,” claiming that all its provi-
sions could already be found in the Arusha Accords. Presidential counselor 
Ruhigira held his own in four hours of debate, claiming that the parties 
need to know that each was going to play the “Arusha game” straight before 
acceding to the installation of institutions. Its provisions on amnesty were 
but a way of clearing the deck for participation of all, including the out-
lawed “armed opposition,” in the new state institutions.71
a us  assessment
 By this time, I had been five weeks in country. As the parties argued, I 
gathered the country team for a review of the situation. The team agreed 




major political forces. SRSG Booh-Booh’s effort to force installation 
on February 14 backfired because he did not have support from a 
major part of the political landscape. The “all-party meeting” on 
February 16 in fact represented a minimal electoral base. Any solution 
that did not include the president’s party and the prime minister’s 
opponents in the MDR was a nonstarter.
•	 There	must	be	cohesion	in	the	international	community.	The	
Rwandans had tried to split the bilateral Observers from the UN 
effort. While multilateral demarches lose that special personal touch, 
which is often the diplomat’s key to persuasion, the formal weight of 
a combined international voice far surpassed any tactical benefit of 
individual bilateral approaches.
•	 The	pace	of	political	compromise	and	acceptance	must	somehow	
catch up with the speed of the international timetable. The peace 
process was moving slowly forward as politicians got to know each 
other’s concerns and ambitions; the UN presence had established a 
transition atmosphere, and the security situation was generally calmer. 
But the country was out of money, international financial institutions 
were out of time, and reassessment of the UN mission was looming.72
 In the light of these principles, the embassy team discounted the pos-
sibility of professional facilitation, an all-parties’ retreat, or renegotiation 
of Arusha elements—there was not time. Similarly, tailored demarches to 
different persons might convince a particular party but would suggest a 
divided international agenda and would not lead to a comprehensive solu-
tion. The embassy did recommend support in the margins for the visit of 
the Belgian foreign minister and the minister of international cooperation, 
for a telephone call from Assistant Secretary Moose to the president and 
prime minister-designate, and for the initiation of informal diplomacy by 
nongovernmental facilitators.73
pro gress  forestalled
 Even as we reviewed our strategy, side negotiations began to break 
down hard lines within the parties. By February 17, elements of a general 
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compromise were in the air; the prime minister would offer two ministries 
to persons in the MDR faction that opposed him (which positions and 
to which persons was not clear). The Liberal Party factions were down 
to haggling about a seven-to-five or a six-to-six split in the national as-
sembly and an argument about which ministerial portfolios each faction 
would get. The MRND would drop its demand for prior commitment to 
a “gentlemen’s agreement.”
 Understandings worked out in these small group meetings were for-
malized at an all-parties’ meeting on February 18. It was still not clear 
whether the RPF would accept compromise within the Liberal Party lists 
as Chairman Kanyarengwe had assured authorities in Washington. The 
public formulation was that of the RPF’s Sendashonga: the RPF consid-
ered the September list the democratic option but would accept whatever 
the Ndasingwa faction agreed to. It was rumored that core RPF policy 
makers were not that flexible. In any case, there was consensus in the Feb-
ruary 18 parties’ meeting that the two factions should work out the exact 
number of national assembly deputies going to each and the number of 
portfolios within government that each would accept. The parties’ meet-
ing also called for installation of these institutions on February 21. After 
months of arguing over national assembly lists, Liberal Party differences 
now seemed to revolve around cabinet seats and whether the minister of 
justice would be Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Mugenzi’s protégé, or a Tutsi from 
the Ndasingwa faction.74
 It was in the context of these hopeful signs of forward movement that 
the minister of public works, Gatabazi, was assassinated just outside his 
home. The assassination froze any progress in breaking the five-month po-
litical impasse and brought back the climate of fear and distrust that had 
dissipated in previous weeks of serious negotiations. Clearly someone did 
not want the interim institutions established and sought to stall the pro-
cess permanently.
 Gatabazi’s death, the revenge killing of Bucyana, and the subsequent 
two days of ethnic violence in Kigali bestirred President Habyarimana 
to an active intervention in the party disputes that he had hitherto es-
chewed. On their return from funeral services in Butare, diplomats heard 
that the president had convoked all the internal political parties to discuss 
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remaining differences and to plan an installation ceremony. All parties and 
factions were represented in a two-day conclave.75
 Initial word was that a possible result of the parties’ meeting would 
be the setting up of a new government that would be more effective in 
managing the political scene than had been the government of Prime Min-
ister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. On hearing of this gambit, I telephoned 
the president’s legal advisor and his director of cabinet, warning them that 
setting up any government other than that provided for under the Arusha 
Accord, especially since the transition process had already begun with the 
swearing in of the president, could be construed as a coup against a le-
gitimate government with attendant consequences for US assistance to 
any government thus established. The fact that both interlocutors tried to 
argue against my points suggests that such a ploy was in fact in the works. 
I then called the SRSG to inform him of my ad hoc demarche. Minis-
ter Booh-Booh said he would take a similar approach and reported on a 
telephone conversation between the president and UN secretary general 
Boutros-Ghali in which the secretary general, in strident terms, told the 
president to get on with the Arusha process.76
 A new government was not formed. Instead, presidential cabinet di-
rector Ruhigira read a communiqué on the radio February 27 detailing a 
party agreement on a formula for installing the Arusha institutions. Ac-
cording to the communiqué, in return for accepting some of Mugenzi’s 
candidates for the national assembly, the Ndasingwa faction would get 
another deputy minister post in government and a chance at the national 
assembly presidency. There were two problems with the meeting’s conclu-
sion: first, it had never been clear that agreements made by leadership in 
camera would be honored in public or accepted by party rank and file; and 
second, the RPF had not been part of the meeting.
the rpf  demurs
 On February 22, the Front had already issued a statement reserving 
the right to reply “appropriately” to the ethnic violence that had broken out 
in Kigali. This violence, according to the RPF, was not a consequence of a 
lack of government but an exploitation of violence by authorities to intimi-
date and wring concessions from opponents while keeping the transition 
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government from forming. More explicitly, on February 27, an RPF com-
muniqué linked recent violence to “previous massacres at Kibilira, Bigogwe, 
Bugesera, Kibuye, Ruhengeri, and Gisenyi.” These targeted massacres initi-
ated at each political impasse constituted, in the Front’s view, a “strategy of 
dissuasion by the Habyarimana regime designed to impose a series of in-
duced concessions on the RPF.”77 The RPF saw no need for an alternative 
approach to conclusions worked out on February 18 and would not accept 
conclusions of a meeting that Habyarimana had no authority to convene.78
 Despite our pleas that it consider carefully the results of the Febru-
ary 25–27 all-parties’ meeting, on March 1, the Front formally stated that 
it would not participate in a government whose terms were adopted in 
a climate of terror imposed by Habyarimana. Up at his headquarters in 
Mulindi, RPF commander Kagame hinted that he might have no option 
but to return to war. RPF leaders in Kigali explained to the UN that they 
opposed any alliance that might give President Habyarimana the ability to 
block acts of the new government. The very marginality that the MRND 
was trying to avoid through a variety of proposals was what the RPF 
was determined to impose.79
Diplomatic Initiatives
 Following Minister Gatabazi’s assassination and attendant ethnic vio-
lence in Butare and Kigali, the diplomatic community pushed with in-
creased urgency for implementation of the Arusha Accords. While the 
United Nations retained its leadership of the negotiating process, the 
Western Observers (Belgium, Germany, France, and the United States) met 
regularly to review events and suggest initiatives, while each sought to weigh 
in bilaterally on the process with high-level delegations from headquarters. 
The Tanzanian government as well took on a renewed engagement in trying 
to bridge the differences. These initiatives all went forward in the face of a 
diminishing capacity of the UNAMIR mission to influence the situation.
the united nations
 The ceremonies did not go forward as planned on the morning of 
March 2, bringing to yet another impasse the continuing effort of the United 
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Nations to support the Arusha process. Behind the glosses of international 
discourse, the ninety-day “Report of the Secretary General” on UNAMIR 
(30 December 1993) had already forecast the problems ahead: “recent signs 
of mutual intransigence” among the parties and the existence of a well-
armed and ruthless group operating in the DMZ intending to disrupt or 
even derail the peace process. Nonetheless, the report cited the goodwill 
and cooperation of the parties and, despite logistical problems, held that 
UNAMIR had on the ground “a minimum viable force which can respond 
to the most pressing needs in Kigali.”80 In accepting this report, the Secu-
rity Council questioned at length UNAMIR’s viability. The January 6 Se-
curity Council resolution urged the parties to cooperate fully in furthering 
the peace process and establishing a broad-based transitional government 
at the earliest opportunity. It stressed that “continued support for the Mis-
sion will depend on the full and prompt implementation by the parties of 
the Arusha Peace Agreement.”81
 In a January 27 response to a letter from President Habyarimana, Sec-
retary General Boutros-Ghali noted that “this persistent impasse can only 
have a negative effect both on your country’s internal political situation 
and on your commitments you have made to the international commu-
nity.” The secretary general appealed for a compromise that would allow 
prompt establishment of the transition institutions and put Rwanda on 
the path toward peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction.82
 Three weeks later, the Security Council endorsed a presidential state-
ment on February 17 that expressed deep concern “by the delays in estab-
lishing the Broad-based Transitional Government.” Taking note of the fact 
that Habyarimana had already been sworn in as the interim head of state, 
it encouraged him to continue efforts for speedy installation of other tran-
sitional institutions. It called on all parties concerned to overcome their 
differences and cooperate fully with UN and OAU representatives. In 
rather blunt language, the presidential statement reminded parties of their 
obligation to respect the weapons-free zone established in and around the 
city and “calls the attention of the parties to the consequences for them of 
noncompliance with that provision of the agreement.”83
 The official record does not tell the whole story. Though initially reluc-
tant to involve the UN in the Rwandan peace process, Secretary General 
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Boutros-Ghali had become deeply engaged in making this UN effort a suc-
cess. He followed the process with personal messages to President Habyari-
mana and telephoned him several times. After a phone call on February 24 in 
which the secretary general excoriated the president for holding up the peace 
process, Habyarimana sent Minister of Transport Ntageruka all the way to 
New York to set the record straight. The minister traveled on to Washing-
ton, where US officials made strong representations on moving the process 
forward.84 SRSG Booh-Booh characterized the secretary general’s personal 
interventions as the last straw in the UN effort, but international initiatives 
under UN leadership persisted during the month of March.
 By the end of March, the secretary general’s second progress report 
on UNAMIR detailed the many failed efforts to install the interim gov-
ernment and the national assembly, and it noted that “the prolonged delay 
in putting the transitional institution in place has not only prevented 
UNAMIR from carrying out its tasks in accordance with the implemen-
tation schedule approved by the Security Council, but has also contrib-
uted to a deterioration of the security situation in the country and posed a 
threat to the peace processes.”85
 The UN tactic for dealing with the impasse had shifted from facilitat-
ing talks and cajoling parties forward to threatening termination of the 
UN effort. The secretary general reported that he and his special repre-
sentative had stressed to the Rwandan political leaders that without the 
early establishment of the institutions, “it would be difficult to affirm that 
sufficient progress has been made in the implementation of the Arusha 
peace agreement to warrant the continued support of the international 
community.”86
 In many ways, the military picture looked more promising than the 
political one. Military targets of UNAMIR were being met; troop strength 
was at peak strength of the twenty-five hundred troops envisioned by the 
plan of deployment. Force headquarters and sectors of deployment were 
deemed “fully operational.” The deployment of engineer, logistics, and 
medical units was complete. The report did note that a dramatic dete-
rioration in the security situation in Kigali had “severely overstretched the 
resources and capabilities of the national gendarmerie.” It recognized that 
disturbing security incidents could seriously hinder the full and effective 
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implementation of the Arusha peace agreement and found the situation 
particularly worrisome because “the national gendarmerie, which is re-
sponsible for maintaining law and order, is severely handicapped in terms 
of personnel, equipment and training.” The secretary general sought, in 
consequence, an increase of forty-five civilian police monitors above the 
authorized level of sixty policemen. Under the category of “Military As-
pects,” the report mentioned the efforts of the SRSG to “express his serious 
concern about increasing reports regarding the distribution of weapons to 
civilians, which constitutes a serious threat not only to public security in 
Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda but also to UNAMIR personnel.”87
 Despite his negative assessment, Boutros-Ghali concluded that prog-
ress in negotiations gave hope that a compromise could be reached on 
transitional institutions. He noted that parties have maintained the pro-
cess of dialogue, and that the United Nations should continue to support 
that dialogue with a view to completing phase one (establishment of the 
government) and moving into phase two (disengagement, demobilization, 
and integration of the armed forces.) He recommended that the Security 
Council should extend the UNAMIR mandate for six months, with a 
mandatory review in two months if institutions were not installed.88
belgium
 In the Security Council, a January evaluation of UNAMIR had al-
ready drawn a strong critique of the Rwandan political performance. In 
early April, a vote was due on the renewal of the UNAMIR mandate. 
Friends of Rwanda were becoming deeply concerned, Belgium perhaps 
the foremost. The Belgian government had been part of the peace process 
from the very beginning. Immediately after the RPF invasion, in October 
1990, Belgium sent troops to protect the capital and Belgian expatriates 
in it. Having helped promote a ceasefire under the mediation of General 
Mobutu at Gbadolite, Belgium withdrew its combat forces, while keeping 
in place a small military training mission and continuing Belgian diplo-
matic and assistance efforts. Now, with an act of good faith in the Arusha 
Accords, the Belgians had deployed 420 troops as the core contingent of 
UNAMIR. Deeply vested in a peace process going wrong, Belgium began 
a series of high-level diplomatic initiatives.
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 In January, former prime minister Eyskens, a longtime friend of 
Rwanda, came to Kigali to urge implementation of the accords and insti-
tutionalization of the peace process. In February, a heavyweight diplomatic 
team led by the Belgian foreign minister and the minister of coopera-
tion came just in time to witness party bickering and observe the effect 
of Minister Gatabazi’s assassination. Foreign Minister Claes was very di-
rect in his private meetings with the president, prime minister, and prime 
minister-designate in which he described the seriousness of the situation, 
the impatience of the international community, and the importance of 
the Rwandans taking up their responsibilities. He was similarly blunt in 
a meeting at the Belgian ambassador’s residence to which all party leaders 
were invited. At a reception for the diplomatic and political community, 
Minister Claes spoke forcefully of the need to reach out and work together 
in the cause of peace. Although Belgium was seen in Rwandan political 
circles as favoring the RPF, the Front chose not to attend the all-party 
gathering or reception, seeking instead a last-minute meeting with Claes 
at the airport. On arrival in Bujumbura, Mr. Claes sent out a most pessi-
mistic assessment and asked his ambassadors in France, the United States, 
and the United Nations to tell their contacts that things were going very 
badly. On his return to Belgium, the foreign minister met with the UN 
secretary general in Europe and requested that the UNAMIR mandate be 
strengthened and troops on the ground reinforced so that they could deal 
with a deteriorating security situation.89
france
 The local situation for Belgium and France was now reversed. Previ-
ously, France had had troops on the ground with the purpose of protect-
ing the expatriate community and undergirding prospects for the Arusha 
negotiations. Now, Belgium had troops in Rwanda as the core contingent 
of UNAMIR in support of the Arusha Accords. Moreover, France had 
turned down a Rwandan government request that its troops be part of 
the UNAMIR operation and had quickly removed its troops as soon as 
the Belgian contingent deployed to Kigali. As the impasse lengthened and 
the chance of a new conflict between forces increased, France had been 
categorical that its troops would not return to Rwanda to restore peace. 
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Peace was now the responsibility of the Rwandans and of the international 
community.90 While playing its part in the several demarches of the West-
ern Observers, France also sent out to Rwanda the vice-minister for social 
affairs and the minister for international cooperation. The message was the 
same that Willy Claes brought: the Rwandans had to move ahead in the 
peace process, or political and social chaos could ensue.
the united states
 High-level diplomacy was a tool the United States used as well. Dur-
ing this period, the United States sent to Rwanda the assistant secretary 
for international organization affairs, Douglas Bennet, and a deputy as-
sistant secretary for African affairs, Prudence Bushnell, along with the di-
rector of Central African affairs, Ambassador Arlene Render, and, late in 
March, the deputy assistant secretary of defense, Pat Irvin.
 Rwanda had recently been elected to a rotating African seat in the 
Security Council and hence was a focus country for Assistant Secretary 
Bennet. His representations on Security Council matters were, however, 
quite pro forma: the Rwandans had usually been cooperative in the United 
Nations and had no problem working with the United States in the Se-
curity Council. But Bennet’s main message was “the great sense of urgency 
with which the United States government viewed the current situation 
in Rwanda.”91 President Habyarimana told Bennet that the impasse was 
caused by a lack of confidence among political leaders and a lack of po-
litical will to press forward on the peace process. Nonetheless, he felt that 
Rwandan political leaders wanted peace; he was prepared to seek compro-
mises so that the peace process would go forward.
 Habyarimana assured Bennet of his full support for the accords and 
his recognition of “scheduling constraints which required early installation 
of the government and the national assembly.” Habyarimana then revealed 
his preoccupation with regional dimensions of the problem, whether in 
Rwanda, in Burundi, or in eastern Zaire. It was important to confront 
ethnic problems and deal with them rather than to claim they did not 
exist. He wanted mutual assurances in this period of “transition to dem-
ocratic elections” so that distrust among contending parties and ethnic 
groups might diminish. Bennet argued that Rwanda should not wait for 
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the problem to be resolved in other parts of the region but step forward 
by transcending ethnic conflict to “become a pole of stability, the standard 
around which others in the region might rally.”92
 The mid-March visit of Prudence Bushnell took place during an inter-
nal debate within the US foreign-policy establishment regarding the util-
ity of the UN peacekeeping program in Rwanda. President Clinton had 
featured the US approach to peacekeeping (based on “Presidential Review 
Directive [PRD] 13”) in his address to the United Nations at the previ-
ous General Assembly. Although the Somali debacle delayed public rollout 
of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 until May 1994, everything 
about the Somali experience seemed to confirm the wisdom of peacekeep-
ing criteria developed under PRD 13. By March 1994, the UNAMIR in-
tervention that our mission at the United Nations had acclaimed as one 
of the best-planned peacekeeping operations in recent years was neither 
meeting its objectives, keeping deadlines, nor staying within budget. To 
the great chagrin of the State Department’s Africa Bureau, US diplomats 
at the United Nations were openly talking to the UN Secretariat about 
“pulling the plug” on UNAMIR.93 Clearly some high-level effort to get the 
peace process back on track was needed. As the deputy assistant secretary 
holding the conflict-resolution portfolio for the Bureau of African Affairs, 
Bushnell’s mission was to get the Rwandans moving.
 Moreover, the actual issues on the table did not seem beyond resolu-
tion. Taking “the cautious assumption” that special missions from the Eu-
ropean Union and from the Tanzanian foreign ministry would not achieve 
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national assembly on technical grounds.
•	 Point	out	to	all	levels	of	government	the	costs	in	US	assistance	from	
further delays in setting up the government.94
 During their March 19–23 visit, DAS Bushnell, Ambassador Render, 
and I met with top ranks of Rwandan political society, urging speedy in-
stallation of a transition regime, noting US consternation over increased 
violence in Rwanda and detailing the cost to the Rwandan people of each 
delay in forming a government. The visitors warned that the United States 
was seriously assessing peacekeeping operations around the world and was 
quite prepared to say “no” to ones that could not achieve their objectives. 
Rwanda could be a model of conflict resolution. The vote on UNAMIR 
was coming up on April 4; an interagency group would decide the US po-
sition on renewing UNAMIR within the next couple of weeks. The inter-
national community could not make the Arusha process work for Rwanda. 
Bushnell said she needed a good word to take back to Washington and that 
good word should come fast. She asked Rwandan leaders to “take respon-
sibility for the future by acting to resolve the impasse, to chart a transition 
to glory rather than to chaos.”95
 Reactions to the visitors’ demarche were, in many ways, set pieces. 
Habyarimana said that he supported the Arusha Accords and would 
continue to do so. He was disquieted by the lack of confidence, respect, 
and good faith in the current political atmosphere. As usual he talked 
about the regional dimensions of the problem and particularly about 
the effect the events in Burundi had on attitudes in Rwanda. The prime 
minister blamed the impasse on the president and said that the new lists 
prepared by the prime minister-designate and herself “allowed all factions 
of all parties to participate in the national assembly and government and 
represented the ‘last compromise.’” She saw no reason for keeping the 
CDR out of the national assembly (even though her list of deputies did 
not have a CDR name on it); she wanted them not only to sign the “Code 
of Ethics” but also make a public declaration of support for the Aru-
sha Accords. She said that, since 1992, the president’s party had blocked 
every decision it did not agree with; the new transition government must 
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be able to take decisions for change. She was examining how to control 
Radio RTLM; the president had asked that Radio Muhabura be con-
trolled as well.96
 The US delegation met with RPF leaders gathered at their up-country 
headquarters at the Mulindi tea plantation. Chairman Kanyarengwe said that 
the current political impasse was in no one’s interest. The Front had agreed 
to changes in the Liberal Party lists but had a hard time accepting decisions 
imposed by violence. Now other bizarre issues had emerged as obstacles. The 
RPF held that someone was purposefully creating the current impasse. “The 
international community should assume its responsibilities by identifying 
that person and helping the Rwandan people remove the impasse.”
 When the US delegation argued for inclusion, Minister-designate 
Sendashonga claimed that the CDR was not an acceptable party. RPA 
commander Kagame said the CDR was a security issue and would be dealt 
with as a security issue once the institutions were in place and the security 
services integrated. DAS Bushnell reminded the Front that the interna-
tional community could not put the institutions in place for them. “They 
would have to work out some arrangement that would let the government 
be set up and they had better do it fast. Time had become finite. The failure 
to reach accommodation could result in tragedy for all Rwandans.”97
 The United States made one more high-level effort to push the parties 
to agreement. The deputy assistant secretary of defense for humanitarian 
assistance and refugee affairs, Patricia Irvin, visited Kigali March 24 and 25. 
Her purpose was to lift visions to what might be: the challenge of bringing 
a better life to war-weary Rwandans, the possibilities of joint humanitar-
ian efforts if the transition government were installed, and the possibility 
of yet making Rwanda an example of a successful peacekeeping effort. In 
Irvin’s visit, President Habyarimana promised her that ceremonies for in-
stallation were scheduled for the next day. The only problem remaining 
was the CDR’s exclusion from the assembly. Habyarimana planned to be 
there at 9:00 the next morning.98
the tanzanian initiative
 Encouraged by the Observer group and determined not to have its 
efforts in the Arusha Accords come to naught, the Tanzanians continued 
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dialogue in Kigali through their ambassador. The two parties to the nego-
tiations also recognized Tanzania’s stake in the peace process. On March 
2, a high-level RPF delegation went to Dar es Salaam to brief President 
Mwinyi on their versions of events in Kigali and to ask his intervention. 
President Habyarimana followed suit on March 4 and with the same in-
tent.99 In return, President Mwinyi sent Foreign Minister Rwegasira to 
Kigali on March 11 for discussions that turned into a weeklong marathon 
of talks with all parties and factions.
 The foreign minister left without seeing the institutions set up but 
with a clear idea of where the blockades were. Rwegasira found it un-
acceptable that a power struggle within the Liberal Party should hold the 
process hostage. As long as he respected the lists presented to him by the 
parties, the prime minister had the right to name the government. The 
RPF’s rejection of compromises made within the Liberal Party was also 
improper. The foreign minister recognized the problem of including the 
CDR in the national assembly as an issue to be resolved.
Pushing for Installation
 On the morning of March 25, as diplomats filed into the CND assem-
bly hall, they learned that the ceremonies were still confronted with two 
lists; the president’s list for the national assembly differed from that of the 
prime minister in that it had different names for deputies from the Islamic 
Party and the MDR and an added name for the CDR. The prime minister 
hustled observers into a side room, where representatives of the presidency, 
the RPF, and the major parties engaged in four hours of recrimination over 
efforts to establish the institutions. Eventually, it was agreed to let the dif-
ferences over the PDI and MDR candidates be resolved by the courts. The 
RPF was adamant, however, that it would not accept immediate installa-
tion of the CDR in the national assembly. That party would have to prove 
its good intentions and be judged by the assembly on a three-fifths vote 
at an appropriate time. RPF representatives did agree to meet later that 
afternoon with CDR leaders and discuss their differences. Coming out of 
the four-hour meeting, I encouraged RPF representatives to work for any 
formula that would meet the concerns of both sides.100
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 The prime minister announced a swearing-in ceremony for the morning 
of March 28. Only parties loyal to her attended. Failure to install the institu-
tions brought the process up against two other datelines: Easter weekend, 
celebrated from Good Friday through Easter Monday in Rwanda; and a 
regional summit on the situation in Burundi called by President Mwinyi for 
April 4. By Good Friday, it appeared that “the sides are inching towards each 
other, but afraid to make the final offer.” The internal opposition told me 
that if the president were clearly to declare that admission of the CDR to 
the national assembly was the last obstacle, they would lobby for CDR ad-
mission. The RPF told Ambassador Tambwe that, if the CDR was clearly 
the last issue at stake, they would take another look at their position. Mean-
while, a CDR youth leader was assassinated, but CDR leadership urged its 
partisans to be patient. Kigali remained relatively quiet with traffic at usual 
levels, even though unexplained grenade explosions and gunshots punctu-
ated the night of March 31. Reportedly, youth taunting guards at the presi-
dency drew their fire and suffered one casualty.101
 When I contacted three different high-level personalities in the presi-
dent’s camp to elicit their views, each had a slightly different view of the 
state of play. Director of Presidential Cabinet Ruhigira told me that the 
CDR was the last substantive issue for the president, but he did not con-
trol party sentiment. The president’s legal advisor said installation of the 
national assembly turned on whether or not Justin Mugenzi, the president 
of the Liberal Party, was successful in getting his candidate, former minis-
ter of justice Mbonampeka, elected as national assembly president. Min-
ister of Transport Ntageruka (and recent presidential envoy to Western 
capitals and the UN) said all would go well with the national assembly 
once the CDR was admitted, but outstanding questions might trouble the 
installation of the government. I told him that the international commu-
nity saw the installation process to be one and indivisible.102
 The tactical details were not on President Habyarimana’s mind when 
he convoked me on April 2. Rather, he was focused on the RPF’s intransi-
gence on the CDR inclusion when all the internal political parties and the 
international community thought the CDR should be in the national as-
sembly. Habyarimana took it back to the RPF’s original intentions: “They 
were a terrorist organization seeking to take power by force.” They tried 
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and failed in a classic military attack and in guerrilla warfare, and now the 
plan was negotiations accompanied by political assassination to destabilize 
the internal political order. He wondered why the internal opposition tried 
to undermine the office of the president, which still had a functional, sta-
bilizing role to play under the Arusha Accords. Habyarimana mentioned 
recent RPF radio broadcasts calling him a traitor, but obviously he had in 
mind as well recent criticism by the prime minister. Finally, the president 
revealed his real concern, which was the US vote in the Security Council 
on the renewal of UNAMIR. Would the ambassador plead with authori-
ties in Washington for a positive vote on extension?103
 I noted that the international community’s position had three ele-
ments: equity in the inclusion of all recognized parties, quick formation 
of a watchdog commission to make sure all parties kept to the principles 
of the accords, and no further intraparty delays in installing the institu-
tions. This meant that all major players—the prime minister, the presi-
dent, the high court, the political parties, and the Front—should agree 
on a single list before ceremonies were announced. As regards terrorism, 
the RPF and the CDR accused each other of all the violence in the coun-
try. Virtually every political group in Rwanda had lost some personality 
to such violence. The answer to such sabotage was to put institutions in 
place and let the UN work with the new law enforcement service to find 
out who perpetrated these acts and stop them. As for the renewal of the 
mandate, a call to Washington the previous day had confirmed that the 
US position was still being debated internally. I would obviously im-
mediately communicate to Washington the president’s plea for a positive 
US vote on UNAMIR renewal.104
 Easter weekend passed in an unusual calm, punctuated by a UN re-
ception and the usual church services. The majority of the RPF political 
representatives in Kigali had left their CND headquarters to return to 
Mulindi for a top leadership meeting. UN special representative Booh-
Booh shuttled between Mulindi and Kigali trying to push the process 
forward. It seemed obvious that no further progress on setting up the in-
stitutions would be possible until Habyarimana’s return from the regional 
summit in Dar es Salaam on the situation in Burundi. The Rwandan crisis 
was also expected to be on the summit’s agenda.
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 Meanwhile, an international peacemaker and friend of the president 
came to town. Mr. Rudolf Decker, a German engineer and senator in 
Baden-Württemburg, had been doing “track two diplomacy” in the Great 
Lakes area for nearly eight years, meeting individually with presidents and 
bringing them together for informal meetings to encourage confidence in 
the possibility of peaceful and friendly relations. Invited to a personal and 
completely private meeting with Habyarimana, Decker found Habyari-
mana deeply troubled by the insecurity and political chaos over which he 
seemed to have little control. Nonetheless, Decker emerged from the meet-
ing convinced that President Habyarimana intended to go ahead with the 
establishment of the Arusha institutions once he returned from Dar es 
Salaam.105
Was Peace Possible?
 Was the calm of Easter Weekend the harbinger of a better day, or a 
pause before another imbroglio? In retrospect, it is easy to see the looming 
storm clouds; at the time, we were looking for hopeful rays of light. It had 
been eight months since the two parties had signed the peace accords in 
Arusha. The parties were now cheek by jowl in Kigali, with the presiden-
tial guard and RPF battalions only a mile apart. Meetings within parties 
and between parties went on endlessly. Yet, there was no real compromise 
in sight. The factions of the MDR were not reconciled, with the prime 
minister-designate still determined to name his own people to the govern-
ment and national assembly. The Liberal Party was as split as ever, with 
failed talks building hostility between the camps. The presidential side, the 
MRND—plus whoever was calling the shots at the presidency—had put 
forward several ideas that would minimally protect its interests: an am-
nesty, a gentlemen’s agreement, or the seating of the CDR in the national 
assembly. The internal opposition had given only recalcitrant, conditional 
responses to all these initiatives, and the RPF, after positive signals in Kigali 
and foreign capitals, had stonewalled all proposals from Habyarimana. Al-
though talks between armies on cantonment and disarmament were going 
forward under the leadership of General Dallaire, the gendarmerie and 
police, backed by UNAMIR, were unable to prevent weapons distribution, 
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contain unauthorized demonstrations, or prevent assassinations of key per-
sonalities. Violence was growing, as was the rumor of renewed war. Peace 
seemed far away.
 Should diplomats have pushed the parties to seize the ever-receding 
day of installation for transition institutions? Or, did this long delay in 
implementation signal something so wrong with the agreements that they 
could not be implemented and a new approach was needed? What were 
the alternatives to more meetings, more endless discussion and no prog-
ress? As we had concluded at the US embassy back in March, alternative 
strategies included a return to discussions at Arusha, an all-players retreat, 
a summit meeting of the leadership and top military, or use of professional 
facilitation or mediation. But the embassy rejected these options because 
there was no time. The six-month evaluation of UNAMIR was coming 
up in early April. Parties needed to install the institutions before then. The 
reality of that upcoming Security Council vote drove the last diplomatic 
ploy, with all diplomatic missions jointly tabling a proposal with a take-it-
or-else ultimatum.106 But concerted diplomatic pressure seemed only to 
crystallize established positions. Could more creative negotiating strate-
gies and more patience have won through to a structure of institutions 
acceptable to all?
 There were two main perspectives on the deadlock. One was that 
Habyarimana was masterminding the divisions within the parties and the 
arguments over positions in the national assembly and government. That 
perspective, insistently pushed by the RPF and increasingly believed by 
many in the international community, left but one recourse with two op-
tions: deal with or deal out the president. Indeed, in the last days of March, 
top-level official and informal diplomacy had focused on Habyarimana. 
But the RPF wanted more than diplomatic pressure. The tenor of their 
argument was that, in order to let the rest of the parties move forward to 
the installation of the institutions, it was necessary to isolate or remove the 
president. The president, however, still held the largest political support 
throughout the country, the loyalty of most of the army, and the control of 
local administration. Getting Habyarimana out of the way as an impedi-
ment to progress would have required more leverage than the international 
interveners had at their disposal and a change of mandate for UNAMIR 
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from that of a “classic peacekeeping operation” to that of a peace enforcer 
with a plan of action, equipment, and forces sufficient to match the mission.
 The other perspective saw the wrangling over the institutions as a con-
test for power among Rwanda’s political elite, each group hoping to use 
representation in the government and national assembly to ensure contin-
ued control during the transition process. The president and the MRND 
wanted a blocking vote in the institutions to ensure that they were not 
completely marginalized and pushed to the side by the end of the tran-
sition. Various elements of the internal opposition wanted a voting pat-
tern that would keep the president powerless to influence the transitional 
agenda and put themselves in a controlling position. The RPF, already 
with military equity but with no significant political base in the country, 
needed a structure of representation within the institutions that would 
build its political position and guarantee its interests throughout the tran-
sition. Each contending faction calculated the arithmetic of representation 
in institutions at the beginning of the transition in such a way as to have 
political control at the end of the transition.
 From the US point of view, shared broadly among development part-
ners, the issue was not personalities or numerical ascendency but prin-
ciples: the Arusha principles of power sharing, inclusiveness, compromise, 
and accommodation. Coalition building around issues, not perpetual con-
trol, was the ideal. It was in this context that the issue of the CDR had such 
saliency. In the early days of the multiparty government, the CDR—with 
its considerable political following in the northwest and Kigali—asked for 
a ministerial seat. The other parties refused, keeping the multiparty gov-
ernment an exclusive club. In negotiations on the transition government, 
only members of the multiparty government were allotted portfolios. Now 
the CDR, admittedly a bumptious actor with an ethnic attitude, wanted 
the seat in the national assembly accorded it in the peace agreement, and it 
was willing to sign on to Arusha principles to get it. International Observ-
ers had long argued for inclusiveness; representation of the CDR in the 
transition institutions was a way of co-opting political dissent.107 But the 
internal opposition parties put up procedural barriers to keep that from 
happening; they did not want a party likely to support Habyarimana in-
side the institutional tent. Moreover, the RPF considered the CDR to be 
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not a political issue but a security problem that would be handled once 
institutions were in place.
 These entrenched positions regarding a seat in a ninety-member na-
tional assembly should have been a signal to Observers that exclusion was 
still the lodestar of Rwandan politics. The power-sharing ethos of Arusha 
had not taken root in elite political practice. A transition that fully reflected 
Arusha principles, incorporating diverse points of view and competition in 
the political marketplace, was an ephemeral hope. The diplomatic corps’ 
demand for immediate institution of the cabinet and a legislature with the 
CDR within it might well have been a “bridge too far.”
 But this was not, as had been reported, the final issue. The split in the 
MDR remained; late lists conceded little to Twagiramungu’s opponents. 
The Liberal Party grew more deeply divided, with no consensus on who 
should represent the party in the institutions. Any ceremony of installa-
tion at that stage might have made a good report for the Security Council, 
but it would have papered over profound fault lines that certainly would 
have resurfaced in the course of governing.
 Holding fractious politicians on course in a transition that kept to 
Arusha rules would have required a forceful UN political presence and the 
power to back persuasion. Already in January and February, Observers had 
underlined the need for a more effective, forceful UN presence. I had urged 
UNAMIR to undertake its responsibility in keeping Kigali a weapons-
free zone. In February, the Belgian foreign minister urgently demanded 
that the UN secretary general immediately reinforce the UNAMIR con-
tingent. France consistently called for a vigorous and effective defense of 
the peace with competent “blue hats.” Yet, neither the UN Secretariat nor 
the Security Council made any change in the equipping or staffing of 
UNAMIR forces.
 Indeed, when conflict broke out, UNAMIR’s chapter 6 rights to self-
defense and responsibilities to protect civilians were downgraded by the 
Secretariat’s instructions “not to fire unless fired upon.”108 Thus the inter-
national presence that was to accompany the peace process had neither the 
political capacity nor the military force to open the way to transition.
 By April 3, Easter Sunday, these factors were not fully appreciated. The 
international community was optimistically looking for any formula that 
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would get the institutions in place and validate the Arusha Accords. 
Rwanda’s political leadership was hunkered down in quest for the power 
that would issue from controlling the institutions. We will never know 
whether, in time, the ambitions of either could have been realized. The 
analysis above speculates in the “what-ifs” of history.
 The historical fact is that on a moonlit night of April 6, we were 
startled by a large explosion, followed by a smaller one. Someone using 
ground-to-air missiles had shot down Habyarimana’s French-piloted jet as 
it approached Kigali airport on return from the Dar es Salaam summit. 
President Habyarimana, President Ntaryamira of Burundi, their presiden-
tial, military, and diplomatic counselors, and the French crew were killed 
in the crash.109 With President Habyarimana’s death, the only transitional 
institution initiated under the Arusha Accords came to an end, as did the 
Arusha process itself. Extremist politics and renewed civil war rushed to 
fill the vacuum. Genocide was soon to follow. To this, the Arusha political 
negotiations proved to have been a tragic prelude.
Lessons We Learned
In Rwanda, interveners had earnestly followed the devices and desires 
of their hearts, namely that the Arusha Accords could usher in a peace-
ful transition to a secure future. They got instead the tragedy of war and 
genocide. Some realizations extracted from this tragedy might include the 
following:
•	 An enviable peace accord not grounded in political realities may have a short 
life. The assassination of President Ndadaye in Burundi brought back 
the deep enmities within the Rwandan body politic that euphoria 
in signing the accords had temporarily masked. Implementing the 
Arusha Accords in that changed political environment was difficult 
and perhaps not possible.
•	 A negotiated agreement must quickly show positive gains in security, economy, 
and governance. Momentum, considered so vital in the early stages of 
negotiation, was just as important in the last stages of implementation. 
The stall really began with slow UN action in setting up and 
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deploying the political leadership and peacekeeping force called for in 
the accords. By the time the United Nations had a minimal presence 
on the ground, things had begun to fall apart.
•	 Effective diplomatic pressure is vital to the success of an international 
intervention. In Rwanda, the UN political leadership was erratic 
and feckless, presiding over counterproductive confrontations 
between parties and often falling back on bilateral representatives 
to carry the ball.
•	 Credible	military	power	is	likewise	necessary;	when	outliers	challenge	the	
process, peacekeepers must be quick footed, decisive, and firm. In Rwanda, 
General Dallaire would deserve high marks on this index, but the 
UN Secretariat countermanded plans to go after arms caches, 
downgraded the rules of engagement, and at the end forced 
peacekeepers into barracks.
•	 Interveners should be prepared for the unexpected. Two “Black Swan” 
events upset the playing field and changed the game after the accords 
were signed: the October assassination of President Ndadaye in 
Burundi, and the April assassination of President Habyarimana. The 
former gave ascendency to voices challenging the Arusha Accords; 
the latter ushered in renewed civil war and genocide. In depth of 
commitment or resources, the international interveners were 
prepared for neither.
•	 Time	moves	on	inexorably;	setting	unachievable	deadlines	complicates	the	
peace process. As we moved into April, Security Council votes on the 
renewal of UNAMIR were imminent. So the diplomatic corps united 
in demanding an end to party palavers and immediate establishment 
of the institutions. Meanwhile, President Habyarimana flew to the 
summit at Dar es Salaam to be similarly pressured by neighboring 
chiefs of state. Did something in those post-Easter pressures cause 
someone to change the game by ordering the president’s plane 
downed?
•	 Common	goals	unite;	common	danger	divides.	High goals of bringing 
peace to Rwanda and restoring security to the region brought 
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states and international organizations into a vital partnership in 
international humanitarian intervention. With the renewal of war 
and the launching of genocide, the partnership melted; each state and 
organization turned to saving its own citizens or staff. Except for a 
brave residual UN mission led by General Dallaire and the intrepid 
work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Rwandans 
were left to their own nefarious devices.
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ePiloGue
 Juvénal Habyarimana, who had ruled Rwanda since July 5, 1973, was 
sworn in on January 5, 1994, as president for the twenty-two-month interim 
stipulated in the Arusha Accords. Four months later, missiles downed the 
presidential aircraft on its return from a summit meeting in Dar es Salaam, 
killing President Habyarimana, his colleague from Burundi, President 
Ntaryamira, their staff, and three French crew.1
 That plane crash brought to an end the Arusha peace process that 
had been brokered and sustained by the international community seek-
ing to bring peace between the Rwandan government and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and to restore security to the Rwandan people.2 The 
president’s death rekindled civil war between a self-proclaimed Rwandan 
government of Hutu extremists and the Front. In an atmosphere of re-
newed conflict, political crisis, and social cataclysm, revenge quickly turned 
to genocide that targeted Tutsi civilians and partisans of the internal oppo-
sition. Some eight hundred thousand innocents were brutally slaughtered 
in one hundred days. Thus, an international humanitarian effort to restore 
peace to Rwanda had instead ushered in a great human disaster.
 The story of the genocide has been recounted by numerous partici-
pants, analysts, and historians. In this epilogue to the narrative on the 
Arusha political negotiations, I review the more important contribu-
tions to this literature, then give my understanding of the major events in 
this story of national implosion and international failure. Finally, I look 
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at lessons from the tragedy that could illumine our understanding of the 
Rwandan conflict and that might buttress future efforts to intervene on 
humanity’s behalf.
Recounting Genocide
 The many narratives of genocide in Rwanda divide along a timeline: 
those written in the immediate aftermath of the event, those written at 
middle distance and filling in dimensions of the picture, and more recent 
revisionist histories calling into question the standard interpretations. I 
mention below the more notable works that focus on the genocide per se 
(full citations are given in the bibliography).
 One of the earliest comprehensive studies, Rwanda: Death, Despair, and 
Defiance, was published in September 1994 by Africa Rights. Rushed to 
press with documentation provided by the RPF, the text established in the 
literature a convincing description of the April–June events as a genocide 
planned by Hutu extremists who shot down Habyarimana’s plane, took 
over government, and intentionally mobilized the military and militia to 
eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda.3 A more scholarly and comprehensive 
study, Human Rights Watch’s Leave None to Tell the Story, is based on de-
tailed fieldwork and well-documented interviews initiated immediately 
after the genocide. Stories and timelines in the study confirm the role of 
the so-called interim government and extremist militia, as well as local 
killers. The last chapter, however, also records the RPF atrocities.
 Other early works include the summary history by Colette Braeck-
man, Rwanda: Histoire d’un génocide, and a study of the genocide’s launching 
by Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda:	Trois	jours	qui	ont	fait	basculer	l’histoire,	based on 
his extensive network of informants among Rwandan political and military 
elite. Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors without Borders, in Devant 
le mal: Rwanda, un génocide en direct, initiated what became a series of soul-
searching NGO reflections on humanitarian action in a war zone. Alain 
Destexhe, then secretary general of Doctors without Borders, weighed in 
with Essai sur le génocide au Rwanda to insist that the massacres in Rwanda 
were indeed genocide, one of three in the twentieth century. Fergal Keane’s 
Season of Blood gives a journalist’s on-the-ground truth about the early days 
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of the genocide. Most accessible and useful of the early studies is Gérard 
Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. A longtime scholar of 
Central Africa, Prunier also had a liaison role between the French and the 
RPF, which gives his story a participant’s cachet.
 Later studies published by participants include reflections of the 
military, such as UNAMIR force commander General Roméo Dallaire’s 
Shake	Hands	with	the	Devil;	Kigali sector commander Colonel Luc Marchal’s 
Rwanda:	La	descente	aux	enfers;	and a more recent memoir, Rwanda 1994 and 
the Failure of the United Nations Mission, by Captain Amadou Deme, a Sen-
egalese officer of both the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group and 
UNAMIR. For a ground-level account of genocide’s terror, there are the 
stories by survivors or their families: Paul Rusesabagina’s An Ordinary Man, 
Immaculée Ilibagiza’s Left to Tell, or Marie Umutesi’s Surviving the Slaugh-
ter. In this same category are the now-classic essays by Philip Gourevitch 
based on accounts of survivors and gathered under the title We Wish to 
Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families.
 At middle distance from the events, we find a number of careful assess-
ments. Jean-Pierre Chrétien and associates analyze a damning collection of 
pictures, cartoons, and media pronouncements in Rwanda: Les médias du 
genocide. The Canadian International Development Research Centre, host-
ing a tenth-anniversary symposium on media, published the symposium’s 
results as edited by Allan Thompson, The Media and Rwanda Genocide. 
That same year, Linda Melvern produced a hard-hitting, well-documented 
critique in Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. The sifting of a re-
search symposium and the editorial work of Howard Adelman and Astri 
Surke turned the Nordic-funded, five-volume Evaluation of Emergency Assis-
tance to Rwanda into The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to 
Zaire. Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers, while elucidating 
the regional context, also offers theoretical and anecdotal insights into the 
meanings of identity, race, and political violence in Rwanda’s genocide.
 Most of these studies accepted the standard scenario: that genocide 
was born out of enmity for Tutsi and planned by Hutu extremists who 
brought down Habyarimana’s airplane, took over the government, mobi-
lized the masses by media invective, and organized military and militia to 
lead the people in carrying out genocide.
Prelude to Genocide
234
 Three books derived from pregenocide social analysis and postgeno-
cide fieldwork began to challenge that scenario. The first out was Peter 
Uvin’s Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, published in 
1998. Uvin had taught in Rwanda and served on development missions 
there before the civil war and genocide. After a thorough examination of 
scholarly literature on genocide (chapter 10), he argues that the genocide in 
Rwanda emanated not just from elite manipulation and coercion but from 
a long history of social violence abetted by the development process and a 
pervasive social attachment to racist values.
 In 2006, Scott Straus published The Order of Genocide, which was de-
rived from a field inquiry that sought a framework that would explain the 
killing. His conclusions from interview data were that war, state power, and 
ethnic categorization drove the genocide. But situations mattered; Rwan-
dans killed not out of long-standing hatred, deprivation, or greed but be-
cause, in given situations, they calculated that compliance was less costly 
than opposition.
 In 2009 Lee Ann Fujii, in Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, 
draws similar conclusions, not from a nationwide survey but from her in-
teraction with villagers in two different Rwandan regions. There and in 
prison interviews, Fujii found that ethnic hatred or ethnic fear does not 
explain genocidal violence. Rather, state-sponsored violence acted as a 
script in which social ties or group dynamics mediated local performance. 
Genocide emerged from social interaction at the local level, which exerted 
powerful pressure to join the violence and powerful identities for continu-
ing the genocide.
 A frontal challenge to the standard scenario came in 2005 from Abdul 
Joshua Ruzibiza, an RPF commando and key witness in the judicial in-
quiry of Judge Bruguière. In Rwanda: L’histoire secrète, he claims that, after 
the 1990 invasion, Paul Kagame and Tutsi extremists perpetrated terrorist 
acts across Rwanda, including shooting down Habyarimana’s plane. Some 
of Ruzibiza’s story has been seconded by a high RPF official. In Healing 
a Nation, former RPF executive secretary Theogene Rudasingwa directly 
asserts that RPA commander Kagame ordered the downing of President 
Habyarimana’s plane. Presidential counselor Enoch Ruhigira in Rwanda: 
La fin tragique d’un régime portrays Habyarimana not as a despot but as a leader 
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trying to hold the political factions of his country together. Captain Deme’s 
book, Rwanda 1994 and the Failure of the United Nations Mission, questions the 
standard view on the famous January informant and whether Hutu ex-
tremists did indeed down Habyarimana’s plane.
 Over the last ten years, documents released and testimony given dur-
ing French investigation into the downing of the aircraft and during the 
procedures of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
have spawned a number of works fully rejecting the standard story. Peter 
Erlinder, in The Accidental Genocide, uses ICTR documents, testimony, 
and decisions to assert that the ex-leaders of Rwanda did not conspire to 
commit genocide and that the RPF was responsible for downing Habyari-
mana’s plane, thereby triggering the spontaneous revenge that followed. 
In Enduring Lies, Edward Herman and David Peterson dissect how the 
Kagame regime and its allies in the West have used the charge of genocide 
to cover over RPF atrocities in Rwanda and Congo and justify support for 
the current regime. Most recently, Barrie Collins, with a foreword from an 
ICTR defense lawyer, ranges broadly through Central African history, the 
war period, and the postwar explanations of genocide in Rwanda 1994: The 
Myth of the Akazu Genocide Conspiracy and Its Consequences. His claim is that 
the myth of the Akazu genocide conspiracy sustains Africa’s first morally 
constituted tyranny.
 The most carefully researched study of recent date is André Guicha-
oua’s From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1940. Based on 
long experience as a researcher in Rwanda, deep access as an expert wit-
ness for the prosecution to the Rwandan Tribunal’s records, and his own 
long contacts with Rwandan officialdom, the book implicates the RPF 
in prewar terror and assassinations, while detailing the inner struggles of 
Habyarimana’s leadership within the MRND.
 My own study has been about the Arusha political negotiations, a pre-
lude to the genocide. As regards who shot down President Habyarimana’s 
plane, I remain agnostic; absent more affirmative evidence, I can only re-
view the explanations others have given (see endnote 1). I do know that the 
assassination rekindled civil war and unleashed genocide. I was there and 
saw the killings begin. I also witnessed the devastation in human life and 
material welfare when I returned to Kigali on July 24, the first diplomat 
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back in country after the installation of the new government. Briefly 
summarized, that story as I experienced it follows.
The History
 Already in the evening of April 6, as news of Habyarimana’s plane 
crash spread by word of mouth, walkie-talkie, and telephone across Kigali, 
military and militia set up roadblocks to seize Tutsi and Hutu partisans 
of the internal opposition. Shortly after midnight, tracer bullets lit the sky 
as machine gun and mortar fire punctuated the silence across the valley 
between the presidential guard and Kigali army headquarters; elements of 
the Rwandan army were fighting for ascendency. By morning light, reports 
on our embassy radio net told of house-to-house searches in residential 
districts with summary killings of civilians, both Tutsi and Hutu. The 
insecurity was such that Western ambassadors and UN leadership, who 
were to meet with Rwandan government officials at 9:00 a.m. at our resi-
dence, could not get past the roadblocks. The government representatives 
who came to the meeting turned back my plea that they make common 
cause with the Rwandese Patriotic Front in restoring peace.4 The represen-
tatives rejected as well my offer of a US forensic mission to determine the 
cause of the plane crash, and they left shortly to deal with “rogue forces.”
 By midmorning, reports were coming in of ministers of the then 
government being hunted down and murdered. The prime minister was 
assassinated in the UN compound in which she had sought refuge, while 
Belgian paratroopers sent to protect her were stopped, told to hand over 
their weapons, taken to military headquarters, and brutally massacred. 
I learned of the whereabouts of the prime minister-designate, Faustin 
Twagiramungu, and was able to direct a UN armored carrier to his res-
cue. But shortly thereafter, UN forces that were to secure Kigali and the 
airport were ordered to barracks, leaving locals and expatriates to their 
own devices.
 Most of the RPF political leadership had already departed from Kigali 
to their headquarters at the Mulindi tea plantation. From there the RPF, 
through the mediation of the UN, let it be known that the killing must 
stop before any truce talks could begin.5 Meanwhile General Kagame, 
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commander of the Rwandese Patriotic Army, released his forces from their 
cantonments and started a three-pronged drive toward Kigali.
 Although I had recommended evacuating most US personnel but 
leaving behind a residual team who would work to restore peace, the State 
Department ordered the embassy closed; US personnel evacuated overland 
to Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi. Belgium, France, and Italy organized 
airlift operations.6 By April 15, most expatriates had left the country. Such 
was the fury at the assassination of President Habyarimana that revenge 
massacres had started already the day afterward, and in broad daylight. 
But it is also true that the genocide exploded without restraint after the 
witnessing eyes of expatriates had left. Whether a residual diplomatic or 
NGO presence in Kigali would have made a difference remains an un-
answered question.
 The force that could have intervened to stop the violence and restore 
security was that of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda 
(UNAMIR). But UNAMIR had a chapter 6 peacekeeping mandate 
whose rules of engagement had been so reduced by UN headquarters as to 
make the troops useless in the first element of its mandate, “to contribute 
to the security of the city of Kigali.”7 Within an hour after the plane went 
down, Force Commander Dallaire called me to report that UN forces at 
the airport seeking to investigate the air crash had had to turn their weap-
ons over to the presidential guard. I telephoned the State Department to 
advise that unless the UN force received a new mandate and the materiel 
to carry out that mandate, it would not be able to hold things together.
 After Belgian paratroopers were brutally massacred the following 
day, the Belgian parliament demanded the recall of its battalion; the Ban-
gladesh government did the same. Only the strong arguments of Force 
Commander Dallaire, interventions by the Nigerian and other permanent 
representatives at the Security Council, and active insistence from the 
OAU kept the UN from closing its mission. Eventually, Resolution 912 
(1994) reduced UNAMIR to a mediating and monitoring role with per-
sonnel levels set at about 270 troops and civilian staff.8 Brave forces from 
Canada, Ghana, Tunisia, and other rehatted OAU observers protected 
thousands in Amahoro stadium right across from UNAMIR headquar-
ters, and at sites around Kigali. They also operated evacuation convoys for 
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hundreds trapped behind hostile lines and undertook missions north and 
south to stop the slaughter. Of the many NGOs present in Rwanda before 
the violence broke out, only the International Committee of the Red Cross 
stayed through, often under fire, keeping two hospitals open (sometimes 
with staff from Doctors without Borders) and establishing liaison with 
both sides.
 As the UN Security Council debated the mandate and composition 
of UNAMIR II,9 RPF forces moved down the eastern side of the coun-
try, encircling Kigali from the south while harrying the government west 
to Gitarama. Under the new mandate of Resolution 918, which included 
protection for civilians at risk, UNAMIR was to get more equipment and 
more troops. But US surplus armored personnel carriers, having finally 
emerged from the morass of US and UN procurement procedures by June 
6, got stuck in Entebbe, Uganda, without onward transportation.10 The 
first reinforcements of fifty Ghanaians arriving under the expanded man-
date did not show up until June 8. By June 17, when UNAMIR II plans 
projected forty-six hundred soldiers on the ground, troop strength was 
slightly over five hundred.11 By this time, the RPF had surrounded Kigali, 
pushed the government out of Gitarama, and organized its own relief 
operations in the large areas of the country under its control.
 What the RPF had not yet taken was the land along the mountainous 
Congo-Nile divide and on over to Lake Kivu. Thousands of displaced per-
sons had fled before the RPF advance toward Rwanda’s southwest quad-
rant. On the western side of the mountains, defenseless Tutsi faced roving 
bands of militia. France decided to carry out a short-term, multinational 
intervention in the area to protect threatened civilians and secure humani-
tarian aid, pending a takeover by UNAMIR forces. While many states 
questioned France’s motives, the Security Council approved a two-month 
intervention under a peacemaking (chapter 7) mandate.12 Opération 
Turquoise launched into Rwanda on June 24, confining its operations to 
Cyangugu and Gikongoro provinces, thus avoiding interposition between 
the RPF and government forces, which were now being pushed to the 
northwest from the government’s temporary capital at Gisenyi.13
 This Opération had several long-term effects. First, although massa-
cres continued against Tutsi enclaves within the humanitarian zone, the 
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French forces, moving continuously about the zone, did save thousands of 
lives, both Tutsi and Hutu. Second, the presence of French forces served as 
a magnet to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons who found refuge 
and sustenance in camps within the zone. Third, although France claimed 
neutrality, the RPF had only grudgingly acquiesced in the intervention; 
government officials and partisans, however, saw the French as rescuers. 
Under the limitations of their humanitarian mandate, French forces did 
not disarm government security forces nor prohibit government officials 
from seeking refuge within the zone. The inability to stop all massacres 
of vulnerable populations, the creation of displaced-persons camps, and 
the harboring of government elements within the zone were to pose re-
sidual political problems both for Rwanda and for France’s relations with 
the Rwandese Patriotic Front, which now pressed on to victory elsewhere 
in the country.14
 By July 4, government forces pulled out of Kigali, leaving the capital 
in RPF control. Pushing toward Gisenyi, the RPF forced the government 
and its forces, followed by some two million refugees, across the border 
toward Goma, Zaire. As a humanitarian disaster loomed in Goma, the 
RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire on July 18 and swore in a government 
of national unity on July 19.15 I returned five days later to a capital that was 
deadly quiet and totally secure.
 Even as contingents began to deploy for a UNAMIR force of fifty-
five hundred in Rwanda, the international community’s focus turned from 
the settlement of Rwanda’s civil war to the humanitarian challenge the 
war had created on Rwanda’s borders. On the lava fields of Goma, cholera 
broke out, food and fresh water were hardly available, and thousands were 
dying each day. The United States’ Operation Restore Hope opened the 
Kigali airport for heavy airlift, largely as a means of coping with the re-
gional humanitarian emergency.
 Having pushed the government and its forces out of Rwanda, the RPF 
invested all parts of the country, eventually moving into Zone Turquoise, 
which UNAMIR peacekeepers had taken over from the French in late 
August.16 The Rwandese Patriotic Front stopped the genocide, won the 
war, and now set up a government of national unity, configured along the 
Arusha framework but dominated politically and militarily by the Front. 
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The MRND, the party of President Habyarimana, once politically as-
cendant, was immediately outlawed. By the time Rwandans got to vote 
in a national election, the MDR, Twagiramungu’s party, was prohibited 
as well. Eventually, General Kagame, initially installed as vice president, 
withstanding challenges from without and from within the RPF, took over 
the presidency and then won three elections by overwhelming percentages. 
With democratic sanction, autocratic executive rule returned to Rwanda; 
the RPF dominated the legislature and co-opted the political arena, replac-
ing both the multiparty politics of the 1991 constitution and the single-
party regime instituted in 1978.
The Lessons
 In the hundred days following the downing of Habyarimana’s plane, 
eight hundred thousand innocents were brutally massacred in a rampaging 
genocide; thousands more died in targeted hillside massacres as the RPF 
asserted control.17 The international community, which began intervening 
in October 1990 to reestablish peace in Rwanda, failed to stop the atroci-
ties. Concerned states and international organizations had helped devise 
the Arusha Accords under which Rwandans would observe the rule of law, 
share power, and provide a secure life to all. But the international com-
munity was not able to establish on Rwanda’s political soil the institutions 
enumerated in the accords. The UN mission, deployed to accompany the 
peace process through a transition to a new constitutional order, was not 
able to stop the renewal of war or the launching of genocide.18
 In view of such disastrous failure, wherein was the international en-
gagement for peace deficient? One must first ask whether the peace proj-
ect could ever have been achieved. The RPF were determined to depose 
Habyarimana and transform the Rwandan polity. Habyarimana was 
similarly determined to preserve the institutions he helped create and to 
emerge in control at the end of the transition. Was this an intractable con-
flict? Where was the middle ground in this struggle for power? The states 
of the region, major donors as well as the OAU and, more latterly, the 
United Nations, endued with a diplomatic sense of fair play and give and 
take, thought that a negotiated peace was possible and sustainable.
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 But the international community underestimated the deep-seated 
complexities of Rwandan culture and the force of antagonisms fueled by 
Rwanda’s history. Against this complexity, the classic modes of diplomatic 
negotiation could not prevail. A negotiated peace clearly was not sustain-
able, at least not under the terms of the Arusha Accords.
 Moreover, as the parties came to a supposed agreement at Arusha, 
the Security Council conceived the role of a neutral international force 
in classic peacekeeping terms.19 Of the Security Council’s five permanent 
members, only France wanted a robust force. China was as usual ambigu-
ous about peacekeeping intervention. The United Kingdom, Russia, and 
especially the United States wanted low budgets and minimal deployment. 
General Dallaire never got the equipment or the troops he requested for 
a mobile reaction force. The United States added an insistence on using 
the crisis in Rwanda as a training ground for OAU peacekeepers, despite 
the OAU’s poor record in deploying and reinforcing its observer force. A 
minimalist peacekeeping strategy failed.
 In the Arusha process, the international interveners failed to pick up 
on two clear warnings. On the one hand, the dominant party, the MRND, 
and the dominant power, the presidency, did not want to be marginalized 
or put in a position where they could not defend their vision for Rwanda 
within the government or the national assembly. Yet, absent some adjust-
ment, the bishops’ allocations for power sharing in the government spelled 
the end of the Habyarimana regime, as did the decision-making majorities 
of two-thirds in the government or three-fourths in the assembly.
 Any hope that somehow it would all work out through goodwill was 
dashed by the attempted coup and assassination of President Ndadaye in 
Burundi. The lesson was clear: not to adjust the power-sharing protocol 
so as to have institutional guarantees for the incumbent party and presi-
dent, supported by an international presence, was political suicide for the 
Habyarimana regime.
 On the other hand, the regime persisted in allowing communal vio-
lence to erupt whenever negotiations moved toward accommodation with 
RPF interests. The tactic, which had worked historically, backfired, fueling 
RPF’s determination to take control politically and to hold a position of 
equity in the integration of security forces. Ethnic violence in the north in 
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January 1993, following weeks of political stalemate in Kigali over terms of 
the power-sharing protocol, triggered an RPF attack that pushed close to 
Kigali, created a huge movement of displaced persons, and greatly weak-
ened the government’s position in subsequent negotiations. A new gov-
ernment, cobbled together out of political factions, ceded to the RPF’s 
interests on military integration, thus creating an agreement that large 
parts of the Rwandan body politic found threatening. A durable accord 
needed something that all major political players could accept.
 The international community considered it a victory during the ne-
gotiations when the RPF gave up its various proposals for a collective 
executive and accepted a formula for power sharing based on the govern-
ment proposal. This proposal, in effect, expanded notions of multiparty-
ism inscribed in the constitution of 1991. Power was to be devolved from 
the president to a “broad-based” government open only to parties then in 
government and to the RPF. The problem was that this formula allowed 
the self-appointed political elite sitting in government to perpetuate their 
power by fiat without ever testing their mandate through electoral scrutiny. 
Nor were members of government willing to seek a referendum on the 
terms of the Arusha Accords, which buttressed the elites’ hold on power 
with international sanction.
 But when those same elite split their parties in contests for position 
and power in the transition regime, there was no provision in Rwandan law 
or procedures in the accords for putting Humpty Dumpty back together. 
It was divisions in the MDR and the Liberal Party that kept the interim 
government and assembly from being installed. Governments do derive 
their just powers from the consent of the governed, but that principle was 
never given credence in the Arusha process.
 The lack of institutional guarantees for the regime in power, the lack 
of security guarantees for the insurgent Tutsi, the shaky basis for political 
power built on elite parties, and the failure to ground the Arusha Accords 
in any popular referent left a most vulnerable and fragile peace. For the 
peace process to succeed, the international community needed quickly to 
assert strong political leadership and deploy a vigorous international force. 
At the time of the signing in Arusha, the Organization of African Unity 
was the organization on the ground. The OAU, which never had a political 
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presence in Kigali, disengaged after the accords were signed in August, 
leaving its Neutral Military Observers Group in place to be integrated into 
an eventual UN force.20 But the political baton was not picked up until the 
secretary general’s special representative arrived on November 23. Minister 
Booh-Booh then proved ineffectual in moving the peace process forward.
 The Arusha Accords signed on August 5, 1993, had called for a neutral 
international force to be in place by September 10. It was clear by August 
that the OAU Observer force could not get up to speed to support the in-
terim peace process. That left the job to the UN. But Boutros-Ghali would 
not send a reconnaissance team to Rwanda until the accords were signed; 
after that, the UN bureaucracy moved with due deliberation in preparing 
the secretary general’s report proposing a UN peacekeeping force. Such a 
force was so critically necessary that the government and the RPF sent a 
joint mission to leverage a quick vote. Meanwhile, the United States, which 
pressed hard for speedy submission of the secretary general’s report, could 
not give assurance that it would vote for the mission. Pressure from the 
contenders, and at highest levels from France and Belgium, finally over-
came US reluctance as the Security Council, on October 5, approved the 
deployment of UNAMIR. Force Commander Dallaire, already in Uganda 
commanding the UN border-monitoring mission, traveled to Kigali with 
a small staff on October 21, the day after President Ndadaye’s assassination 
in Burundi. Although General Dallaire and his team moved with great 
speed in setting up the force, one wonders what might have happened if 
an accompanying international mission had been in place and developing 
confidence in the peace process before the tragic events in Burundi gave the 
skeptics their day.21
 As Convener, Facilitator, or Observer at the Arusha political nego-
tiations, the international interveners brokered political negotiations that 
failed to meet either side’s deeply held needs. They then sought to bolster 
the implementation of the agreements with a lightweight, poorly equipped 
peacekeeping mission that did not meet the force commander’s minimum 
needs. Moreover, the peacekeeping office in New York had rejected the 
force commander’s recommendation for aggressive action to enforce the 
terms of the Arusha agreement in January and in April reduced the force’s 
rules of engagement to the point where units could not defend themselves.22 
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The UN leadership was determined to win the peace diplomatically, but 
the parties were not playing a diplomatic game.
 The allure of diplomatic options also beclouded efforts to stop the 
killing and restore peace as civil war recommenced and genocide erupted. 
There was an initial effort under OAU auspices to bring the parties back 
to Arusha, but whereas the RPF would talk to Rwandan military forces, 
it would not recognize or deal with the self-proclaimed government so 
obviously complicit in the murder of political opponents and genocidal 
massacres of Tutsi civilians. Accompanying Assistant Secretary of State 
John Shattuck on a mission to regional capitals, I was told to prepare for a 
return to Arusha at a moment’s notice. The moment never came.
 Nonetheless, interlocutors continued to insist on ceasefires and a re-
vival of “Arusha principles” as though there were two legitimate parties 
and a common ground on which to build peace for a future Rwanda. 
Pleas for a ceasefire became a litany in contacts with the RPF, as did pleas 
to stop the killing in calls to the self-proclaimed government.23 To the very 
end, the conceit behind these requests was that a ceasefire could be turned 
into a negotiation in which the various parties of the Rwandan political 
landscape would be accommodated. Power sharing was still the goal. The 
RPF were being asked to forswear victory in the interests of national rec-
onciliation; the dream of Arusha held sway.24
 The goal of international intervention since the RPF incursion in 1990 
had been to restore peace to Rwanda and succor to its populations. When 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, the international 
effort for peace needed overweening force, not more diplomacy. The quick-
est way to assert that was to reinforce UNAMIR with a fighting man-
date, adequate materiel, and battalions willing to use force.25 There is no 
gainsaying the difficulty of making that happen. UNAMIR belatedly got 
a new mandate on May 17, but no significant materiel until late June and 
no reinforcements until the war was effectively over. Minister Booh-Booh 
withdrew, leaving his political duties to General Dallaire. Dallaire was to 
mediate for a truce as the first step in returning to the Arusha process for 
rebuilding the Rwandan state.26 Had UNAMIR been reinforced in time, 
it would have confronted the discredited but vengeful presidential guard 
and multiple militias, on the one hand, and a disciplined RPA released 
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from their barracks by General Kagame, who wanted no international in-
terpositional force on the ground, on the other hand. But with timely deploy-
ments, before the course of the war was set, a reinforced UNAMIR could 
have stopped the genocide.27
 Once the Rwandese Patriotic Front had won the war and established a 
government of national unity, international partners judged the new order 
by its resemblance to the Arusha pattern. International organizations and 
bilateral partners needed a state to deal with, but one built to their own 
model: cooperative, inclusive, and reconciled.28 The new regime sought 
rather to demonstrate its independence by controlling movements of mili-
tary and human rights observers, canceling a large international program 
of judicial assistance, expelling many nongovernmental agencies, voting 
against the International Criminal Court for Rwanda, and forcibly sup-
pressing displaced-persons camps in the southwest, while accepting, only 
under intense diplomatic pressure, the continuance of a much-reduced 
UNAMIR mission.
 The Rwandan tragedy has two distinct phases: the era of sporadic civil 
war and political negotiations that this study covers; and the era of geno-
cide and all-out war that followed the downing of the president’s plane. 
The state-centric focus of international humanitarian intervention in 
Rwanda poorly fit the needs of the complex humanitarian crisis generated 
in either phase. When faced with low-level interests in Central Africa and 
electorates leery of interventions in distant places, states sought out what 
other states might do before taking action to succor the helpless. As a mat-
ter of policy, the United States deferred to Belgium and France throughout 
the Arusha negotiations. But to demonstrate the “rigor” of the Clinton ad-
ministration’s peacekeeping stance, the United States nearly vetoed a UN 
peacekeeping mission. With the deployment of UNAMIR, the feckless 
pace of international diplomacy was in the hands of the UN, which lacked 
the insight, the will, or the force to lead the peace process to completion.
 When the president’s plane went down and the violence erupted in the 
capital city, the first and natural thought was of self-preservation. States 
that had worked lockstep in humanitarian intervention now organized 
their own evacuations as UN forces retreated to barracks. The interna-
tional consensus was broken. Weeks of Security Council debate ensued 
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while the killing went on in Rwanda. The tragedy here was both in the 
slowness of the international response and in the conceit that the Arusha 
process could be resurrected, that an internationally brokered ceasefire was 
all that was needed.
 If ever there was a moment when the plight of “the least of these” 
should have captured the heart and driven the actions of the international 
community, it was after April 6, 1994, in Rwanda. But to override notions 
of state sovereignty and diplomatic propriety with an international rescue 
operation would have taken great-power leadership. No state stepped for-
ward. By the time world leaders had resolved their differences and set their 
policy through the Security Council, it was too late. Rwandans settled 
their own accounts, with reverberations that are still heard today.
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chronoloGy
1600 Reign of Mwami Ruganzu Ndoori Nyginya dynasty
1894 Count von Gertzen discovers Lake Kivu
1896 Musinga supplants his brother Rutarindwa as mwami (king) at 
Runcunshu
1897 Germany offers Musinga a letter of protection
1907 Germany establishes civil administration by indirect rule
1916 Belgian forces push Germans out of Rwanda and Burundi
1919 League of Nations Mandate Commission approves the Belgian 
mandate for the territory of Ruanda-Urundi
1931 Belgians depose Musinga and install Rudahigwa as mwami
1947 Ruanda-Urundi becomes a Trust Territory under the United Nations
1959–60 Social revolution and death of Mwami Rudahigwa results in 
overturn of the monarchy and establishment of a republic
1962 United Nations recognizes independence of the Republic of 
Rwanda with Grégoire Kayibanda as president
1963, ’64, ’66 Exiles attempt a return to power, unleashing Hutu violence 
against local Tutsi
1973 April–June: National Guard is called out to quell preelectoral 
violence
 July 5: National Guard high command takes over power as Com-
mittee for Peace and National Unity. Guard commander 
Major General Juvénal Habyarimana named president
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1975 Habyarimana institutes the Revolutionary National Movement 
for Development
1978 Referendum approves a new constitution and the single-party 
state
1990 July 5: Habyarimana promises multiparty democracy, refugee  
return
 October 1: Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invades from Uganda
1991 March 29: N’sele Ceasefire Agreement
 September 16: Gbadolite Ceasefire Agreement
1992 April 7: A multiparty coalition government is sworn in with Dr. 
Dismas Nsengiyaremye, a leader of the opposition Demo-
cratic Republican Movement (MDR), as prime minister
 June 6–9: Ceasefire talks in Paris
 July 12: Amended N’sele Ceasefire signed in Arusha (Arusha I)
 August 11–18: Negotiations on the rule of law (Arusha II)
 September 8–18: Negotiations on power sharing (Arusha III)
 October 6–30: Negotiations on power sharing (Arusha IV)
 November 23: Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira returns to 
Arusha without instructions
1993 January 9: Ngulinzira signs protocol on power sharing against 
president’s wishes
 January: Ethnic violence breaks out in northwest Rwanda
 February 8: RPF attack across front lines, then offer a truce
 March 5–7: Dar es Salaam summit restores ceasefire and Arusha 
negotiations
 March 16: Delegations return to Arusha to negotiate military inte-
gration and refugee questions (Arusha V)
 June 9: Protocol on refugees signed
 July 23: Negotiations move to Kinihira in the demilitarized zone 
in Rwanda




 August 5: Arusha Accords signed
 October 5: UN Security Council votes Resolution 872 establish-
ing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR)
 October 21: Tutsi military assassinate President Melchior Nda-
daye in Burundi
 October 22: UNAMIR force commander Roméo Dallaire and 
staff deploy to Rwanda
 November–December: Massacres and assassinations in northwest
1994 January 5: Habyarimana sworn in as interim president under the 
Arusha Accords
 January–April: Multiple failed attempts to install the transitional 
government and national assembly
 February 21: Minister of Public Works Gatabazi is assassinated
 April 6: President’s plane is shot down, killing President Habyari-
mana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira, staffs, 
and crew
 April 6: Civil war is relaunched and genocide unleashed
 July 4: RPF take over Kigali
 July 18: Government and refugees harried into Zaire; RPF de-
clares unilateral ceasefire




Documents with the notation (AC) are from the author’s collection, archived 
at George Fox University in Newberg, Oregon.
prolo gue
1. The common English adjective for Rwanda is “Rwandan”; however, in their 
own documents, the Front keeps the French spelling “Rwandese,” as in Rwandese 
Patriotic Front and Rwandese Patriotic Army. This study keeps to the adjective 
form that the Front has chosen.
2. By “international humanitarian intervention,” I mean actions by states and 
interstate actors that abridge national sovereignty (intervene) in the interest of 
preserving human life and restoring peace in a particular country. Finnemore 
similarly defines humanitarian intervention as “deploying military force across 
borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence.” 
Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53. Fassin argues that natural disasters 
and human conflict “are now embedded in the same global logic of intervention . . . and 
the conflation of political and moral registers.” Didier Fassin and Mariella Pan-
dolfi, eds., Contemporary States of Disaster (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 10. My 
definition admits of any actions of “coercive inducement” that abrogate sovereign 
jurisdiction. See Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, with Chantall de Jonge 
Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises (Washing-
ton, DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 21–24.
3. Throughout this study, the capitalized terms “Observer,” “Facilitator,” or 
“Convener” indicate an official status at the Arusha peace negotiations, as distin-
guished from other observers, facilitators, or conveners in other situations.
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4. The document, formally entitled Peace Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, is commonly called the 
“Arusha Accords” since it incorporates seven different protocols signed at differ-
ent times in the Arusha peace process.
5. For details on the coup, see Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda: Droit 
public et évolution politique, 1916–1973 (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l’Afrique Cen-
trale, 1985), 506–8. Reyntjens records that Habyarimana, initially loyal to Presi-
dent Kayibanda, had his hand forced first by Kabyibanda’s attempt to purge the 
administration of suspect northern elements and then by the impatience of other 
officers, especially Lt. Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe. The Committee for Peace and 
National Unity had seven of eleven officers from Rwanda’s northern prefectures.
6. The manifesto and statutes for the movement were published on the 
second anniversary of the coup. See Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le 
Développement, Manifeste et Statut, Kigali, 5 Juillet, 1995 (AC).
7. Ron Rosenbaum, Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil 
(Boston: Da Capo, 2014), chap. 14.
8. Cited in Michael Ignatieff, “The Art of Witness,” New York Review of Books 
42, no. 5 (March 23, 1995). See also Czesław Miłosz, The Witness of Poetry (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
9. Joseph C. Miller, “Beyond Blacks, Bondage, and Blame: Why a Multi-
centric World History Needs Africa,” Historically Speaking 6, no. 2 (November/
December 2004): 7, 11.
10. Ibid., 8.
11. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998 [1958]), 192.
12. Ibid.
13. See the epilogue for a review of this literature.
14. See the Belgian inquiry at http://www.senate.be/english/rwanda.html, 
and the French investigation at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers 
/rwanda/rapport.asp.
15. See “Report of the Conference,” The Rwandan Genocide: Can It Happen 
Again? The Paul Simon Center for Public Policy, University of Southern Illinois, 
Carbondale, 1999.
16. See United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996 (New 
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).
17. The majority of the documents in this study, then, have been taken from the 
archives of the Department of State or those of other US foreign affairs agencies. 
The documents are essentially of two kinds: Department of State telegraphic mes-
sages to and from embassies, and internal messages within the bureaucracy such as 
memoranda, background papers, and e-mails. I use in this study a simplified citation 
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system that identifies the document first by date, then by type, and finally by subject 
matter. Dates for telegraphic traffic use the abbreviated form found on the cable, 
that is, “28 Jun 92,” or “08 Aug 92,” with a six-digit number for the Department of 
State cables and a five-digit number for cables from embassies. 
These documents can be retrieved by referencing the document number and 
date from the National Security archive at nsarchive.org, or the State Depart-
ment’s Freedom of Information Act website: foia.state.gov. In these notes, docu-
ments marked “(AC)” are available in the author’s collection archived with other 
documents at George Fox University, Newberg, Oregon. 
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chapter 1 :  ceasefire
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au problème des réfugiés” (AC). The Amnesty Law, voted on November 12 and 
Notes to Pages 27–31
262
promulgated a month later, in essence ratifies the Dar es Salaam Declaration and 
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bito, who argued in and out of court for release of all those against whom there 
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any political party and was named as an “independent” minister of justice in the 
first postgenocide government.
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36. 02 Mar 92 Nairobi 00853, “The Church and Peace.” For further details on early 
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in stopping the conflict in Rwanda, the Department of State asked embassies in 
Paris and Brussels to be sure that the Belgian and French approach tracked with 
our own.
46. 29 Jul 91 Harare 06923, “GOR/RPF Meetings Make Little Progress.”
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5. See Dallaire, Shake Hands, 250–52. This established a pattern that persisted 
until the RPF finally won on the battlefield. International pleas for an end to 
communal violence and a ceasefire between forces was met by the RPF with the 
demand that killings stop before ceasefire talks begin and with the “government” 
riposte that it could not use forces to get militia under control until a ceasefire 
was in place. On the eve of April 7, it was the extremists within the Rwandan 
government forces who were calling the shots; the so-called interim government 
was not cobbled together until the next day. For details on the efforts of Theon-
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